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SUMMARY 
 
 
Shared residence was previously viewed with suspicion by the judiciary, but 
following D v D [2001] a line of cases has developed, where this order is said to 
benefit children, firstly, by helping them feel cherished, and, secondly, by improving 
parental cooperation and thus protect children from the harmful effects of exposure 
to their conflicts. This thesis reviews available research to conclude that shared 
residence is so unlikely to achieve either objective where it is ordered against a 
parent’s wishes, that the order should be restricted to families where both parents 
agree.  Autopoietic theory is combined with feminist critique to explain the self-
referential nature of law, its tendency to prioritise children’s abstract need for 
fathers and its inability to fully understand parents’ complex disputes.  The thesis 
compares the preconditions for, and use of, shared residence in England and in 
Sweden, concluding that despite better preconditions, Swedish court-imposed shared 
residence arrangements are unlikely to last, and can harm children by increasing 
their exposure to conflict. There is also, in contested cases, a worrying focus on 
equal rights for parents, with children who have grown up in these arrangements 
complaining of feeling objectified. This, combined with a growing emphasis in 
English case law on sending symbolic messages about status, is a strong argument 
against a shared residence presumption.  It seems naïve to assume that new, 
collaborative co-parenting patterns can develop after separation merely because law 
coerces the adults into a particular kind of formal arrangement.  The suspicion is 
therefore raised that law’s agenda is in fact something very different: to mask 
familial and societal change by making post-separation families conform to a 
binuclear pattern which resembles the nuclear ideal not only in membership but also 
in its hierarchical structure.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 SHARED RESIDENCE  
 
This thesis argues against a presumption in favour of shared residence, an 
arrangement where children of separated couples spend significant periods of time in 
both parents’ homes. Shared residence is also sometimes labelled joint physical 
custody, shared parenting, or joint residence; the Swedish term alternating residence 
has the advantage of describing the arrangement from a child’s perspective.  It is not 
only terminology which varies across jurisdictions, but also the amount of time 
required in each parent’s home for the arrangement to qualify as shared; this allows 
for misuse of the legal label to achieve objectives unrelated to the welfare of the 
individual children involved.  Therefore, shared residence should be understood to 
involve a substantial and equitable sharing of the responsibility for caring for the 
child.   
 
Shared residence is a demanding arrangement, for all parties.  Where parents choose 
to let their children remain in the matrimonial home and alternate themselves, the 
arrangement is almost invariably abandoned as too disruptive.1  Yet many children 
are made to endure frequent moves for years, and research shows that they pay a 
high price “in order to have equal access to both parents”.2  One Swedish teenager 
suggested: “Parents who force their children into this ought to try it for themselves 
for a while so they could see the problems.  Always lugging things around, 
forgetting your favourite jumper in one place and your mobile phone charger at the 
other house.  Adapting to a new environment and a new set of rules every week.  
Wondering where your home is.  Having the disappointment of hearing friends say: 
no, we didn’t phone you because we didn’t know which place you were at.”3  It is 
only having two very capable, sensitive parents that makes this bearable.  Thus, 
shared residence should be reserved for families where both parents choose and 
implement this arrangement without external involvement.   Empirical research 
                                                 
1  Socialstyrelsen (2004b) Växelvis Boende (2a upplagan), Stockholm, Socialstyrelsen, p24. 
2  Singer, A (2008) “Active Parenting or Solomon’s Justice?”, Utrecht Law Review, 35-47, p41.  
3  Letters page, Svenska Dagbladet, 6th November 2005.    
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shows that court-ordered shared residence is so unlikely to benefit children that such 
orders should not be made; children’s need for relationships with both parents is 
better met through the making of sole residence and contact orders.   
 
1.2 A DEVELOPING PRESUMPTION? 
 
Since the thesis argues against a presumption in favour of shared residence, it must 
be asked why such a presumption is likely to develop.   In previous decades, courts 
tended to start from a presumption against shared residence on the grounds that it 
denied children much-needed stability.4   Shared residence is still comparatively 
unusual, but is preferred by increasing numbers of parents, while courts have tended 
to overcome their misgivings.5  The Court of Appeal stated in the landmark case of 
D v D [2001] that courts should not require exceptional or unusual circumstances, 
but simply apply the paramountcy test. Shared residence orders were said to benefit 
children in two ways: by reflecting the realities of the situation and by signalling 
clearly that both parents are of equal importance and should cooperate rather than 
seek to undermine or exclude each other.6    In subsequent case law, greater emphasis 
has been put on the symbolic messages than on the need to ensure that the order 
reflects realities, and shared residence is used in high conflict cases.7  A presumption 
is developing through gradual judicial reinterpretation of existing precedent.  
Judicial views of when shared residence is in children’s best interests are rightly said 
to lack a firm foundation in empirical research.8   Parallels have been drawn with the 
development of a de facto presumption in favour of contact, where it is now 
recognised that serious risks to children were wrongly ignored or held to be 
outweighed by the supposed general benefits of contact.9  Furthermore, critics have 
doubted that giving parents formal equality through a court order will make them 
more willing, or able, to co-parent effectively.  Instead, it has been suggested that 
                                                 
4  Riley v Riley [1986] 2 FLR 429.  
5  Peacey, V & Hunt, J (2008) Problematic Contact after Separation and Divorce?, London. One Parent 
Families/Gingerbread, p19; Gilmore, S (2006b) “Court Decision-Making in Shared Residence Order 
Cases”, 18(4) CFLQ, 478-498, p485. 
6 D v D [2001] [2001] 1 FLR 495. 
7  A v A [2004] EWHC 142; Re R [2009] EWCA Civ 358 per Wall LJ at [30].  
8  Gilmore (2006b) op cit n5, p487.  
9  Gilmore, S (2008) “The Assumption that Contact is Beneficial: Challenging the ‘Secure Foundation’”, Fam 
Law 1226-1229, p1227.  
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shared residence orders will in many cases only provide fathers with an opportunity 
to control or harass mothers and children.10   
 
1.3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES  
 
This thesis uses autopoietic theory and combines this with a feminist perspective to 
examine the legal frameworks and case law developments of the chosen 
jurisdictions.  Autopoietic theory is helpful in several ways.  Its description of 
society as one large, primary system, which contains a number of closed, self-
referring specialised subsystems can explain why interaction between law and other 
subsystems such as politics, the different sciences, or litigants, is so difficult, and 
why law reforms often prove ineffective or counterproductive.11  Autopoietic theory 
can be used to provide a realistic assessment of what can be achieved through law; 
this is particularly important since English courts are currently making a number of 
optimistic assumptions regarding the benefits of shared residence. 
 
Furthermore, autopoietic theory can be employed to explain why presumptions 
develop and particular points of view become entrenched within subsystems since 
information cannot move across subsystems’ borders; instead, new versions of the 
information are created within the recipient subsystem.  These simplified versions 
are structured to achieve a better fit with the subsystem’s existing cognitive 
framework.  They are then refined; definitions, assessments and recommendations 
become increasingly rigid as they circle the closed chains of communication.  Thus, 
the “complexities and ambiguities” of scientific knowledge about what is good for 
children are converted into legal certainties, with no need to make further reference 
to external authorities.12  Law has also imperfectly translated into its binary codes 
recommendations from mediation as well as post-liberal and communitarian ideas of 
individual responsibility. The result is an inflexible insistence that separating 
parents must be rational and conciliatory regardless of the emotional, financial or 
                                                 
10  Kaganas, F & Piper, C (2002) “Shared Parenting – a 70% Solution?” 14(4) CFLQ, 365-379.   
11  Teubner, G, Schiff, D & Nobles, R (2003) “The Autonomy of Law: Introduction to Legal Autopoiesis”, in 
Schiff, D & Nobles, R (Eds) Jurisprudence, London, Butterworths, p10. 
12  Barnett, A (2009a) “The Welfare of the Child Re-Visited: In Whose Best Interests? Part I” Fam Law, 50, 
p51; Teubner, G (1993) Law as an Autopoietic System, London, Blackwell, p56.  
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other stresses they are experiencing.  This places wholly unrealistic expectations on 
parents who are ordered to share residence.   
 
Autopoietic theorists have asserted that law retains epistemic authority not only 
through reinterpreting knowledge but also by rejecting much external information as 
irrelevant.  Similar observations have been made from a feminist perspective.  Law 
has been described as inherently male, preoccupied with formal, abstract rights, 
while ignoring arguments based on individual needs, relationships or contexts.13  
Feminist critique has also exposed the supposedly natural division into public and 
private spheres as a social construct, and has been useful in identifying law’s role in 
maintaining this dichotomy.  According to autopoietic theory, separate subsystems 
have developed from the general system of communications that is sometimes 
referred to as society.  Subsystems therefore start with an inherently patriarchal 
basic framework of communications.  The thesis examines feminist law reform 
strategies, concluding that successes have been limited because law, as an autopoietic 
subsystem, ‘thinks’ in a male way and therefore excludes from its considerations 
much of what it characterises as ‘female’.  This classification has significant 
consequences for law’s understanding of disputes between parents over children in 
general, and shared residence cases in particular.  Law’s inability to recognise the 
value of care has led to a focus on status and decision-making, a legal preoccupation 
with encouraging fatherhood and a greater readiness to use coercive measures 
against mothers.   According to autopoietic theory, law is not only unaware that its 
vision is partial; it also maintains epistemic authority by refusing to adjust its 
standards when litigants fail to meet them.  Autopoietic theory can, therefore, be 
utilised to explain the current insistence that parents can be taught to cooperate 
through the imposition of a shared residence order.   It also explains why such 
attempts to influence behaviour are unlikely to succeed and why law is unable to 
recognise how this harms children whose exposure to parental conflicts is increased 
by the frequent changes between households.   Finally, autopoietic theory can be 
combined with feminist theory to give an account of why law, which exists to 
dissolve conflicts and preserve existing power structures, wants all families to 
conform as far as possible to its existing, patriarchal, nuclear standard.   
                                                 
13  Abrams, K (2001) “The Second Coming of Care”, 76(3) Chicago-Kent Law Review, 1605-1617, p1607.   
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1.4 THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH  
 
This thesis focuses on two jurisdictions: England and Wales; and Sweden. 
Comparative studies typically involve a comparison of two systems where 
similarities and differences are identified, and the solutions utilized in different legal 
systems are evaluated.14  Comparisons can also be used to test theoretical assertions, 
identify different variables, and expose underlying norms which would otherwise be 
taken for granted.15   This thesis compares the approaches to shared residence in the 
two jurisdictions in order to draw conclusions regarding best practice.  The English 
case law on shared residence has developed rapidly in unchartered directions. Smart 
has correctly cautioned against the greater use of shared residence since not enough 
is known about how children experience such arrangements, and are affected by 
them.16   Bogdan has suggested: “Instead of guessing and risking less appropriate 
results, it would be better to use the enormous wealth of experience that is found in 
foreign legal systems”.17  This thesis argues that the experience from Sweden, 
research evidence and observations of English developments, combine to present a 
strong argument against a presumption.   
 
These jurisdictions have been chosen since they are both similar and significantly 
different.  These are two Western democracies where the last half century has seen 
dramatic changes in the patterns of family life (a decline in marriages, high but now 
stable divorce rates, and increases in cohabitation).18 Demographic changes have 
resulted in debates about the changing nature of families.19 However, there have 
been marked differences in these debates, possibly because of different 
understandings of desirable family forms and of law’s role in their regulation.20   In 
England, the family is conceptualised as an institution under threat, and it has been 
                                                 
14  De Cruz, P (2007) Comparative Law in a Changing World (3rd Ed), Abingdon, Routledge-Cavendish, p19; 
Bogdan, M (1994) Comparative Law, Deventer, Netherlands, Kluwer, p18.  
15  De Cruz (2007) op cit, n14, p11; Hantrais, L (2009) International Comparative Research: Theory, Methods and 
Practice, London, Palgrave, pp10-11 
16  Smart, C (2004) “Equal Shares: Rights for Fathers or Recognition for Children?” 24(4) Critical Social Policy, 
484-503, p485.  
17  Bogdan (1994) op cit n14, p29.  
18  Eurostat (2009) Europe in Figures, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, pp153-157.  
19  Angelin, A (1999) “Faderskap efter Separation”, 8 Socionomen, 37-40, p40.  
20  Ryrstedt, E (2007) “Tvistlösning mellan Separerade Föräldrar – för Barnets Bästa”, 0708(4) Svensk 
JuristTidning, 398-414, p398; Bradley, D (1990) “Children, Family and the State in Sweden”, 17(4) Journal of 
Law and Society 17, 427-444, p427. 
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observed that the “assumed naturalness” of the nuclear family has helped it retain its 
normative influence even though fewer women are now full-time housewives.21   
Mothers are implicitly expected to structure their involvement in the public sphere 
around their private caring responsibilities, which are conceptualised as matters of 
private choice.22    
 
Sweden has gained a reputation for innovative and often highly interventionist 
legislation.23   The dual-earner model, combined with generous parental leave, means 
mothers have a stronger attachment to the labour market and fathers have more 
opportunities for hands-on parenting.24  Swedish separated couples thus appear to 
have better preconditions for shared care; shared residence is not only more likely to 
benefit children but also to distribute the burdens of parenting fairly between the 
adults.  It is also more common in Sweden; and the courts encouraged its use at least 
a decade before the English Court of Appeal observed in D v D [2001] that shared 
residence did not require exceptional circumstances.25   The comparison of the two 
jurisdictions can, consequently, inform English debate.  
 
It is recognised that comparative study requires an awareness of the methodological 
pitfalls.26 Statistics are often either not available, or not comparable, but analysis of 
quantitative research is not a central part of this thesis.  There are sometimes no 
directly corresponding translations for legal terms; rules of interpretation may vary, 
as may the relative importance accorded to different sources of law.27  For example, 
travaux préparatoires play a much more significant part in the interpretation and 
development of Swedish family law, while the converse is true of case law.28   
Appellate judgments are brief and focus exclusively on statutory interpretation.29  
The author is bilingual and has lived in both jurisdictions; although these difficulties 
                                                 
21  Diduck, A (1995) “The Unmodified Family: The Child Support Act and the Construction of Legal 
Subjects”, 22(4) Journal of Law and Society, 527-548, p527.  
22  Land, H (2002) “Spheres of Care in the UK: Separate and Unequal”, 22(1) Critical Social Policy¸ 13-31. 
23  Ryrstedt (2007) op cit n20, p398; Pylkkänen, A (2007) “Liberal Family Law in the Making: Nordic and 
European Harmonisation”, 15(3) Feminist Legal Studies, 289-306, p294.  
24  De Los Reyes, P (2000) ”Folkhemmets Paradoxer”, Kvinnovetenskaplig Tidskrift, 27-47, p44.  
25  D v D [2001] 1 FLR 495, per Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P at p503. 
26  Bogdan (1994) op cit, n14, p18.  
27  Ibid, pp46-47.  
28  Ibid, pp45-46.  
29  De Cruz (2007) op cit n14, p266.  
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cannot be assumed to have been completely eliminated, every care has been taken to 
avoid significant inaccuracies.       
 
Moreover, a legal system cannot be understood in isolation.30 Autopoietic theory can 
be used to assert that systems are essentially closed; they change in response to 
external pressures, but in unpredictable ways. It can be difficult to ascertain the 
relative importance of economic, political, religious, geographical, demographic and 
other “accidental or unknown factors”, which all influence the development of a 
legal system.31  Consequently, a solution which is successful in one jurisdiction can 
be ineffective or even counterproductive elsewhere.32  This thesis examines shared 
residence law in a wider context.  Academic critique of the law, not only from 
feminist but also from practitioners’ perspectives, is used to gain a fuller picture of 
shared residence law in both jurisdictions.  Close attention is paid to comparative 
work by Swedish academics, which is used to ensure comparisons are 
contextualised.  This not only makes it possible to see the comparison from the 
alternative viewpoint, exposing implicit assumptions, but also helps to inform this 
evaluation of how different factors interact, and how the two legal systems differ in 
their understandings of the public/private dichotomy and the gendering of 
parenthood, yet are both inherently patriarchal.    
 
1.5 THE THESIS 
 
The first chapter of the thesis develops the theoretical framework that is used in 
later chapters.  After explaining autopoietic theory, it identifies the three main 
themes which can be found in the family law discourse of both jurisdictions.  The 
first is the inherently patriarchal nature of law which causes it to equate parenting 
with decision-making and focus on encouraging paternal involvement (often 
constructed in terms of decision-making), while ignoring the practical caring 
performed in the private sphere.   Secondly, it is argued that, although welfare 
discourse has now become so dominant that is impossible to articulate arguments 
any other way, the welfare test has also developed a uniquely legal meaning.  Law, as 
a closed system, often fails to identify what is actually best for individual children; 
                                                 
30  Hantrais (2009) op cit n15, p72; Bogdan (1994) op cit n14, p54.  
31  De Cruz (2007) op cit n14, p244. Bogdan (1994) op cit n14, pp70-77.  
32  Bogdan (1994) op cit n14, p70.  
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this should caution against a shared residence presumption. The final theme is 
family law’s increasingly dogmatic insistence that the parents involved in these 
disputes must behave reasonably, i.e. must seek compromise, must act in a 
conciliatory manner rather than dwell on past hurts, and must prioritise the child’s 
interest in relationships with both parents over their own needs.   This ostensibly 
gender-neutral standard in fact demands a disproportionate contribution from 
women; post-separation families should, as far as possible, resemble the nuclear 
paradigm, and mothers should maintain the bonds of the binuclear unit.  The three-
themed framework is employed in the subsequent chapter to structure discussion on 
available research in this area.  The conclusion is drawn that there is no evidence to 
support a shared residence presumption; studies instead show that shared residence 
is unlikely to last, or benefit children, where parents have not themselves managed 
to reach an agreement on contact and residence.   
 
The chapter analysing the private law framework in England uses the three-themed 
structure to conclude that law’s patriarchal perspective means that (outside of a 
narrowly construed exceptional category of domestic violence), children’s need for a 
father is held to outweigh the other factors listed in the welfare checklist.  At the 
same time, post-liberal insistence that parents must be forward-looking makes it 
difficult for mothers to raise objections without being labelled bitter, selfish and 
unreasonable.  The following chapter focuses on shared residence.  It uses the three 
themes to examine how English family law has developed a view of shared residence 
as benefitting children through symbolic messages about parental status rather than 
the actual arrangement of children’s time.  It is highly critical of the reversal of the 
causal relationship between good cooperation and shared residence: the former is 
now seen as a by-product rather than an essential prerequisite. Autopoietic theory is 
used to explain this development and, furthermore, it is argued that the shared 
residence order is becoming an increasingly important part of law’s strategy of 
making post-separation dual household families conform to the new binuclear mould 
despite the fact that this use of the order is contrary to the instructions in s.1 of the 
Children Act 1989.   
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The chapter analysing the legal framework in Sweden observes that the very 
different socio-political context has produced different, but nevertheless gendered, 
understandings of parenthood.  Women have entered into the public sphere, but the 
change from an exclusionary to a segregationist welfare state has restricted them to 
inferior positions in both spheres.  There is also a curious contradiction in Swedish 
family law; it is both ostensibly gender neutral, with an insistence on formal 
equality, and simultaneously highly gendered, as its implicit normative expectations 
for mothers and fathers remain cast in a traditional mould.  Primary sources, 
including the codes, travaux préparatoires and official guidance, have been used 
extensively, and secondary sources have provided not only useful background 
knowledge, but also insightful critical analyses of how the law is being applied in 
practice.   
 
Swedish family law, like its English counterpart, is characterised by a narrow focus. 
The welfare enquiry typically balances the child’s abstract need for contact against 
any potential risks of harm conceptualised predominantly in terms of exposure to 
domestic violence or inter-parental conflict rather than the parent’s dependability 
and actual ability to care for the child.  It is, moreover, noted that law’s autopoietic 
tendency to focus on what ought to be, rather than what is, has allowed the legal 
system to ignore the very real difficulties faced by most families involved in these 
disputes.  Fathers are presumed to be equally capable of meeting children’s needs, 
but it is very rare for questions to be asked on how these needs are actually met.  As 
in England, orders are not always in children’s interests, and are often made on the 
implicit assumption that mothers will make considerable sacrifices to make them 
work.   
 
The chapter on shared residence in Sweden observes that this arrangement is more 
common in Sweden, yet still involves a near-equal sharing of the child’s time, 
confirming the prediction that better preconditions exist for successful sharing of 
residence.  The picture is not, however, wholly positive.  Although shared residence 
is used to regulate practical arrangements rather than send symbolic messages, 
studies have reported complaints from practitioners that many applications are 
motivated by a desire for justice and equal rights.  The available research suggests 
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that district courts generally follow the recommendations of a National Board of 
Health and Welfare Report and are slow to order shared residence against one 
parent’s wishes.  There is some evidence that a presumption is developing; that the 
perceived, abstract benefits of shared residence are held to outweigh risks 
highlighted by objecting parents. However, where shared residence is ordered, it is 
envisaged that fathers’ involvement will be hands-on.  The third section of this 
chapter observes that family law’s insistence on conciliatory behaviour and 
promotion of out of court settlement has led to shared residence being used to 
suppress rather than solve disputes. In the short-term, cases are kept out of court, but 
there is no viable long-term solution. More recently there has been greater 
recognition of the harm children suffer when exposed to parents’ conflicts; since 
shared residence involves frequent and detailed communication the view has 
developed that it should only be ordered where parents’ post-separation relationships 
are “particularly good”.33   Nevertheless, mothers often do not dare resist fathers’ 
requests for equal time, for fear of otherwise being labelled selfish and unreasonable; 
and many mothers complain that the responsibility for caring for their children rests 
disproportionately on them.  It is argued that if these complaints are expressed in 
Sweden, where the preconditions are so much better, widespread use of shared 
residence in England will lead to a highly unequal distribution of rights and 
responsibilities between fathers and mothers, and will fail to benefit children.   
 
The final, concluding chapter identifies the similarities and differences in the two 
jurisdictions’ approach to the shared residence order.  It also contrasts judicial 
comments with researchers’ conclusions, and makes use of this material to argue 
against the development of a shared residence presumption in England.   It argues 
that empirical research confirms the conclusion that follows from the use of 
autopoietic theory: that shared residence cannot be used to teach parents to 
cooperate, and that the Swedish courts’ pragmatic approach is to be preferred.  It is 
known that coerced or court-ordered shared residence is likely to be abandoned, 
leading to the stress of further litigation.  Shared residence is a very demanding 
arrangement; the benefits have to outweigh the substantial emotional, practical, 
financial costs.  Parents must be sensitive to children’s reactions, and able to 
                                                 
33  Proposition 2005/06:99, p53.  
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renegotiate arrangements in response; it, moreover, appears that shared residence 
suits some children but not others.  Courts’ inability to really listen to children or 
fully assess whether individual parents will cope, as explained through the use of 
autopoietic theory, means they cannot be trusted to filter out the families where 
shared residence is likely to harm children.  The solution is, therefore, to restrict 
shared residence to cases where both parents agree to this.  Although it cannot be 
guaranteed that these parents have listened to their children, empirical research 
shows that they are far more likely to be able to put their children’s interests first 
than parents involved in high conflict disputes.  Finally, the conclusion combines 
autopoieticists’ observations about law’s self-imposed blind-spots with feminist 
critique of the public/private dichotomy.  It suggests that law’s current claim that 
children will benefit when parents learn to cooperate through a shared residence 
order is implicitly built on the assumption that mothers will continue to provide the 
majority of care for children whilst also maintaining emotional bonds across the 
new, binuclear family.  The perceived benefit, according to autopoietic theory, is 
that the imposition of the patriarchal, nuclear structure on binuclear post-separation 
families masks social change and preserves existing power structures; law as a 
system is inherently conservative since its role in society is to maintain stability and 
diffuse challenges to power relationships which are likely to cause further conflict.    
A shared residence presumption would thus exist primarily as an obfuscatory device 
for the preservation of patriarchal power structures.   
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2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides a theoretical framework which is used in later chapters.  It 
begins by setting out the origins of autopoietic theory and its development in 
relation to law as a social autopoietic system, and then combines this with feminist 
theory to explain law’s inherently closed, inflexible and patriarchal nature.  It 
explores how knowledge from child welfare science as well as communitarian and 
post-liberal thinking has been recreated within law.  In later chapters, this thesis 
uses these conclusions drawn here to examine the law in the two chosen 
jurisdictions and argue against greater use of shared residence.   
 
2.2 AUTOPOIESIS 
 
Autopoietic theory can be used to explain van Krieken’s observation that  “[f]or 
every observer arguing for the significance of the law in ‘radiating messages’ and 
changing behaviour, there will be another expressing scepticism about its impact”.1  
Autopoiesis is formed from two Greek words: auto, which means ‘self’ and poiesis, 
which means ‘creation’.2  Autopoietic theory was initially developed by biologists 
Varela and Maturana to describe the self-creating functions of biological cells.3  Cells 
are closed units and, although they operate in concert, cell reproduction is controlled 
by internal structures and processes, rather than being determined by what comes in 
                                                 
1  van Krieken, R (2005) “The ‘Best Interests of the Child’ and Parental Separation: On the ‘Civilizing of 
Parents”, 68(1) MLR, 25-48, p25.  
2  Rejmer, A (2003) Vårdnadstvister: En Rättssociologisk Studie av Tingsrätts Funktion vid Handläggning av 
Vårdnadskonflikter med Utgångspunkt från Barnets Bästa, Lund, Sweden, Lund Studies in the Sociology of 
Law, p30.  
3  Varela, F (1979) Principles of Biological Autonomy, New York, Elsevier; Maturana, H (1982) Erkennen: Die 
Organisation und Verkörperung von Wirklichkeit, Braunschweig, Vieweg; both cited in Teubner, G (1993) Law 
as an Autopoietic System, London, Blackwell, p27.  
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from the outside.4  Consequently, the effects of external influences are difficult to 
predict.5     
2.2.1 Social Autopoietic Theory  
 
These central observations have been used in the social sciences, notably by 
Luhmann and Teubner, to depict society as one large, primary system, which 
contains a number of closed, self-referring subsystems of communications, including 
law, medicine, politics etc.6    In social autopoietic theory, communications, rather 
than individuals, are the basic constituent units of these discourses or social 
subsystems; just as a cell is made from its own elements, social subsystems are re-
created exclusively by use of their existing communications.7  Participants in a 
discourse are conceptualised as individual, psychic autopoietic systems, which are 
unable to communicate directly with the social subsystem.  Social subsystems are 
different from, and more than, the combined thought-processes of the members;8 the 
meaning which a statement gains as it becomes part of the system’s communications 
is more important than the meaning intended by the original actor.9   
 
Despite this, society in itself is not classified as a complete autopoietic system.  
Instead, it is labelled a first-order autopoietic system.  Law, and other specialised 
systems, have developed one step further.  The first factor which defines a 
subsystem is the emergence of communications that are specific to that subsystem.  
Moreover, these communications are articulated and processed in the same way as 
earlier communications, so that past, present and future communications are linked 
together in a recursive chain; the system becomes self-referential.10  The validity of a 
new communication is assessed solely by reference to internal criteria from the 
system’s earlier communications.  Each system develops its own specific binary code 
or codes which are used to describe the environment and guide decision-making: e.g. 
                                                 
4  Varela, F (1981) “Autonomy and Autopoiesis” in Roth, G & Schwegler, H (Eds) Self-Organizing Systems, 
Frankfurt, Camps, pp17-18, as cited in Teubner (1993) op cit n3, p15.  
5  Teubner, G, Schiff, D & Nobles, R (2003) “The Autonomy of Law: Introduction to Legal Autopoiesis”, in 
Schiff, D & Nobles, R (Eds) Jurisprudence, London, Butterworths, p1, obtained from http://www.jura.uni-
frankfurt.de/ifawz1/teubner/dokumente/ autonomy_of_law.pdf accessed 18th April 2007.  
6  Luhmann, N (1995) Social Systems, cited in Smith, C (2004) “Autopoietic Law and the ‘Epistemic Trap’: A 
Case Study of Adoption and Contact”, 31(3) Journal of Law and Society, 318-44.   
7  Luhmann, N (1989) “Law as a Social System”, 83(1) Northwestern University Law Review, 136-150, p136.  
8  Teubner (1993) op cit n3, p45.   
9  Teubner et al (2003) op cit n5, p4, p18; King, M & Piper, C (1995) How the Law Thinks About Children (2nd 
Ed), Aldershot, Arena, p22.  
10  Teubner et al (2003) op cit n5, p11. 
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healthy/unhealthy within medicine; profit/loss in relation to the economy and 
legal/illegal, or relevant/irrelevant, reasonable/unreasonable within law.11   Social 
systems’ internal realities determine how they see the world, just as individuals’ 
conceptions of reality are coloured by their earlier experiences.12 This description of 
discourses as closed and self-referential is particularly apt in relation to law.  
Luhmann has observed that “[o]nly the law can say what is lawful and what is 
unlawful”, and can only decide this by looking within itself.13 According to Teubner, 
theorists in jurisprudence had needlessly struggled with the inherent circularity in 
their accounts of law, erroneously seeing this as a weakness in their theoretical 
model rather than an inescapable feature of law.14  A subsystem’s communication is 
linked to earlier communications and triggers further communications.15   This 
linking together of communications into a closed chain, described by Teubner as 
primary closure, makes law increasingly divorced from the general discourse of 
society.16  Law, like other subsystems, compensates for this not by seeking to reverse 
the processes, but by closing itself off further, complementing the primary cycle of 
communications with a second-order “hypercycle” of communications which 
observe, evaluate and regulate the subsystem.17  Developing its own specialised way 
of commenting on its workings thus insulates law from external pressures, allowing 
it to self-generate its identity undisturbed.18  Circularity guarantees autonomy.19   
 
Within autopoietic theory, there are divergent opinions about the level of 
communication possible between subsystems.20  Luhmann has argued that a system 
is either autopoietic or not, just like a woman “cannot be a little pregnant”,21 while 
Teubner has contended that closure and autonomy are questions of degree.22  
                                                 
11  Ibid,  p1.  
12  Carlsson, B & Rejmer, A (1998) "The Swedish Way of Dealing with Custody Disputes: Juridification and 
Professionalisation of the Private and Social Spheres" in Carlsson, B (Ed) Social Steerage and Communicative 
Action: Essays in Sociology, Lund Studies in Sociology of Law, 104-142, p119.  
13  Luhmann (1989) op cit n7, p143.  
14  Teubner (1993) op cit n3, p9.  
15  James, A (1992) “An Open or Shut Case?  Law as an Autopoietic System” 19(2) Journal of Law and Society, 
271-283, p274; Teubner et al (2003) op cit n5, p4.  
16  Teubner, G (2001) “Alienating Justice: On the Surplus Value of the Twelfth Camel”, in Nelken, D & 
Pribán, J (Eds) Law’s New Boundaries: Consequences of Legal Autopoiesis, Aldershot, Ashgate, 21-44, p24.  
17  Teubner (1993) op cit n3, p20, p31.  
18  Ibid, p33.  
19  Ibid, p75. 
20  Smith (2004) op cit n6, p323.   
21  Luhmann, N (1990) Essays on Self-Reference, New York, Columbia University Press, p12, cited in Smith 
(2004) op cit n6, p324.   
22  Teubner (1993) op cit n3, p27.   
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Teubner’s approach appears more realistic; closed subsystems do not exist in a 
vacuum but are “necessarily” influenced by external social, economic and political 
influences.23  In the main, however, there is agreement that once a system is 
autopoietic, information can no longer come in; instead it is recreated within the 
system itself on the basis of what it understands of the outside world.24  Thus, 
change within a system such as law can occur in indirect and unpredictable ways, 
and only where the external pressures are “powerful enough to be perceived on the 
screens of the legal system itself”.25 
 
Where external information is created within a system this is as simplified, “self-
produced fictions” known as semantic artefacts.26  Within society, the autopoietic 
subsystems construct incompatible versions of reality: there is no overarching 
conceptual framework and no shared language, and thus no real communication 
between subsystems.27  There is also no true communication between an autopoietic 
subsystem and its participants; the individual autopoietic systems.  Litigants, 
witnesses and lawyers reappear within law as semantic artefacts expressed in binary 
codes.28   Although the artificiality of some constructs is more readily recognisable 
than others - a reasonable man on his Clapham omnibus or a Gillick competent 
adolescent - Teubner has asserted that this process is applied to all who seek to have 
their communications admitted as legal.29  Indeed, law is often accused of not 
listening to, or not understanding, those who appear before it.30   
 
2.2.2 Interaction between Systems 
 
Nonetheless, the assertion that law is closed off from other systems does not fit well 
with positivist or critical legal theory accounts of law, and appears to be contradicted 
by simple empirical observation.  Legislation requires law to import a variety of 
political, economic or social values, while law’s role as arbiter of disputes requires it 
                                                 
23  Ibid, p21.   
24  Ibid, p41.  
25  Ibid, p59.   
26  Teubner (2001) op cit n16, pp22-23.  
27  King & Piper (1995) op cit n9, p26.  
28  Ibid, p27.  
29  Teubner et al (2003) op cit n5, p14. 
30  Geldof, B (2003) “The Real Love that Dare Not Speak its Name: A Sometimes Coherent Rant” in 
Bainham, A, Lindley, B, Richards, M & Trinder, L (Eds) Children and their Families: Contact, Rights and 
Welfare, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 171-200, p176.  
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to acknowledge external information and communicate its normative 
pronouncements to the outside world.31  The increasing functional differentiation in 
society has resulted in the legal subsystem attempting to balance its understandings 
of the diverse and sometimes incompatible demands emanating from other 
specialised systems against the need for internal consistency within law as well as 
the requirements of political regulation.32  The result has been specialisation within, 
and fragmentation of, law.33   Separate terminology developed within corporate, 
criminal, family or property law indicate differing normative expectations.  
“[T]endencies to autarchy” within different branches of law help mask 
inconsistencies in the way law responds to different kinds of turbulence or 
interference.34   
 
Family law is particularly dependant on external information, since decisions 
involving children need to be based on external expertise on what harms or helps 
children.35    Subsystems are closed, but do not function in isolation; external actions 
trigger internal reactions.36  Separate systems are sometimes required to act in 
concert, e.g. where the signing of a contract has legal or economic consequences, or 
where the decision to take a child into care is discussed by lawyers, doctors and 
social workers.   
 
Interaction between systems is described as “structural coupling” rather than true 
communication.37  Human agents are recreated within a system as semantic 
constructs, but exist in an external environment as “independent autopoietic 
(psychic) systems”.38  They decide whether or not to comply with legal rules using 
pre-existing normative frameworks shaped by previous turbulence from religious, 
cultural, political and other subsystems.   If the costs of obeying a rule are felt 
tooutweigh the benefits, the rule will be disregarded.  Law interprets this as “norms 
being disobeyed and flouted”; its response is the introduction of further norms, since 
                                                 
31  Smith (2004) op cit n6, p334.  
32  Teubner (1993) op cit n3, pp113-114.   
33  Ibid.   
34  Ibid, p114.   
35  Ibid, p319.   
36  Teubner et al (2003) op cit n5, p10.  
37  Ibid, p4.  
38  Teubner (1993) op cit n3, p21.   
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“disobedience and circumvention of norms is forbidden”.39  Consequently, the 
success of legal measures to modify behaviour (such as the current use of shared 
residence orders to improve interparental communication) can never be guaranteed, 
nor predicted with anything approaching certainty.   
 
According to Teubner, however, some direct contact between social subsystems is 
possible.  Subsystems such as law, politics and the economy have all developed from 
the first-order system of society (through a process of internal differentiation) and 
occupy the same “phenomenological domain” since they all use communications as 
their basic units in order to create “meaning” and all such internal communications 
are simultaneously also forms of general societal communication.40  Consequently, 
interference can become a bridging mechanism, where different systems are linked 
through one communicative event; although information is still “created anew in 
every social system” this happens simultaneously in two systems; the event is likely 
to have greater impact.41  Although the mechanisms for the variation, selection and 
retention of information are entirely internal,42 a subsystem can detect external 
pressures as noise or disturbance, and respond by making “minor modifications in 
its internal order until relative peace is restored”.43 Autopoieticists do not deny the 
relevance of power;44 some systems or discourses appear more powerful than others, 
and this is likely to result in greater adjustments within the system that perceives 
itself to be less powerful.  
 
Although different subsystems use the same terminology, meanings differ.  
Communications can be defined as information, utterance, and understanding; the 
act of utterance is the same within different systems, whereas the elements of 
understanding and information differ.45  A contract will be evaluated in terms of 
profit/loss within the economic subsystem, while law will only look at its legality.46  
What a particular child needs is understood and evaluated very differently within 
law, medicine or social work, and it is a common observation among lawyers, 
                                                 
39  Ibid, p72.   
40  Teubner (1993) op cit n3, p81, p87.   
41  Ibid, p87.   
42  Ibid, p56.   
43  Ibid, p81.   
44  Ibid, p73.   
45  Ibid, p88.   
46  Teubner et al (2003) op cit n5, p15.  
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psychiatrists, and social workers that the resolution of interparental disputes is 
hampered by lack of mutual understanding.47   
 
Teubner has argued that subsystems such as law resolve the tension between the 
safeguarding of subsystem autonomy through autopoietic closure and the external 
demands placed upon it by being “cognitively open” to external information, while 
nevertheless remaining “normatively closed”.48  Where information does appear to 
be admitted into law, this is termed re-entry: terminology from other systems is 
reinterpreted into law’s binary codes in such a way as to fit as neatly as possible 
within law’s pre-existing normative framework.49  An obvious example is the way 
expert witnesses are asked to translate their opinions into language which has little 
meaning within their own discourses; for instance, no psychiatrist today gives a 
diagnosis of insanity.50  Autopoietic subsystems also maintain their closure by being 
selective in terms of what information they admit.  This process, termed 
“redundancy”, is particularly important in law, since the modus operandi of legal 
communication is linked to law’s functions.  Law, by its very nature, seeks to bring 
structure and order to society.51 It excludes from consideration some factors that it 
cannot control, while legal rules classify facts so as to find similarities where none 
may be thought to exist.  In this way complex and diverse disputes are reduced to 
generalisations or repetitions, which mask tensions and create an impression of 
internal consistency.52    
 
These new, and peculiarly legal, ways of communicating about conflicts or problems 
are then further refined and entrenched as they travel around law’s circular chain of 
communications.  One expert may, in a court, give an opinion which he is forced to 
re-structure in order for it to be understood by law.  The judge will, in summing up, 
repeat this understanding of the issue, perhaps narrowing it slightly further to 
ensure a better fit with law’s previous communications.  The same process may be 
repeated by a practitioner who writes a case comment, a judge who subsequently 
                                                 
47  Carlsson & Rejmer (1998) op cit n8. 
48  Teubner, G (1989) “How the Law Thinks: Towards a Constructivist Epistemology of Law”, 23 Law and 
Society Review, 727-757, p743, as cited in King & Piper (1995) op cit n9, p30.  
49  Teubner (2001) op cit n16, p24.  
50  Teubner et al (2003) op cit n5, p3; King & Piper (1995) op cit n9, p31.  
51 King & Piper (1995) op cit n9, p26.   
52  Teubner (1993) op cit n3, p57.  
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refers to the case, or an academic who summarises case law development in a text 
book.  The chain of communications serves to confirm the veracity of what is said, 
without further need to refer to external authorities.  Left to develop in this way, 
legal translations of information from other discourses can become unrecognisable, 
very far removed from the understandings that pervade the first-order autopoietic 
system of society itself.53  There is an element of self-fulfilling prophecy about the 
circular structure of law’s communications.  It could be likened to a Chinese 
whispers procedure that returns the original statement in a highly modified form; 
but unlike Chinese whispers the transformation is not completely random, but also 
determined by law’s existing discursive framework.  However, law hides these 
processes from itself.54  According to Luhmann “the system does not see that it does 
not see what it doesn’t see”.55  Law is sometimes described as no more than an 
instrument of power for those in political control.  While adherents of autopoietic 
theory would acknowledge that law does play an important role in the regulation of 
relationships and the allocation of resources, they nevertheless deny such a simple 
correlation between input and output.56  Instead, the processes of re-entry and 
redundancy are identified as the involuntary and largely unplottable responses to 
interference that result from second-order autopoiesis.57  
 
The combination of cognitive openness and normative closure allows law to deal 
with its environment without having to depart from its own internal normative 
expectations.  If an act, such as breaking a speed limit, ought to be illegal then it 
remains so despite the fact that many people drive too fast.58  If parents ought to 
cooperate over post-divorce contact, then conflict remains wrong despite the fact 
that most cases which arrive in the appeal courts involve entrenched disputes.   In 
this way, law can absorb social conflicts, and create the appearance of resolution.59  
Thus, although family law, in particular, appears more open to its social 
environment due to the subject matter of the disputes, it simply uses selective, 
internally reconstructed versions of outside information about what is in a child’s 
                                                 
53  Ibid, p56.  
54  Luhmann (1989) op cit n7, p145.  
55  Ibid.  
56  Teubner (1993) op cit n3, p26.   
57  Luhmann (1989) op cit n7, p145; King & Piper (1995) op cit n9, p50.  
58  King & Piper (1995) op cit n9, p29.  
59  Ibid, p29.  
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best interests.60  This way law both ensures that competing claims can be compared, 
and safeguards its normative closure.61  Accordingly, complaints from disappointed 
litigants often include the assertion that “the experience had nothing to do with 
what they were seeking to achieve”.62   
 
Autopoietic theory can be used to show why it is that despite increasing 
“juridification” of society through a proliferation of legal rules, changes are often 
insufficient or temporary, with some reform even proving counterproductive.63   
When one subsystem thinks it is studying another system, what it is in fact 
observing is its own semantic artefact, its internally constructed version of what it 
thinks the other system looks like.64  Moreover, information cannot travel across 
systems’ boundaries, but is, instead, re-invented within the target system; much is 
lost in translation.  It is, therefore, not surprising that family law reforms, which 
have to be translated into law from the political second-order autopoietic system and 
then out of law to the target families, often appear to have substantially unexpected 
effects.    Moreover, all systems evaluate the potential benefits of the proposed 
change according to their own internal code. The economy assesses legislation using 
its “cost-benefit calculations” so that new laws will only be obeyed if compliance 
proves financially efficient.65  Similarly, research shows that parents in contact and 
residence cases perform similar cost/benefit analyses, and feel justified in disobeying 
legal pronouncements where these conflict with their internal moral codes.66  
Finally, new developments in autopoietic subsystems have to be constructed using 
the subsystem’s existing cognitive framework and processes.  Thus, a subsystem 
cannot be made to suddenly depart from its existing modus operandi. For example, 
when law, which usually finds similarities in cases and evaluates competing claims 
according to set criteria, is asked to use a discretionary approach, it is common for 
initial guidance to develop into fixed lists and presumptions.  
                                                 
60 Ibid, p27.  
61  Teubner, G (1997) “Altera pars Audiatur : Law in the Collision of Discourses”, in Rawlings, R (Ed) Law, 
Society and Economy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 149-176 as cited in Teubner et al (2003) op cit n5, p39.  
62  Teubner et al (2003) op cit n5, p4.  
63  Ibid, p19.  
64  Teubner (1993) op cit n3, p79. 
65  Ibid. 
66  Laing, K (2006) “Doing the Right Thing: Cohabiting Parents, Separation and Child Contact”, 20(2) IJLPF, 
169-179, p173; Kaganas, F & Day Sclater, S (2004) “Contact Disputes: Narrative Constructions of ‘Good’ 
Parents”, Feminist Legal Studies, 1-27, p22; Smart, C (1999) “The ‘New’ Parenthood: Fathers and Mothers 
after Divorce”, in Silva, E & Smart, C (Ed) The New Family?, London, Sage Publications, 101-114.  
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Having examined autopoietic theory, the remainder of this chapter now analyses 
three aspects of contemporary family law: the construction of parenthood as a 
permanent status, which is essentially patriarchal in character; the reliance on re-
interpreted information from the child welfare sciences to decide what is in 
children’s best interests; and the law’s increasing insistence that parents must learn 
to behave reasonably rather than rely on the courts.    
 
2.3 PARENTHOOD AS A PERMANENT STATUS 
 
Current family law is often criticised from a feminist perspective, with the claim 
being made that law is, as an instrument of male power, protecting fathers’ interests 
at the expense of both mothers and children.67  This can be reconciled with the 
above-made explanation of law’s autopoietic nature.   Law, and other subsystems, 
were initially constituent parts of a greater first-order autopoietic system, general 
social communications, but separated themselves from this system through 
increasingly specialised jargon.68  These subsystems thus adopted the basic values 
and ways of reasoning which were at that time used within the first-order system 
(society).  A patriarchal strand can be identified as part of this initial set of values, 
and this patriarchal strand has remained and developed into patriarchy-within-law 
through law’s circular and self-referential chain of communications.  Luhmann has 
also observed that “it is only realistic to assume that the law accommodates 
dominant interests; it could not conduct itself otherwise and still be accepted”.69    
 
The term patriarchy is constructed from two Greek words: pater (father) and arche 
(to rule); in its wider meaning, it connotes a system of society in which men hold 
most or all of the power in public life as well as within individual families.70  The 
possible causes or origins of the patriarchal social order have been investigated from 
many different academic perspectives without any definite answers having been 
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found.71 A biological explanation can be found in women’s unique reproductive role, 
which can be seen as rendering them weaker and thus in need of male protection.72  
Some, writing from a perspective on the political left, have built on Engel’s ideas of 
an initial, gendered division of labour to identify male control over women’s 
reproduction as the first expropriation of labour.73   Thus, biological differences can 
be said to have formed the basis for socially determined, unequal gender roles.74   
Historically, women have at times been viewed as little more than property and 
although many of these severe restrictions have now been removed, feminist 
scholars tend to take a wider view of patriarchy as a continuing imbalance of power 
in favour of males throughout society, while patriarchal constructions of gender 
relations are reproduced through communications within politics, education, religion 
and the arts.75   
 
Patriarchy has also granted men the power to define, and the male prerogative in 
defining women’s roles has been identified as crucial in the maintenance of 
patriarchy.76  Men have predominantly defined women as ‘different from’ and 
inferior to themselves, through a series of dichotomies which have become both 
descriptive and normative: analytical/intuitive, strong/weak, cultured/natural, 
principled/personalised, and enterprising/nurturing.77  The consequent 
identification of men with civic life and women as more suited to the domestic 
sphere has been termed the public/private dichotomy.  The origins of this 
dichotomy are likely to lie so far back in time that they are impossible to pinpoint; 
its influence is discernable, for example, in the writings of classical scholars such as 
Artistotle, who did not see women as able to meet the demands of citizenship.78  
Laws dealing with families have relied heavily on the dichotomy as a binary code of 
public/private to guide or justify decisions.  Feminists have sought to expose the 
supposed natural dichotomy as socially constructed, highlighting the way law’s 
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image as impartial has concealed its role in the entrenchment of patriarchy.79   This 
section charts how law’s understandings of public/private have altered in response 
to external interference, but still exert a significant influence over the development 
of family law.   
 
2.3.1 Patriarchy and the Nuclear Family 
 
The feudal society, where limited geographical and economic mobility made 
women’s secondary status less controversial, was challenged by the changes wrought 
by the industrial revolution.80   Liberalism, the dominant school of thought, espoused 
freedom from state interference for laissez-faire capitalism and freedom from 
unwarranted state intervention within the private, family domain.81  Despite this 
emphasis on freedom, the confinement and subordination of women was made more 
explicit through the removal of production from the domestic sphere.82  
Additionally, there was a tension between the democratic values of the public sphere 
(where freedom was seen as best promoted by assigning ostensible equal bargaining 
power to all participants, allowing them free reign to fashion their agreements), and 
the strict hierarchy of the traditional family.83  The law played an important part in 
“maintaining a boundary between private and public”.84  It also preserved the 
patriarchal family by presenting it as natural and benign.85  Luhmann and Teubner 
have suggested that law, as a subsystem, is inherently conservative.  Its role in 
society is to impose order and absorb tension; it dislikes changes in power 
relationships which are likely to cause further conflicts.86  In response to 
interference, its semantic artefacts were changed slightly, so as to preserve the 
overarching normative framework.87   The 19th century idealisation of the family 
extolled the very characteristics of nurture, care and sensitivity that were 
                                                 
79  Slaughter, M (1995) “The Legal Construction of ‘Mother’” in Fineman, M & Karpin, I (Eds) Mothers in 
Law: Feminist Theory and the Legal Regulation of Motherhood, New York, Columbia University Press, 73-100, 
p75; Okin, S (1994) “Families and Feminist Theory: Some Past and Present Issues” in Nelson, H (Ed) 
Feminism and Families, 13-26,p18.  
80  Rejmer (2003) op cit n2, p93.  
81  Rhode, D (1991) “Feminist Critical Theories”, in Bartlett, K & Kennedy, R (Eds) Feminist Legal Theory: 
Readings in Law and Gender, Boulder, Westview Press, 333-350, p339.   
82  Olsen, F (1983) “The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform”, 96(7) Harvard Law 
Review, 1497-1528, p1524.  
83  Ibid, p1505.  
84  Rifkin (1980) op cit n74, p84; O’Donovan (1985) op cit n77, p2.  
85  Olsen (1983) op cit n85, p1524; Rifkin, (1980) op cit n74, p86.  
86  Luhmann (1989) op cit n7, p144.  
87  Teubner (1993) op cit n3, p81.   
 24 CHAPTER 2 
 
simultaneously said to make women unable to cope with the harsh realities of public 
life.88   Moreover, law portrayed the family as both crucially important and fragile; 
any disturbing of “the delicate quality of family relations” could have unforeseen 
negative consequences.89  State intervention into families, even to correct palpable 
abuses of patriarchal power, was not in anyone’s long term interests.90  Law could be 
overtly “based on male authority and patriarchal social order”,91 while “marriage was 
the chief means by which families were linked to law”.92   
 
Thus, the importance of the traditional conjugal family has always been located 
primarily in its normative power.93   It was constructed as natural, timeless, and 
essential to a stable, healthy society.94  Consequently, change (which is a historical 
fact) came to be perceived as an undesirable symptom of moral decline, while the 
normative value given to the label “traditional” legitimised treating other family 
types less favourably.95  Motherhood, although idealised, was truly valued only when 
practised within the patriarchal framework of the conjugal family.96  Furthermore, 
mothers who did not conform to the gendered pattern of self-sacrifice and gentleness 
risked being labelled unfit and losing their children.97  Motherhood is thus “a 
colonised concept”, used to tame “unruly women” into responsibility and 
conformity.98  This thesis argues that a presumption in favour of shared residence 
built on the ideal of the reconstituted binuclear traditional family would strengthen 
this construction of motherhood and unduly restrict individual women’s freedom.   
 
The ideal of the private family continues to exert considerable influence on the 
regulation of families; non-intervention remains the norm, and public action the 
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exception which has to be justified.99  Feminism has, however, challenged both the 
desirability and the actual existence of the public/private dichotomy.100  On an 
ideological level, it devalues women and the tasks traditionally associated with 
them; law’s stance is an implicit recognition that “women simply are not sufficiently 
important to merit legal regulation”.101  In practical terms, public authorities have 
always intervened in poor or otherwise “failing” families; regulation in a number of 
areas such as taxation and social security impacts on families; and, on other 
occasions, ostensible non-intervention hides a passing of control to less formal 
mechanisms.102    Thus, it is, according to Olsen, “nonsense” to discuss state non-
intervention in families as though it were an achievable ideal.103   She has argued that 
no civilized society can maintain a consistent stance to the point of refusing to 
investigate homicides or to remove seriously maltreated children.  Therefore, the 
question becomes one of degrees of intervention.104  The decision not to intervene is 
itself a political, regulatory decision, which helps the state shape families by 
ratifying the status quo and thus defining acceptable behaviour.105  The non-
intervention ideal is a normative rather than analytical tool; a simple reference to 
non-intervention can be used to obscure genuine conflicts.106  Legislatures and 
judiciaries have used the policy of non-intervention to consolidate male authority 
and “to prevent women and children from using state power to improve the 
conditions of their lives”.107   In the 19th and early 20th centuries, law refused to 
intervene into the nuclear family, yet actively policed its boundaries; sanctions and 
stigmatisation discouraged independent motherhood.108  One result of the non-
intervention strategy, which is particularly relevant to this thesis, is law’s inability 
to recognise the value of care.  When caring is relegated to the private sphere, it 
becomes the responsibility of individual women and, because it takes place in 
private, it is invisible to those who think and communicate in the public sphere.  
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Additionally, the construction of the practical work of caring as a “natural 
outpouring” of instinctive love has meant women’s substantial investments in 
domestic labour have been taken for granted.109   Thus, a societal structure premised 
on the liberal autonomous individual is in fact supported and subsidised by 
unrecognised caring.110 As is argued in subsequent chapters, the result is that 
decisions in contested shared residence are made without adequate recognition of 
how children benefit from receiving proper care.   
 
2.3.2 Public Patriarchy 
 
The second part of this narrative focuses on the latter half of the 20th century, when 
industrialised society changed so dramatically that law’s adherence to the 
traditional, nuclear model could not be maintained.  This created tension within the 
first-order autopoietic system that is society itself, and law responded by modifying 
its meaning-making procedures in such a way as to protect existing power 
structures.111   Indeed, it has been observed from a feminist perspective that the 
gender system was adjusted to these new conditions in such a way as to ensure 
“women’s continued relegation to the margins”.112   Feminists had made substantial 
achievements by demonstrating that women could do as well as men in public life.   
The advantage of this “sameness” strategy was its compatibility with the liberal 
worldview; law could admit this external interference without too much being lost 
in translation.113   The disadvantages were, however, the implicit valorisation of 
supposedly male characteristics, and reliance on formal equality. Women who were 
perceived to be like men were entitled to be treated the same as men; but women 
who were classified as different could not complain when they were treated less 
favourably.114  Law thus remained uninterested in the private sphere, and unable to 
value domestic labour.  Consequently, women’s entry into public life, and the 
employment market in particular, proceeded on the unspoken understanding that 
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this must not lead them to neglect their private responsibilities.115  This has preserved 
the public/private dichotomy, disadvantaged women in the employment market, 
and left individual women with poor earning capacities dependant on breadwinner 
men.116  However, the formal equality approach allows law to dismiss this wider 
context as redundant and ignore the empirically documented fact that an equal 
sharing of family responsibilities between women and men “is the great revolution 
that has not happened”.117  Thus, in this 20th century “reinvention”, patriarchy can be 
described as public rather than private and as “segregationist” rather than 
“exclusionary”: women have gained access to the public as well as the private sphere, 
but remain subordinated within both.118  Law’s role in the reproduction of patriarchal 
order has become more complex, “increasingly obscured and difficult to identify”.119   
Yet, it can be argued that women are worse off; law’s pursuit of gender-neutrality 
has, in fact, made law more discriminatory by de-emphasising children’s need for 
the “stereotypical motherly characteristic of nurturing and caring”.120   
 
Feminism can in one way thus be said to have become a victim of its own success, 
and consequently, alternative strategies were pursued in the last decades of the 20th 
century.  Rather than questioning the gendering of the liberal dichotomies, 
difference feminists rejected their “hierarchization” (e.g. the view of abstract reason 
as superior to contextualised and needs-based caring).121  In her research, Gilligan 
found that many of her female subjects, including eleven-year-old Amy, used very 
sophisticated reasoning, which rejected the binary right/wrong approach to 
hypothetical scenarios and instead emphasised compromise and the need to sustain 
relationships.  Yet, this “ethic of care” was not recognised by the standard scoring 
model.122  Difference feminists used this “pathbreaking” empirical work to argue for 
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greater recognition of traditionally female characteristics.123  They also harboured a 
deep mistrust of law, arguing that it, like Gilligan’s eleven-year-old interviewee 
Jake, spoke with the “male” voice and used a “male” form of reasoning: objective, 
abstract, universal, with a tendency to organise information along hierarchical 
dichotomies.124  Law was found to be inherently patriarchal: “a paradigm of 
maleness”.125    This can be reconciled with autopoieticists’  description of discourses 
as impersonal systems of communication.  Furthermore, since legal communications 
were initially generated almost exclusively by men, for men, it is not surprising that 
the tendency towards objectivity, abstraction and logic was reinforced within law’s 
chains of communications.  The process of “redundancy”, information selection, 
explains law’s tendency to ignore or reject as unintelligible arguments based on 
context, relationships or feelings.126  It can also explain the limited success of 
difference feminists’ attempts at legal reform; law, as a closed system, is unable to 
process such very different information.127   The celebration of traditionally female 
characteristics, and the consequent tendency towards essentialism, have been 
criticised for inadvertently reinforcing gendered stereotypes.128  Thus, although the 
sameness/difference debate at one point “threatened to engulf” feminist debate with 
its “interminable irreconcilability”, the two approaches never really challenged the 
public/private dichotomy.129 Accordingly, more radical feminists like MacKinnon 
asserted that feminism had been asking the wrong questions: rather than dividing 
the world into dichotomies the dominance model saw a repeated pattern of women’s 
subordination.130  According to MacKinnon, “[p]ower is socially constructed such 
that if Jake simply chooses not to listen to Amy, he wins; but if Amy simply chooses 
not to listen to Jake, she loses.  In other words, Jake still wins because that is the 
system”.131  Dominance feminism made a valuable contribution to feminist debate, 
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but did not successfully translate into law reform since it demanded too dramatic a 
departure from law’s existing modus operandi.132  According to autopoietic theory, 
minor modifications may occur, but complete reorientations of closed autopoietic 
subsystems are impossible: the system is what it is.133     
 
2.3.3 The Binuclear Family 
 
This narrative now examines how law has absorbed the tension created by recent 
demographic changes.  Marriage was for centuries the primary institution used by 
law to organise familial life, and feminists have argued that this is because 
patriarchal structures depend for their survival on husbands and fathers as 
inculcators of patriarchal values and defenders of the status quo.134  However, the 
statistically documented decrease in conjugal families and the increased prevalence 
of divorce, single parenthood and unmarried cohabitation have “exposed the 
fragility” of the nuclear paradigm.135 Family breakdown thus becomes a threat to 
prevailing patriarchal order.  When law responds to political turbulence by adjusting 
its own processes it is, according to Teubner, “making order from noise”.136  The 
legal system is “driven by the disorder outside” and forced to adjust its cognitive 
framework in minor ways “until relative peace is restored”.137  Family law’s response 
has thus been to construct bi-nuclear families, which expand the definition of family 
in order to hide the reality of demographic change and thus contain “the anxieties 
that it engenders”.138   Law has reconstructed parenthood into a relationship with “a 
reassuring irrevocable permanence”, which can have a stabilising influence on 
individuals, families and society.139   Since the public/private dichotomy hides 
maternal caring, law’s new emphasis on biological (rather than social) parenthood is 
focused almost exclusively on the encouragement of fathers through the allocation 
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of rights.140  Fatherhood has been transformed through circulation in law’s chains of 
communications from a secondary link established through marriage, to a primary, 
direct relationship, which should endure “unaffected by the vicissitudes of adult 
life”.141    
 
This new dual-household post-separation family is expected to conform to the 
nuclear ideal not only in terms of membership but also the gendered and hierarchical 
distribution of rights and responsibilities. It, then, occupies a similarly privileged 
position.   Although this ‘new’ family is presented as progressive, it is in fact both 
conservative and repressive. In France, Vonèche and Bastard have suggested that 
legislation enacted in 2002, which emphasises the continued involvement of the 
“parental couple” after separation, is not the “modern vision” of family life it 
purports to be, but instead an attempt to preserve traditional, Catholic family 
structures.142  At the same time, those who wish to argue against the imposition of 
the new binuclear template on their own families are finding this increasingly 
difficult.  One of the reasons (two others are explored in later sections of this 
chapter) is law’s continued disregard for the “different voice”.  Although it is 
unnecessarily essentialist to equate motherhood with “caring for” in practical terms 
and fatherhood with “caring about” in an abstract sense, it remains the case that the 
former activity is still disproportionately performed by mothers, who are also more 
likely to ground their arguments in disputes over children on the ethic of care.143    
Yet, law is unable to understand arguments based on the closeness and expertise 
developed by primary carers.144    
 
In conclusion, it can be seen that a pre-existing patriarchal element in law’s 
understanding of society has been preserved through the adaptation of the 
public/private dichotomy and law’s ideal family.  Different feminist strategies to 
combat the exclusion, relegation or silencing of women have had only limited 
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success since they have not managed to challenge the dominant liberal “male” 
standard which is used to assess legal claims. This makes it very difficult for 
resident mothers to resist fathers’ shared residence applications.   Moreover, it 
should be noted that any admittance of an ethic of care into family law faces a 
significant obstacle.  There is already another discursive framework which has 
become dominant, prevailing even over law’s traditional ethic of justice; indeed, 
Geldof has complained of family law’s failure to recognise his “rights as a man”.145   
 
2.4 THE PARAMOUNTCY PRINCIPLE 
 
The resolution of disputes between family members is most effectively achieved by 
finding workable solutions for all; there has consequently been a greater concern 
with promoting the wellbeing of those involved than in other branches of law.146  In 
previous centuries this concern was fitted within law’s patriarchal framework.  The 
best interests of a child were presumed to be aligned with the father’s interests, “the 
maintenance of his authority, and the stability of marriage”.147  Consistent with the 
public/private dichotomy, a father was understood to be better placed to know what 
was best for his child than any external agency.  However, this view has had to be 
adjusted in response to the 20th century understanding of children as precious and 
vulnerable.148  In recent decades, the paramountcy principle “has become increasingly 
and more firmly entrenched” in the family law of most Western jurisdictions.149  In 
the two jurisdictions studied, as in many other countries, the principle is interpreted 
to mean that the child’s welfare should be the court’s only relevant consideration; 
other factors should only be considered to the extent that they may impact on the 
child.150   The popularity of the welfare principle is demonstrated by the large 
number of jurisdictions that employ it, its durability, and its strong symbolic 
appeal.151  It is difficult to argue with the proposition that children are vulnerable, and 
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that law’s focus should be on helping them mature into well-adjusted adults (rather 
than on state or parental rights).152  However, the flexibility that is the principle’s 
greatest strength is also its greatest weakness.153  Whilst it is easy to endorse the 
general principle, it is considerably more difficult to give it content; to agree on how 
children’s interests are best promoted.154   As a standard it is “indeterminate and 
unpredictable”.155  Consequently, the law has come to rely on expertise from other 
social autopoietic subsystems, to provide these decisions with a more authoritative 
knowledge base than either judicial opinion or traditional fault- or gender-based 
rules of thumb, which are now perceived to be outmoded.156      
 
2.4.1 Law and Child Welfare Science 
 
King and Piper have asserted that, as a result, a separate autopoietic subsystem has 
developed, which they have labelled child welfare science.  Although initially an 
amalgam of predictions from medicine, psychology, psychiatry and social work 
about what is good for children, it has developed its own discursive identity, with its 
own meaning-making procedures and personnel, and with a binary code of “bad for 
children” or “good for children”.157   This system appears increasingly self-referential 
and self-reinforcing.158   
 
Researchers have found the participants in this new welfare discourse to be well-
versed in structuring their communications to be heard by law.159   However, it is too 
simplistic to assume that there has been a complete merger of these two discourses.160 
As has been seen, adherents to autopoietic theory assert that true communication 
between closed subsystems is impossible.  What may look like genuine sharing of 
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information is instead termed interference, where one subsystem creates 
“turbulence”, which forces the other subsystem to recreate this information and 
adjust its processes in a way largely pre-determined by its own existing structures.161   
In the case of law and child welfare science, the two systems’ objectives and 
understandings of children remain incompatible.162  Moreover, commentators have 
detected signs of “growing legal imperialism or colonisation”: law is imposing its 
discursive frameworks where the languages of medicine or mediation were 
previously used, and since law enslaves other discourses, it reserves the right to 
reinterpret or reject child welfare science evidence.163   It can be argued that law is, 
within both subsystems, perceived to be the more powerful; it is, therefore, the child 
welfare science subsystem that has to make changes to redress the contradictions 
created by interference.164  Family law reforms, like individual court decisions, must 
be justified by reference to child welfare science findings.  Data is used and 
presented as neutral, objective and scientific. Yet, in both these situations, law 
“hijacks” or enslaves child welfare knowledge by recreating it internally in a way 
that fits its existing cognitive framework and its purposes.165  There are numerous 
examples of re-entry in law’s adoption of empirical work from the welfare sciences.  
There is, for instance, a large body of research on divorce, paternal involvement and 
child welfare; but recent overviews have reached agreement only on the 
impossibility of drawing any clear conclusions.166 However, King and Piper have 
traced how influential research findings and theories from Bowlby in the 1960’s, 
Goldstein et al in the 1970’s, and Wallerstein and Kelly in the 1980’s have all been 
imported into law as simplified “quasi-legal principles”.167   Social science caveats 
against the generalisation of study findings (expressed, for example, by Wallerstein 
and Kelly) are not heard by law since it is part of law’s modus operandi to generalise 
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and detect common patterns in order to deliver consistent judgments.168  It should, 
moreover, be noted that not all findings from child welfare sciences are adopted; 
selections appear to be made.169  Research from the early 1980’s stressing the harm 
children suffer when their parents divorce was admitted into legal knowledge, but 
later research painting a more complex picture has been largely ignored.170   
Contemporary child welfare science is misunderstood as stipulating that children 
need both their parents.  The section on permanent parenthood traced how law’s 
definitions of family have changed to maintain links between fathers and children 
and thus obfuscate social change.  Furthermore, the public/private dichotomy was 
identified as the cause of law’s inability to value the unregulated (and thus invisible) 
care that is still provided primarily by mothers.  As a closed, self-evaluating 
subsystem, law is unaware of this self-imposed blind spot.171 Thus, when the welfare 
principle mentions the child’s need for continuing ties with both parents, this 
seemingly gender-neutral insistence is in fact gendered.  The continuation of the 
mother’s care is implicitly assumed so that the welfare test comes to focus almost 
exclusively on the child’s need for a father, or the risk of harm if the father-child 
relationship is damaged.172     
 
In conclusion, law has enslaved child welfare science information to create “a 
selective and simplified version of welfare” with a rigid and patriarchal insistence on 
continuing father-child relationships.173 Since children are thought to be unlikely to 
grow into healthy adulthood without fathers, fatherless families are dysfunctional, 
and legal intervention is consistent with the public/private dichotomy.  As is 
discussed in later chapters, there is a very real risk that the shared residence order 
will come to be seen as a tool to fix these supposedly broken families, without any 
real consideration of whether this will, in fact, improve individual children’s 
circumstances.     
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2.5 REASONABLENESS 
 
2.5.1 Introduction  
 
The final section of this chapter focuses on the third important strand in 
contemporary family law; the insistence on ‘reasonableness’: conciliatory, 
responsible behaviour on the part of parents.  The promotion of non-adversarial 
means of dispute resolution has been a long-term objective of family law in most 
Western jurisdictions.174  This is not only because the welfare principle prohibits 
consideration of which parent deserves to win, but also due to a realisation that the 
results that can be achieved through the use of law are limited.175  The adversarial 
process has been proven to be a largely ineffective or even counterproductive use of 
both individual and public resources, as “high-conflict parents” have kept their 
families “in perpetual turmoil” through hearings, appeals and new cases.176   
Consequently, the past two decades have seen “a paradigm shift” in how legal 
systems process disputes involving children.177  Legislation is based on the 
assumption that parents can and should negotiate their own arrangements for their 
children and there is a well-documented “settlement culture”, where this message is 
conveyed by all professional groups.178  This emphasis on private ordering, and on 
giving parents the freedom to negotiate their own agreements, could be seen as 
consistent with the traditional liberal public/private dichotomy.  However, the focus 
on parental autonomy does not amount to a carte blanche.  The law not only expects 
parents to take private responsibility for their children but also to exercise this in a 
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responsible way.179  Family lawyers are expected to encourage clients to settle, and 
also to steer them towards preferred solutions and get them to “act sensibly”.180   
 
2.5.2  A Paradigm Shift?  
 
In 1995, King and Piper, writing from an autopoietic perspective, were pessimistic 
about law’s capacity for fundamental change in its approach to disputes over 
children.181  They contrasted the traditional retrospective adversarial approach with a 
more forward-looking, conciliatory “welfarist” approach as typified by mediation.   
The latter was described as involving a rewriting of parents’ stories which sought to 
focus attention away from past events, constructed both parents as having the 
capacity to be sensible and responsible, and facilitated compromise in order to avoid 
adversarial litigation.182  It is impossible to read these comments without noticing the 
striking changes that have occurred since they were made.  The terminology used by 
mediators and child psychologists has replaced the adversarial language of taking 
sides, blame and fault.183  It should be noted, however, that this change stops short of 
“shared normativity”;184 what has been incorporated into law is the legal system’s 
own versions of “psychology-within-law” or “mediation-within-law”.185  The legal 
subsystems can never fundamentally alter its character, since new components have 
to be created from existing components in compliance with existing internal 
structures and to suit existing purposes.186  Thus, these new versions of welfare-
related discourses differ markedly from the originals; they are, for example, more 
rigid in their hierarchies.  The limited effect of this structural coupling can be seen 
inter alia in relation to mediation.  Alternative forms of dispute resolution developed 
within different subsystems, but have increasingly been “colonised” by law.187  
Separating parents are encouraged, coerced or ordered into attending at all stages in 
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the legal process.188  As mediation has been accommodated into the legal framework, 
the focus has been narrowed to agreement on the immediate issues rather than long 
term resolution of conflicts.189 Mediation is often considered to be working well; but 
success is assessed solely in terms of quantity rather than the quality of the 
agreements reached.190  Although the same terminology is used, words have been 
given slightly different meanings, and the objectives have been adjusted to suit law’s 
purposes; it would not be an unreasonable observation to speak of law’s enslavement 
of mediation.191    
 
Secondly, family law’s current emphasis on compromise and ‘reasonableness’ is the 
result of incorporation into law reform debate of external arguments (or 
interference) of a political nature.  If law appears more powerful than child welfare 
science, and, thus, able to dismiss some child welfare communications as redundant 
“noise”,192 the opposite is true in relation to law and politics.193  Law is, according to 
Teubner, “determined to a considerable extent by political influences, economic 
structures, and social factors”.194  For the purposes of this thesis, it is useful to 
explore the influence of post-liberalism and communitarianism.  It should be borne 
in mind, however, that the post-liberal and communitarian ideas explored within the 
politics autopoietic subsystem become something very different once admitted into 
law.195  Communitarianism, as espoused by Etzioni, emphasises communities as 
counterbalances to both personal selfishness and excessive state power or 
bureaucracy.196  The critique of liberalism’s autonomous individual resonates well 
with contemporary fears about societal disintegration, as does the assertion that 
“state responsibility should be matched by individual responsibility”.197  Post-
liberalist perspectives, moreover, reject the liberal reliance on individual autonomy 
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and freedom of choice as artificial.  There is, instead, a more realistic recognition 
that individual characters are shaped by social experiences and relationships to such 
an extent that their choices cannot be regarded as truly autonomous.198  The 
conclusion that choice is not really free has led to reinterpretation of autonomy and 
responsibility where decisions are appraised purely on how they are made; the 
emphasis is on reflection and self-discovery.199 There is, however, a further strand to 
communitarianism.  It has justly been criticised for its simplistic view of 
communities as essentially benign repositories of community norms, and the belief 
that these values can be acquired through participation in civic life.200 It is also seen 
as legitimate to use law to send normative messages expressing these shared values, 
and academic commentators in a number of disparate areas have identified the 
coercive potential of communitarianism’s conclusion that “the state is better 
equipped to identify the common good than those selfishly interested in advancing 
their own private goals”.201  Etzioni saw a clear role for family law in halting family 
disintegration since “[l]aw in a good society is first and foremost the continuation of 
morality by other means”.202  The insistence on inclusion, as defined by subscribing 
to a shared set of norms and morals, means that policy on supporting parents 
“shades into authoritarian control”.203   According to Reece, this leads to a “coercive 
slide” where the obligation to reflect is complemented by “an additional duty to 
reach the right result”.204   
 
These interferences from politics and mediation have had to be recreated within the 
legal subsystem using existing components: context-dependent ideals, 
recommendations and probabilities have been translated into abstract prescriptions 
and certainties.  The good divorce, “the ‘idealised’ pole of a binary divide” is 
forward-looking, conciliatory and child-focused, preserving good links between all 
family members.  Conversely, it is “bad” to focus on past behaviour, or to take an 
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aggressive or adversarial stance.205   These classifications have “become entrenched 
through the cumulative effect of self-reinforcing professional received wisdom”.206   
Thus, in legal discourse, if a responsible parent always puts the child first, 
recognising the child’s paramount need to know the other parent, and conflict per se 
is constructed as harmful, then parents who fight over matters such as contact or 
residence are prima facie in the wrong.207  Consequently, their objections are often 
dismissed or trivialised.208  As is argued in subsequent chapters, a presumption in 
favour of court-ordered shared residence should, therefore, be resisted on the 
grounds that it could expose parents and children to unjustifiable risks.    
 
2.5.3 The Gendered Dimension  
 
The insistence on reasonable, conciliatory parenting appears prima facie to apply 
equally to both sexes, but normative expectations are, in fact, highly gendered.  Law, 
as a closed subsystem, is unable to interact directly with the parents who appear 
before it.  Instead, individuals are reconstructed as semantic artefacts and the “role 
bundles” ascribed to fathers and mothers differ markedly.209  Constructions of 
fatherhood are characterised by flux or ambivalence, resulting from a tension 
between the breadwinner model and the new “hands-on” father.210  Law seeks to 
encourage fathers to maintain an involvement with their children without any real 
consideration of what fathers ought to do and is reluctant to categorise litigants as 
“bad” fathers.211 Thus, a “powerful and culturally hegemonic representation of good, 
benign fatherhood in law” has emerged, but it is vague and hazy.212  Fathers’ active 
participation in parenting is neither expected nor subjected to any particular legal 
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scrutiny; “virtually any involvement” has “come to be considered good-enough 
fathering”.213   
 
The contemporary construction of motherhood is also shaped by the tension 
between the Victorian domestic paradigm and the contemporary expectation that 
women can be successful in a variety of roles.  However, the modern emphasis on 
child welfare, together with the construction of mothers as the primary “meeters” of 
children’s needs, has made the semantic artefact of mother more demanding.214   At 
the same time, law’s relegation of typically female tasks such as caring for children 
into the private sphere allows it to ignore the gap between gender-neutral legislation 
and the gendered organisation of most families.  Empirical research has suggested 
that fathers in particular find it very difficult to adapt to post-separation parenting 
because in their intact families their interaction with their children was 
predominantly mediated by the mothers.215  Legal debate, however, remains focused 
on the problems of parent absence; the understanding of maternal care as a “natural 
outpouring of love” allows law to assume that mothers will remedy any paternal 
shortcomings.216  The “idealised image of the separated family” obscures gendered 
inequalities, since mothers continue to shoulder the practical responsibilities, while 
decision-making must be shared with fathers.217   This unequal distribution of rights 
and duties is particularly disappointing for women who do not judge post-separation 
relationships to be good enough to justify the efforts necessary to maintain them.218  
It is, however, difficult for mothers to complain.  This is partly because “good” 
motherhood is understood in terms of self-sacrifice.219  Furthermore, the taken-for-
granted nature of mothering combines with law’s desire to preserve patriarchal 
power structures to focus the welfare test on children’s need for fathers.220 Mothers 
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who reject the dominant welfare rhetoric are condemned as “bad” and “selfish”.221  
Wallbank has suggested that the law’s strong reaction can be attributed to these 
women’s “twofold” treachery against the patriarchal norm: they are not only 
renouncing the stereotype of meek and selfless motherhood but are also rejecting the 
emotional and economic authority of a man inherent in the binuclear family.222    
 
In conclusion, law has attempted to fit mediation’s construction of parents’ disputes 
as well as post-liberal and communitarian understandings of responsible behaviour 
into its pre-existing normative framework where child welfare is best promoted 
through continuing father-child ties within a binuclear, patriarchal family.  The 
result is that law has altered its normative expectations, and has begun to judge 
mothers according to a binary code where those who fail to support the father-child 
relationship are “bad” mothers.  Law’s coercive power is, however, hidden behind 
ostensible gender neutral and laudable exhortations to behave reasonably.   
 
2.6 CONCLUSION  
 
The closed nature of the legal autopoietic system has preserved a patriarchal 
cognitive framework, which still determines how law processes family disputes.  
The current stress on the permanent nature of parenthood is an attempt to protect 
patriarchal power structures, but this is hidden by the welfare discourse, where the 
child’s welfare is first stated to be paramount, and then interpreted primarily as the 
child’s need for a legal relationship with his or her father.  The importation into 
law’s binary code of the language of mediation and post-liberal understandings of 
responsible behaviour have led to a rigid proscription of good post-separation 
parenting which law enforces by coercing parents, and mothers in particular.  Thus, 
family law becomes another means of discouraging autonomous motherhood 
through the rhetoric of child welfare.223  This thesis argues that it is, in this 
discursive climate, undesirable and even dangerous to use the shared residence order 
in contested cases; it will develop this point further in subsequent chapters. 
                                                 
221  Bailey-Harris et al (1999) op cit n181, p116; Smart & Neale (1999) op cit n142, p143. 
222  Wallbank (1998) op cit n175, p361.  
223 Diduck, A (1995) “The Unmodified Family: The Child Support Act and the Construction of Legal 
Subjects”, 22(4) Journal of Law and Society, 527-548, p538. 
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3 WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT 
SHARED RESIDENCE 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis argues against a shared residence presumption and it is, therefore, 
important to examine what is currently known about the benefits or disadvantages 
of shared residence, and to consider in particular how these differ when the 
arrangement is imposed against the wishes of parents.   The chapter is not confined 
to the two jurisdictions which are the subject of this thesis, but also includes material 
from the US, where the arrangement first gained popularity, as well as 
Commonwealth and other Scandinavian jurisdictions.   The thesis argues that the 
implementation of a shared residence presumption would be shaped predominantly 
by the three dominant strands in contemporary family law and would, therefore, 
develop in an undesirable way.   This chapter, thus, discusses available knowledge in 
relation to these themes: law’s inherently patriarchal character; its rigid 
interpretation of what is in a child’s best interests; and its insistence that parents 
must be reasonable.  It concludes that shared residence should not be forced upon 
reluctant parents or children.  
 
3.2 PERMANENT PATRIARCHAL PARENTHOOD 
 
It may be thought that it is unnecessary to consider arguments based on patriarchy 
or fathers’ rights given the dominance of the paramountcy principle; all arguments 
in residence disputes now have to be expressed in the dominant welfare language.  
The previous chapter traced how welfare has come to be understood primarily as the 
child’s need for a father.  Moreover, the welfare discourse is also often successfully 
used to clothe rights-based arguments with a veneer of respectability.1  
 
                                                 
1  Ryrstedt, E (2009b) “Samarbetssamtal” Svensk Juristtidning, 821-842, p839.   
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3.2.1 Shared Residence and Anxieties about Fatherlessness  
 
These arguments can draw on a wealth of research which asserts that children living 
with separated single mothers are at greater risks than their counterparts from 
nuclear families, in terms both of external behaviours such as truancy or alcohol 
abuse, and internalising problems such as depression.2  US studies have, moreover, 
claimed to link high father involvement to better outcomes for children in terms of 
development and adjustment; a large Norwegian study has suggested this cannot be 
attributed solely to the economic deprivation of single parent families.3  It has 
consequently been argued that shared residence, which is the post-separation 
arrangement which most closely mimics the intact family, can diminish the negative 
effects of parental separation.4   
 
There is also research that claims to identify reasons why shared residence helps 
fathers have a positive impact in a child’s life.  Law’s autopoietic nature means that 
research findings are more likely to be taken up by the legal system where they focus 
on the characteristics law conservatively associates with fatherhood.  Amato and 
Gilbreth have suggested that shared residence helps fathers exert the kind of positive 
influence they identify as “authoritative parenting” and link to better outcomes for 
children.5   Other academics have also cited these findings to support shared 
residence on the grounds that this sort of involvement is more likely where parents 
are implementing children’s everyday routines.6 
 
Since father absence has been associated with negative outcomes, research has also 
focused on identifying factors which cause or prevent it. Kruk interviewed 80 US 
non-custodial fathers for his study on paternal disengagement and found that the 
                                                 
2  Amato, P (2000) “The Consequences of Divorce for Adults and Children” 62(4) Journal of Marriage and the 
Family, 1269-1287; Breivik, K & Olweus, D (2006b) “Children of Divorce in a Scandinavian Welfare State: 
Are they Less Affected than US Children?” 47(1) Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 61-74.   
3  Scott, E & Derdeyn, A (1984) “Rethinking Joint Custody”, 45(2) Ohio State Law Journal 455-498, p487; 
Breivik, K & Olweus, D (2006a) “Adolescents' Adjustment in Four Post-Divorce Family Structures”, 44(3) 
Journal of Divorce and Remarriage, 99-124, p112.  
4  Scott & Derdeyn (1984) op cit n3, p458. 
5  Amato, P & Gilbreth, J (1999) “Nonresident Fathers and Children’s Well-Being: A Meta-Analysis”, 61(3) 
Journal of Marriage and the Family, 557-573, pp558-559.   
6  Bauserman, R (2002) “Child Adjustment in Joint-Custody versus Sole-Custody Arrangements”, 16(1) 
Journal of Family Psychology, 91-102, p98; Buchanan, A & Hunt, J (2003) “Disputed Contact Cases in the 
Courts” in Bainham, A, Lindley, B, Richards, M & Trinder, L (Eds) Children and their Families: Contact, 
Rights and Welfare, 365-386, p367; Singer, A (2008) “Active Parenting or Solomon’s Justice?  Alternating 
Residence in Sweden for Children with Separated Parents”, 4(2) Utrecht Law Review, 35-47, p44.  
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majority “indicated a feeling of exclusion in relation to the postdivorce family”.7  He 
saw fathers’ consequent disengagement as a direct consequence of the stilted nature 
of the traditional model.8   Similar claims have been made by fathers who complain 
of being relegated to the secondary status of a Sunday “McDad”.9   In Trinder’s 
sample, non-resident fathers complained that the loss of daily dealings with their 
children had caused a “sense of role insecurity”.10  Children interviewed for the same 
project reported that the artificial circumstances of contact visits stood in the way of 
meaningful relationships.11  In a study by Simpson et al, many fathers “alluded to the 
sense of emotional distance” in their relationships with their children, and linked 
this to the loss of daily routines of child care and home-making.12    Consequently, 
shared residence appears to provide the solution to father absence that law has been 
seeking.   However, less appealing reasons why fathers want shared residence have 
also been identified in the research.   
 
3.2.2 The Wrong Motives: Justice 
 
There is evidence that shared residence is sometimes seen as a question of parental 
entitlement; a simple, formal interpretation of equality is employed to claim that a 
50/50 split eliminates discrimination.13  Although this cannot be argued at court, 
where only welfare-related submissions are heard, it has been asserted sufficiently 
frequently and vociferously elsewhere to create what Teubner has termed 
turbulence; external interference which results in the closed system making internal 
changes to adjust.14  Empirical research also shows that some litigants do not 
subscribe to law’s dominant welfare discourse, but instead think in terms of justice 
and entitlement.  Smart et al worryingly noted that for a significant minority of 
divorced fathers in their study, a rhetoric of legal rights had become a substitute for 
                                                 
7 Kruk, E (1994) “The Disengaged non-custodial Father: Implications for Social Work Practice with the 
Divorced Family”, 39(1) Social Work, 15-25, pp21-22. 
8 Ibid, p23.  
9  http://men.typepad.com/mens_hour/mcdad_day_demo_17_jun_2005/ accessed 12th August 2009.   
10  Trinder, L (2003) “Working and Not Working Contact After Divorce” in Bainham et al (Eds) op cit n6, 
387-406, pp390-391.  
11  Ibid, pp390-391.  
12  Simpson, B, Jessop, J & McCarthy, P (2003) ”Fathers after Divorce” in Bainham et al (Eds) op cit n6, 201-
219, pp212-213.  
13 Fineman, M (2001) “Fatherhood, Feminism and Family Law”, 32(4) McGeorge Law Review, 1031-1049, 
pp1039-1040.  
14  Teubner, G, Schiff, D & Nobles, R (2003) “The Autonomy of Law: Introduction to Legal Autopoiesis”, in 
Schiff, D & Nobles, R (Eds) Jurisprudence, London, Butterworths, 897-954.  
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bonds of affection.15 The authors warned that shared residence, as a modern version 
of Solomon’s famous judgment, “might actually become a detrimental splitting of 
the child’s time to provide equal parts to competing parents”.16   Two studies 
conducted for the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare (NBHW) and a 
Swedish Legislative Review Committee respectively also found substantial numbers 
of court cases where the focus had shifted away from the child onto the parents’ 
needs and wishes.17    
 
3.2.3 Shared Residence and Gender Equality  
 
Fathers’ rights campaigners tend, however, to have moved away from simple rights 
rhetoric and often promote shared residence as a route to greater equality between 
men and women: “[f]atherhood is now the key to feminism”.18  It is said that a 
greater use of shared residence could help remould societal understandings of 
fathering, while also encouraging individual men away from traditional gendered 
patterns.19  The autopoietic perspective necessarily renders any response to such 
arguments pessimistic, following Teubner’s assertions regarding the impossibility of 
true communication between systems, and the often unpredictable effects that result 
when one system attempts to influence another.20  Indeed, law reform has repeatedly 
been shown to be an inefficient tool for changing individuals’ behaviour, particularly 
in the area of familial organisation where cultural norms play a significant part, and 
a variety of other factors are known to influence decisions.21  Studies show that 
women continue to perform a disproportionate amount of caring/domestic tasks in 
intact families, leaving fathers underequipped for their post-divorce role.22  At 
present research suggests that many post-separation fathers continue to delegate 
                                                 
15  In contrast, fathers who had formed strong emotional links with their children tended to see the question 
of rights as superfluous.  Smart, C & Neale, B (1999) Family Fragments?, Cambridge, Polity Press, p130, p165. 
16 Neale, B, Smart, C & Wade, A (2001) The Changing Experience of Childhood: Families and Divorce, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, p126. 
17 Socialstyrelsen (2004b) Växelvis Boende.  Att Bo Hos både Pappa och Mamma Fast De Inte Bor Tillsammans, 
Stockholm, Socialstyrelsen, p37.  
18  Geldof, B, “You Sit Outside and Wait and Sob”, The Times, 5th December 2003.  
19  Ibid.  
20  Teubner, G (1993) Law as an Autopoietic System, London, Blackwell, p14, p95. 
21  Statistika Centralbyrån (2004) Barn of deras Föräldrar 2003, Stockholm, SCB; Lundqvist, Å & Roman, C 
(2003) ”Önska, Välja och Vilja”, Sociologisk Forskning, 12-33, p26.  
22  McKie, L, Bowlby, S & Gregory, S (2001) “Gender, Caring and Employment in Britain”, 30(2) Journal of 
Social Policy, 233-258, p242; SOU 2004:70, p113 (Swedish Official Enquiry); Barry, M (1997) “The District of 
Columbia's Joint Custody Presumption: Misplaced Blame and Simplistic Solutions”, 46(3)Catholic 
University Law Review, 767-834, p819. 
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practical caring responsibilities to female members of their extended families.23  This 
can suggest not only unfamiliarity with the new role but perhaps also a reluctance to 
assume it.24     
 
Presumptions in favour of 50/50 have been criticised for granting fathers a stronger 
position “than their efforts in the care-taking of children should fairly allow”.25  
There are reasons justifying the courts’ current perceived preferential treatment of 
mothers; to disregard these reasons amounts to discrimination.26  Mothers have, in 
several studies, expressed disappointment regarding gender neutral legislation that 
renders their parenting efforts during the relationship largely immaterial.27  
Sandberg has asserted: “the result of treating people equally when their situation is 
in fact different is a de facto inequality”.28   This point is revisited towards the end of 
the chapter.   
 
3.2.4 The Wrong Motives: Power and Financial 
Considerations  
 
Similarly, greater use of court-ordered shared residence through the introduction of 
a presumption should be resisted on the grounds that it may perpetuate or exacerbate 
imbalances of power.  In theory, disparities should disappear, since both parents are 
given equal responsibility and authority.   However, family law has previously 
justifiably been criticised for ignoring hidden power relationships within families.29   
This could be attributed to law’s autopoietic nature, and the continuing influence of 
the public/private dichotomy, which allows law to dismiss information about the 
domestic sphere as redundant.  There is ample evidence from England and Sweden 
of abusive men using court orders to harass their former partners and frustrate the 
                                                 
23  Smart & Neale (1999) op cit; Altman, S (1996) “Should Child Custody Rules be Fair?” 35(2) University of 
Louisville Journal of Family Law, 325-354, pp340-341. 
24 Scott, E (1992) “Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody”, 80(3) California Law Review, 615-672, 
pp635-636; Fineman, M & Opie, A (1987) “The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: 
Custody Determinations at Divorce”, Wisconsin Law Review, 107-158, p124.   
25  Sandberg, K (1989) “Best Interests and Justice” in Smart, C & Sevenhuijsen, S (Eds) Child Custody and the 
Politics of Gender, London, Routledge, 100-125, p109; Scott (1992) op cit n24, p627. 
26  Altman (1996) op cit n23, p340. 
27  Laing, K (2006) “Doing the Right Thing: Cohabiting Parents, Separation and Child Contact”, 20(2) IJLPF, 
169-179. 
28  Sandberg (1989) op cit n25, p109. 
29  Smart, C (1989b) “Power and the Politics of Child Custody” in Smart, C & Sevenhuijsen, S (Eds) Child 
Custody and the Politics of Gender, London, Routledge, 1-26, p25; Pearce, J, Davis, G & Barron, J (1999) “Love 
in a Cold Climate - Section 8 Applications under the Children Act 1989", Family Law, 22-28, p25. 
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latter’s efforts to rebuild self-esteem and parenting skills.30  Since shared residence is 
known to require more frequent and more detailed negotiations between parents, it 
provides ample opportunities for this sort of harmful behaviour.31  In addition, 
research suggests that a larger proportion of fathers feel unhappy about a perceived 
loss of control to sole-residence mothers; they may seek shared residence primarily 
in the hope of avoiding negotiations they perceive as unnecessary, burdensome or 
demeaning.32    
 
There is so much anecdotal evidence from a number of jurisdictions that it seems 
clear that parents either request or resist shared residence for reasons related to child 
support and the allocation of state benefits.33   In Sweden, surges in the popularity of 
shared residence in 1997 and 2000 coincided with changes in the child support 
calculations.34  Two research projects interviewing National Insurance Bureaux 
(NIB) administrators have  shown that the latter think all but a small minority of 
contact or residence disputes involve financial considerations, and that as many as a 
quarter of shared residence applications are motivated primarily by a wish to stop 
paying child support.35     There are English reported cases where it would seem 
fathers have made shared residence applications chiefly or solely to escape child 
support or secure social housing.36   
 
Finally, interviews with family lawyers have suggested that fathers with these kinds 
of motives pose a double threat to children.  Firstly, a parent who has sought shared 
                                                 
30 Hale, B (1999) “The View from Court 45", 11(4) CFLQ, 377-386; Eriksson, M & Hester, M (2001) “Violent 
Men as Good Enough Fathers?: A Look at England and Sweden” 7(7) Violence Against Women, 779-798, 
p792; Nilsson, E (1998) Att Dela Ett Barn – Tvistiga Vårdnadsmål, Stockholm, Stiftelsen Allmänna 
Barnhuset & Socialstyrelsen,  p50. 
31  Johnson, J (1994) "High Conflict Divorce" 4 The Future of Children 165-182 as cited in Cossman, B & 
Mykitiuk, R (1998) “Reforming Child Custody and Access Law in Canada: A Discussion Paper”, 15 
Canadian Journal of Family Law, 13-78, p53.   
32 Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n17, p21; Smart & Neale (1999) op cit n15, p145; Rhoades, H (2002) “The ‘No 
Contact Mother’: Reconstructions of Motherhood in the Era of the ‘New Father’”, 16(1) IJLPF, 71-94, p72. 
33 Singer, A (2008) “Active Parenting or Solomon’s Justice?  Alternating Residence in Sweden for Children 
with Separated Parents”, 4(2) Utrecht Law Review, 35-47,p46; Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n17, p30; Elrod, L 
& Dale, M (2008) “Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of Children in 
the Balance”, 42(3) Family Law Quarterly, 381-418, p399.  
34  Saldeen, Å (2001) Barn och Föräldrar (4:e upplagan), Uppsala, Iustus Förlag, p192; Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op 
cit n17, p38.   
35  Singer (2008) op cit  p45; Interview with Eva Ryrstedt in Larsson, C (2004) ”Samförstånd Till Varje Pris?”, 
2 rfv.se Tidning om Socialförsäkring, 8-11, p9.  
36  Child-Villiers v Secretary for Work and Pensions [2002] EWCA Civ 1854;  Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond LBC 
[2009] UKHL 7. The House of Lords, however, upheld the council’s decision that under the Housing Act 
1996 s.198(1)(b) it did not have to house the father, as he was not someone with whom children could 
reasonably be expected to reside.    
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residence for financial reasons, for example, may actually use that time to improve 
the relationship, but it would be overly optimistic to assume this will always be the 
case.37    Secondly, the experience of many legal personnel is that where parents seek 
orders with the wrong objectives, children are often disappointed by fathers’ 
subsequent lack of interest.38  One solicitor interviewed by Bailey-Harris et al 
commented that he had “a filing cabinet full” of contact cases where fathers had 
used the legal process “as a way of control”, but had subsequently taken so little 
interest in the children that contact was eventually abandoned.39  The story was by 
no means unique.40  Shared residence is known to be a practically and financially 
demanding arrangement, which is particularly likely to be abandoned.41  Parents who 
seek it for selfish reasons are, thus, unlikely to continue making the necessary 
sacrifices over long periods of time.  In these circumstances, shared residence harms 
children. Family law is unlikely to be able to identify these cases, due to its self-
imposed inability to see the domestic as well as its documented reluctance to 
question fathers’ motives.  There is now widespread agreement, at least in principle, 
that shared residence should only be ordered where it is in children’s best interests, 
and this chapter, therefore, continues by exploring the relationship between shared 
residence and the welfare test.   
 
3.3 THE PARAMOUNTCY PRINCIPLE 
 
Courts deciding residence and contact disputes have increasingly come to depend on 
child welfare science expertise, but since an autopoietic subsystem can only admit 
information that is compatible with its own cognitive framework, law’s 
understanding of this information is only partial.42  It is, therefore, important to 
examine what the research evidence can contribute to this debate.   
 
                                                 
37  Ryrstedt, E (2006) “Family Law and Social Law: Reciprocal Dependency in a Comparative Perspective”, 
20(1) IJLPF, 44-52, pp47-48.  
38 Extra-judicial observations by Hall J, based on the experience of hearing contact cases.  Hall, V (1997) 
“Domestic Violence and Contact”, Family Law, 813-818, p817; King, M (1987) “Playing the Symbols – 
Custody and the Law Commission”, Family Law 186-191, p188. 
39 Bailey-Harris, R, Barron, J & Pearce, J (1999a) “From Utility to Rights? The Presumption of Contact in 
Practice”, 13(2) Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 111-131, p122. 
40 Ibid. 
41  Smart & Neale (1999) op cit n15, p23; Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n17, p12.  
42  Rejmer, A (2003) Vårdnadstvister: En Rättssociologisk Studie av Tingsrätts Funktion vid Handläggning av 
Vårdnadskonflikter med Utgångspunkt från Barnets Bästa, Lund, Sweden, Lund Studies in the Sociology of 
Law, p46.  
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3.3.1 Shared Residence and Empirical Research  
 
Within legal discourse, selectively admitted and reinterpreted child welfare 
knowledge is used by proponents of shared residence to assert that its merits have 
been proven through empirical research.   Benefits in terms of children’s adjustments 
have been found by some studies; such findings must, however, be treated with 
caution.43  The samples of many early studies were comprised exclusively of 
volunteers; the results cannot be used to support court-imposed shared residence.  
Furthermore, most of the studies usually cited in support of shared residence have 
subsequently been shown to suffer “serious methodological shortcomings”.44  There 
is a lack of reliable findings from longitudinal or large-scale studies; samples are 
often comprised of self-selecting, or homogenous groups, and there are no attempts 
to consider the impact of other, unidentified, variables.45   Finally, there is a 
tendency of “mixing correlation with cause”.46    Since the research is “necessarily 
relational rather than experimental in nature” there can be no firm evidence of a 
causal effect between shared residence and improved outcomes for children.47  More 
recent work has acknowledged the importance of self-selection: parents who get 
along tolerably well are more likely to choose shared residence; and that this is 
probably the main explanation for better relationships within shared residence 
families.48  It cannot, therefore, be said as a general assertion that shared residence 
has been proven to benefit children.  A comprehensive review of existing research 
carried out for the Washington State Supreme Court concluded that no particular 
post-separation custody arrangement could be proven to be the best.49   The same 
conclusion was drawn by the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare as well 
as two overviews of research published in UK journals.50  According to Gilmore, 
“[t]he most consistent finding across research studies is that child outcome is largely 
                                                 
43  Gilmore, S (2006a) “Contact/Shared Residence and Child Well-Being: Research Evidence and its 
Implications for Legal Decision-Making”, 20(3) IJLPF, 344-365, p346.    
44  Singer, J & Reynolds, W (1988) “A Dissent on Joint Custody”, 47(2) Maryland Law Review, 497-523, p507. 
45  Bauserman (2002) op cit n6, p99; Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n17, p16; Gustavsson, T (1999) ”Barn- och 
Ungdomspsykiatriska Synpunkter på Vårdnad, Boende och Umgänge” in Ds1999:57, Appendix 1, p126; 
Amato & Gilbreth (1999) op cit n5, p561. 
46  Barlow A & Duncan S (2000b) “New Labour’s Communitarianism, Supporting Families And The 
‘Rationality Mistake’: Part II” 22(2) JSWFL, 129-143, p134.  
47  Bauserman (2002) op cit n6, p92; Gilmore (2006a) op cit n43, p344.  
48  Breivik & Olweus (2006a) op cit n3, p119; Bauserman (2002) op cit n6, p98.   
49  Lye, D (1999) What the Experts Say: Scholarly Research on Post-Divorce Parenting and Child Wellbeing 4-2, as 
cited in In Re Marriage of Hansen (2007) 733 N.W.2d 63 per Appel J at p19.  
50  Gilmore (2006a) op cit n43, p346; Wilson, G (2006) “The Non-Resident Parental Role for Separated Fathers: 
A Review”, 20(3) IJLPF, 286-316, p290.  
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independent of custody type”.51   There is, thus, no child welfare science support for 
a presumption.   
 
3.3.2 Is Shared Residence too Disruptive?  
 
It can now be considered to have been reliably proven through empirical study that 
successfully implemented and long-lasting shared residence arrangements are not per 
se harmful to children.52  There is no need for law to stop parents where both agree to 
have the children alternating between their homes. Reservations have, nonetheless, 
been expressed that shared residence can prove too disruptive. In Sweden there is a 
general professional consensus that children under the age of three should not be 
subjected to shared residence, since they have a different sense of time, and need 
stability to establish developmentally vital parent-child bonds.53  There are US 
studies which suggest that school-age children can also find the different sets of 
rules about bedtimes, television or mealtimes a source of confusion.54  For older 
children, developmental psychologists increasingly emphasise children’s need to 
create their own social matrixes and diverse relationships.55   Shared residence is 
known to disrupt interaction with siblings, peer groups and the child’s school; it can 
make children feel different and detached.56  Some children cope well with the 
frequent transitions; they see them as a price worth paying for the advantages of 
living with both parents, or even describe them as “an exciting expansion of their 
horizons”.57  Modern technology has made it easier for older children to maintain 
contact with friends and set up social activities, despite geographical distances.  
Others, however, find the frequent changes a strain. One of the teenagers 
interviewed for the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare Report 
complained:  “There have been times when I’ve thrown myself on the bed and 
shouted ‘I can’t do this again!’.  It just feels like too much to pack everything up and 
                                                 
51  Gilmore, S (2006b) “Court Decision-making in Shared Residence Order Cases: A Critical Examination”, 
18(4) CFLQ, 478-498, p493.  
52  Gilmore (2006a) op cit n43, p355.  
53  Broberg, A & Bohlin, G (2001) ”Växelvis Boende för Små Barn: Utvecklingspsykologiska Aspekter” in 
Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n17, pp55-56; Barnombudsmannen (2000) Barndom Pågår, BO, Stockholm, 
pp113-114. Melli, M & Brown, P (2008) “Exploring a new Family Form – the Shared Time Family”, 22(2) 
IJLPF, 231-269, p240.   
54  Kipp, M (2003) “Maximizing Custody Options”, 79(1) North Dakota Law Review, 59-82, p72.  
55 Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n17, p9;  Broberg & Bohlin (2001) op cit n53, 49-63; SOU 2005:43, p161. 
56  Neale et al (2001) op cit n16, p128, p132; Barry (1997) op cit n22, p787. 
57 Neale et al (2001) op cit n16, p128. 
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re-adjust to another place one more time”.58  Two-thirds of the children in 
Rothberg‘s shared residence sample expressed negative feelings about the frequent 
moves.59 Smart et al noted that adapting to two different regimes “could require an 
astonishing amount of flexibility”; one interviewee said: “I find that I’m a different 
person at different houses”.60  Although children quickly learn to adapt to different 
environments such as school, childminders’ or relatives’ homes, “what one ‘is’ at 
home is often experienced as a ‘core’ identity”, and where this is unclear it can upset 
a child’s “sense of ontological security”.61  It is interesting to note that in McIntosh’s 
sample shared residence was a less likely outcome in families where children were 
consulted, suggesting that children are less likely than adults to favour this 
arrangement, since they are the ones who have to make the greatest sacrifices.62    
 
3.3.3 Shared Residence and Parent-Child Relationships  
 
Research evidence provides no clear conclusion on whether this is a price worth 
paying.  It has been argued that shared residence can improve the quality of parent-
child relationships by providing better opportunities for parents to act as confidants 
and role models.63  It is known that it can limit the actual loss of emotional and 
material resources otherwise experienced by children; and can also offer children a 
sense of continuity of relationships.64  If loyalty conflicts are removed and children 
can maintain their relationships with each parent without upsetting the other, this 
not only removes one source of stress, but can also provide the emotional security 
needed to cope with other pressures.65   However, children who struggle with the 
frequent transitions, or find their parents less accommodating, may feel “left out of 
both households” rather than welcome in two homes.66   
                                                 
58 Teenager quoted in Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n17, p32. 
59  Rothberg, (1983) “Joint Custody: Parental Problems and Satisfactions”, 22(1) Family Process, 43, quoted in 
Scott & Derdeyn (1984) op cit n3, pp485-486. 
60 Rachel, aged 16, quoted in Neale et al (2001) op cit n16, pp129-130. 
61 Ibid, p129. 
62  McIntosh, J (2009) “Legislating for Shared Parenting: Exploring some Underlying Assumptions”, 47(3) 
Family Court Review, 389-400, p396. 
63  Melli & Brown (2008) op cit n53, p250; Singer (2008) op cit n6, p42; Gustavsson (1999) op cit n45, p126.  
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Shared arrangements allow for the considerable burdens of childcare to be shared; 
children should consequently benefit from better parenting from both adults.67  In 
Maccoby and Mnookin’s study, adults whose children were in dual residence 
reported fewer difficulties in finding quality time for their children.68  However, it 
cannot be assumed that all parents will use their time this way.  The increasing 
popularity of shared residence may be partly because this time-sharing arrangement 
allows mothers, as well as fathers, to fit their parenting around their careers, social 
lives and new relationships.69  The creation in Sweden of the specific new term of 
barnbollning – child juggling – suggests there is some truth to this.70  If the child, too, 
forms this view of the arrangement it cannot bring the benefits of emotional 
security detailed above.  It is acknowledged that where both parents agree, there is 
very little the law can do to prevent this misuse of shared residence, but attributing 
greater weight to one parent’s objections should go a considerable way towards 
eliminating this risk.   
 
The available research suggests that the success of shared residence depends on a 
variety of variables.  For example, several studies have shown that siblings can 
report markedly different levels of satisfaction with shared residence.71  It is 
reasonable to presume that children’s individual characteristics are important, and 
that children must be consulted in order to ensure that the decision to share 
residence is in their best interests.  In McIntosh’s study, shared residence 
arrangements were more likely to last in families where the children had been 
consulted prior to their implementation.72  Moreover, children who are consulted by 
their parents and feel they can influence arrangements tend to report higher levels of 
                                                 
67 Breivik & Olweus (2006a) op cit n3, p103; SOU 2005:43, p160; Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n17, p40. 
68  Maccoby, E & Mnookin, H (1994) Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody, Harvard, 
Harvard University Press, p209.   
69  McIntosh (2009) op cit n62, p391; Svenska Dagbladet, 24th October 2005, 3rd November 2005, 6th November 
2005.  
70  Svenska Dagbladet 3rd November 2005. 
71  Buchanan, C, Maccoby, E & Dornbusch, S (1996) Adolescents after Divorce, Cambridge MA, Harvard, 
Harvard University Press and Skørten, K, Barlindhaug, R & Lidén, H (2007) Delt Bosted før Barn, Oslo, 
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satisfaction with shared residence.73  Again, this weighs against court-ordered shared 
residence since, as will be explored in subsequent chapters, children’s individual 
views are often lost in contested proceedings.   
 
One variable that appears very important is the quality of the relationship between 
the child and the parent who would otherwise not have had residence.  US research 
has shown contradictory results on the relationship between frequent contact and 
children’s outcomes; something which suggests that certain aspects of this contact 
are likely to be significant in determining its value to children.74     Research in intact 
families has shown that what fathers do with children is more important than how 
much time they spend with them.75  The meta-analysis of shared residence-related 
studies carried out by Amato and Gilbreth suggested strongly that the same applies 
to non-resident fathers.76   “[A]uthoritative parenting”, defined as a combination of 
a high level of involvement and support and a moderate level of discipline and 
guidance, could be associated with better outcomes for children in terms of academic 
achievement as well as internalizing and externalizing problem behaviours.77  It is 
true that this sort of involvement is more likely to occur if parents can participate in 
children’s daily lives “without worrying about making every minute fun”.78  
However, whether it does in fact occur depends to a large extent on the adults 
involved.  Competent fathers need to be both committed and capable; they must 
have developed the skills which enable them to parent in a child-focused and 
effective way.79  Where fathers neither possess nor actively seek these skills, but are 
content to leave the relationship at the superficial level, shared residence cannot be 
presumed to benefit their children.80     
 
                                                 
73  Cashmore, J (2003) “Children’s Participation in Family Law Matters” in Hallet, C & Prout, A (Eds) 
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Skjørten & Barlindhaug (2007) op cit n71,  p383.  
74  Amato & Gilbreth (1999) op cit n5, p564.  
75  Young, M, Miller, B Norton, M & Hill, E (1995) “The Effect of Parental Supportive Behaviors on Life 
Satisfaction of Adolescent Offspring”, Journal of Marriage and the Family, 813-822, as cited in Amato & 
Gilbreth (1999) op cit n5, p559.  
76  Amato & Gilbreth (1999) op cit n5, p569. 
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78  Kipp (2003) op cit n54, p70.   
79  Lamb, M (1997) The Role of the Father in Child Development (3rd Ed), New York, Wiley as cited in Amato & 
Gilbreth (1999) op cit n5, p569. 
80  Amato & Gilbreth (1999) op cit n5, p569; Hunt, J, Masson, J & Trinder, L (2009) “Shared Parenting: the Law, the 
Evidence and Guidance from Families Need Fathers”, Family Law, 831-836, p834. 
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This section has reviewed the available research to conclude that shared residence 
cannot be said to be uniformly good or bad; whether it benefits any particular child 
can only be determined by looking at the particular circumstances of that case.  The 
limited extent to which such enquiries are currently conducted is used in subsequent 
chapters to argue against shared residence.  
 
3.4 REASONABLENESS 
 
The final section of this chapter revisits family law’s insistence on “reasonableness”: 
sensible, responsible behaviour on the part of parents.  It was explained in the 
second chapter that family law tends to favour compromise; has become increasingly 
reluctant to intervene; and prefers to equip parents to litigate “in the shadow of the 
law” by communicating its normative expectations through legal personnel.81  
Parents must understand the need to promote their children’s long-term interests by 
toning down their own conflicts and learning to co-parent in a sensible way.82    
 
3.4.1 The Potential for Conflict Reduction 
 
It has been suggested that shared residence will reduce hostility because it introduces 
new, less adversarial language, but experience from several jurisdictions shows that 
new terminology becomes just as contentious and value-laden as the pervious 
terminology once it is used in parents’ conflicts.83     Shared residence is said to 
reduce conflict, since the equal distribution of rights and responsibilities means there 
is neither winner nor loser.84  It may be thought that the requirement for frequent 
communication will increase the opportunities for parents to disagree.  However, it 
has been said that shared residence can help parents learn vital co-parenting skills, 
that the closer collaboration will, “[i]n layman’s terms”, force parents to “get their 
act together and keep it that way”.85     There may be some moral force in the 
                                                 
81  Maccoby & Mnookin (1994) op cit n68; King, M (1999) “Being Sensible: Images and Practices of the New 
Family Lawyer”, 28(2) Journal of Social Policy 249-273; Neale, B & Smart, C (1997b) “’Good’ and ‘Bad’ 
Lawyers? Struggling in the Shadow of the New Law”, 19(4) JSWFL, 377-402, pp379-381.  
82  van Krieken, R (2005) “The ‘Best Interests of the Child’ and Parental Separation: On the ‘Civilizing of 
Parents”, 68(1) MLR, 25-48, p37.  
83  Elrod & Dale (2008) op cit n33, p398; Rejmer, A(2002) ”Barnperspektiv och Barnet Bästa i Tingsrätts 
Handläggning av Vårdnadstvister”, Svensk JuristTidning, 139-156, p147.  
84  Harty & Wood (1991) op cit n66, p430; Altman (1996) op cit n23, p334. 
85  McIntosh (2009) op cit n62, p395; Statistics Sweden, cited in Svenska Dagbladet, 20th October 2005.   
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common-sense assertion that since it was the parents who created the difficult 
situation through their decision to separate, “they should be the ones who have to 
learn to cooperate for the best interests of their child”.86   Nevertheless, there is no 
empirical evidence to support the idea that parents can learn this way; the available 
studies suggest the opposite.87  Smart et al found that families with traditional sole-
residence-and-contact arrangements contained conflict better than their shared 
residence counterparts.88  Clearer roles, less negotiation and greater individual 
freedom for both parents were identified as possible reasons, as were the 
comparatively lighter financial and emotional costs involved.89  This study also 
echoed findings by Maccoby and Mnookin that degrees of parental collaboration 
tended to diminish over time, even where practical care was still shared on an 
approximately equal basis.90    
 
McIntosh has concluded that while the assumption that parents will ‘learn to get 
their act together’ may work in some instances, “[t]his logic falters with complex, 
conflicted families”, i.e. the sort of families who are most likely to resort to 
adjudication to resolve their disputes.91  Parents with shared parenting have been 
shown, in several studies, to be just as likely to feel negatively about each other as 
other parents.92  Shared residence “is not necessarily the product of a shared 
commitment to its ethos” but may instead, according to Smart and Neale, represent 
“an uneasy compromise” or a temporary stalemate.93  One Swedish parent described 
shared residence as “a balance of terror” rather than peace:  negotiations had broken 
down and a 50/50 split was seized upon to put the conflict on hold.94   Such truces 
are unlikely to last, and several studies have shown shared residence to be less stable 
than sole residence alternatives.95   This is particularly so where parents have not 
freely agreed; in McIntosh’s sample, families who had voluntarily chosen shared 
residence were more than twice as likely to remain committed to it than the families 
                                                 
86  Kipp (2003) op cit n54, p71.  
87  SOU 2005:43, p161; Singer (2008) op cit n6, p42; Gilmore (2006a) op cit n43, p350; Rhoades (2002) op cit n32, 
p87; Maccoby & Mnookin (1994) op cit n68, p236.  
88  Smart & Neale (1999) op cit n15, p63. 
89  Ibid, p59, p63. 
90  Maccoby & Mnookin (1994) op cit n68. 
91  McIntosh (2009) op cit n62, p395.   
92  Smart & Neale (1999) op cit n15, p60; Maccoby & Mnookin (1994) op cit n68, p51. 
93  Smart & Neale (1999) op cit n15, p60. 
94  “Med Barnen som Vapen: Vi Ville ha Stöd inte Världskrig”, Dagens Nyheter,27th November 2001.  
95  Singer, J (2009) “Dispute Resolution and the Postdivorce Family: Implications of a Paradigm Shift”, 47(3) 
Family Court Review, 363-370, p367;  McIntosh (2009) op cit n62, p395; Smart & Neale (1999) op cit n15, p76. 
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who had been coerced into trying shared residence.96   In the entire sample, only one-
third of all shared residence arrangements were still in place after one year; after 
four years, that figure had fallen to 17%.97  A qualitative study carried out for the 
Swedish NBHW report found that half of the court-ordered shared residence 
arrangements in the sample had been abandoned after one year, with parents 
reporting that shared residence had failed to remedy their previous inability to 
communicate.98  These research findings must constitute a strong argument against 
a shared residence presumption, which would be likely to make the judiciary more 
willing to impose shared residence despite one parent’s objections.  It can be argued 
to be contrary to the no-order principle’s stipulation that orders should only be made 
where children are shown to benefit.99  Abandoned shared residence schedules, 
consequent renegotiations, and further litigation are likely to impact negatively 
upon children.   
 
3.4.2 Shared Residence can be Counterproductive  
 
There is also evidence that suggests that shared residence can be bad for children in 
cases where it does last, and that this is particularly likely to be the case when 
parents have been coerced or ordered to share residence.  Research for a Norwegian 
commission of inquiry found that forcing shared residence on reluctant parents did 
nothing except expose children to harmful conflict.  As a result of its 
recommendation, the legislation was amended to prohibit shared residence where 
one parent objects.100  Similarly, the NBHW report concluded from its small study 
that the imposition of a shared residence arrangement often amplified existing 
conflicts.101  Melli and Brown found that the frequent contact needed for shared 
parenting meant those parents were more likely to report disagreements.102  This is 
an important aspect of the general evaluation of shared residence, since there is “a 
substantial body of research” which has identified a link between interparental 
                                                 
96  McIntosh (2009) op cit n62, p394.   
97  Ibid.  
98 Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n17, p8.  
99  The Children Act 1989 s.1(5).   
100  NOU 1998:17 p80, [12.4.1]. 
101 Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n17, p8, p36.  
102  Melli & Brown (2008) op cit n53, p252.  
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conflict and poor outcomes for children.103  It may explain why frequent contact 
with both parents seems to benefit children in harmonious families, yet the same 
amount of contact in highly conflicted families appears to have the opposite effect.104    
Buchanan et al found links between family conflicts and depression, anxiety and 
“deviant behaviour” in adolescents.   They also noted that among teenagers in 
hostile families, shared residence increased the incidence of these negative feelings.105    
 
Johnston et al, whose sample consisted exclusively of high-conflict families, found 
no benefits associated with joint custody.106   The authors in fact cautioned against 
shared parenting in such families since children are likely to be harmed by exposure 
to “toxic inter-personal dynamics” and the parents’ decreased ability to respond to 
the children.107  The findings are consistent with other empirical work that has 
shown that the parents with the worst conflicts are also the ones most likely to lack 
the resources to improve their situations.108  In Johnston’s sample, two-thirds of 
parents could be identified as having personality disorders.109  There is also research 
which suggests that a small (but not insignificant) minority of parents actively seek 
to perpetuate their conflict regardless of any legal measures taken to resolve 
disagreements over particular issues.110   The fact that parents have “exhausted the 
dispute resolution continuum” of private negotiation, mediation and pre-trial 
discussions without being able to reach agreement should be seen as a 
contraindication of shared residence since such parents are “unlikely to be good 
candidates for future joint decision making”.111   
 
The demanding nature of shared residence means that the young people subjected to 
it need to feel like active participants, but young people have in several studies 
                                                 
103  Gilmore (2006a) op cit n43, p350.  
104  Amato & Gilbreth (1999) op cit n5, p560.  
105  Buchanan,C, Maccoby, E & Dornbusch, S (1996) Adolescents After Divorce, Cambridge, Harvard University 
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complained of being treated like objects and feeling like “pawns in an ongoing 
war”.112 The practical inconveniences of frequent changeovers were exacerbated by 
inflexible parents whose hostility prevented the retrieval of football kits or favourite 
toys.113   The above points form a strong argument against forcing resistant parents 
into closer contact, on the grounds that it is unlikely to work but, instead, actually 
harm children.   
 
3.4.3 Shared Residence, Practicalities and Gendered Practices 
 
This section will now continue by exploring financial and practical issues; these not 
only provide opportunities for parental disagreement, but are also relevant when 
examining the assertion that a shared residence presumption could help improve 
gender equality through a fairer distribution of the burdens associated with raising 
children.   The practical and financial obstacles associated with providing two 
permanent homes, adjusting parents’ working hours and coordinating transport are 
considerable per se, and are, furthermore, exacerbated by the novelty of shared 
residence, which means that most jurisdictions’ benefits systems are not designed to 
accommodate it.114  Whilst the long-term solution lies in changes to state measures, 
the difficulties experienced by parents must be acknowledged, as must the risk that 
children’s living arrangements are determined by factors unrelated to their best 
interests. Moreover, mothers are disproportionately affected.   Many are “doubly 
disadvantaged” by the contradiction between the clean-break principle and 
permanent parenthood.  Mothers often bear the negative consequences of the 
resolution of the economic partnership, while also being disproportionately 
restricted by the demands of continuing joint decision-making about the children.115  
Smart et al found that shared residence constituted a substantial limitation of the 
individual parents’ freedom and capacity for self-determination.116   Yet, as second 
chapter argued, law’s partial blindness to the private sphere leads it to expect 
mothers to provide the emotional and practical caring necessary to sustain the 
binuclear family.   
                                                 
112  Neale et al (2003) op cit n66, p906; Buchanan & Hunt (2003) op cit n42, p380.  
113  Neale et al (2003) op cit n66, p906.  
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Shared residence cannot be said to advance gender equality if the financial, material 
and emotional burdens continue to be borne disproportionately by single mothers, a 
group which is already known to be economically vulnerable.117  A switch from sole 
to shared residence is likely to result in reduced child support or benefit payments 
although the fixed costs of keeping a family home will not be reduced.118  
Furthermore, any re-allocation of expenditure will depend on how much time the 
child actually spends in each household; studies suggest that where the shared 
residence order turns out to be a matter of form rather than substance, this may 
impact so negatively on the primary caretaker’s economy that it will inevitably 
affect the children.119  It should also be borne in mind that empirical research has 
found a link between how the primary carer is coping, and the child’s adjustment.120   
Where shared residence is sought for the wrong motives, it may not only force 
children into an arrangement they find objectionable, but may also deprive them of 
crucial support from their primary carer parent.    
 
In conclusion, the available empirical research shows a clear difference between 
voluntary and coerced/court-ordered shared residence.  In the former category, 
parents can be presumed to have chosen to share residence because they get on 
reasonably well and have the financial or emotional resources necessary to cope. 
Children report high levels of satisfaction; practical inconveniences are outweighed 
by the close relationships, particularly where the parents are flexible and sensitive to 
children’s changing needs.  These are, however, families, where good 
communication, cooperation and a responsible attitude to parenting precede the 
decision to share residence.  Studies which have either included or focused 
exclusively on high-conflict families who have tried shared residence against at least 
one parent’s wishes show that this arrangement is likely to exacerbate rather than 
reduce conflicts, impact negatively on children, and disproportionately affect 
mothers who remain de facto primary carers despite the shared residence order.   
 
                                                 
117  Singer (2008) op cit n6, p45; Ryrstedt (2006) op cit n37, pp44-45.  
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3.5 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that some parents pursue shared residence 
for their own reasons: to assert authority, secure practical or financial advantages, or 
as a means of perpetuating conflicts.  Family law, which is focused on encouraging 
fathers to maintain the patriarchal father-child link, is already slow to critically 
examine men’s motives.  Therefore, court-ordered shared residence should be 
resisted on the grounds that parents need to be required to justify their applications 
to show that they genuinely wish to benefit the child and are capable of caring for 
him or her.    
 
Secondly, research from the child welfare sciences has shown that although shared 
residence is not per se dangerous, considerable caution must be exercised when 
recommending it.  It seems only to suit certain families, and can be harmful; because 
it does not suit the individual child; because the arrangement breaks down, or 
because it leaves a child locked into an inflexible arrangement with poor rewards.  
The success of shared residence depends on too many different factors for it to be 
possible to draw up a comprehensive checklist of when it should be ordered.  The 
detailed enquiries necessary to evaluate the arrangement’s prospects for success also 
lie beyond the scope of an already overstretched family law system.  Therefore, it 
seems more sensible to restrict shared residence to families where both parents have 
freely chosen it; they can be assumed to have consulted and considered their children 
and to have the skills needed to make the arrangement work.    
 
Finally, available studies provide a comprehensive argument against the assertion 
that shared residence can teach parents to co-operate; they show that children are, 
instead, likely to be harmed by continued exposure to conflict.  Moreover, shared 
residence seems an ineffective or even counterproductive tool for improving gender 
equality; it appears to give fathers the formal benefits of equal status while it lies 
beyond law’s role to supervise whether the economic and practical burdens are 
actually distributed equitably across both households.   The result for many families 
could well be a covert resurrection of patriarchal structures.   
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4 ANALYSING THE PRIVATE LAW 
FRAMEWORK IN ENGLAND 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter begins with an overview of the relevant domestic family law before 
exploring the three influences identified in the second chapter to ascertain the role 
they play in shaping statute, policy and case law, while acknowledging that 
interference between closed systems is not a simple relationship of cause and effect.1   
The English jurisdiction is often cited as an archetypal liberal one, law’s refusal to 
intervene in the private sphere has supported patriarchal power structures and the 
hierarchical nuclear family.  More recently, concern about the falling popularity of 
marriage has created turbulence within the political discourse, which in turn has led 
law to promote a new form of permanent, patriarchal parenthood.  This has affected 
law’s view on what is in a child’s best interests, since new information from the 
child welfare sciences has had to be recreated and fitted within the existing 
normative framework.2  The contemporary focus on party negotiation and sensible, 
responsible parenting is also shaped by patriarchal understandings of parenthood.   
 
4.1.1 The Family Courts and the Children Act 1989  
 
There is no single family court; parents’ disputes over children are heard in 
specialised courts which are spread across the three tiers of High, County, and 
Magistrates’ Courts, with approximately 80% of private law cases heard in the 
County Courts.3   Children and Family Reporters from Cafcass are responsible for 
writing reports for contested cases, and help parties identify common ground.4   The 
less formal setting is a result of a wish to avoid intimidating litigants and avoid 
adversarial posturing.  Family law has always preferred compromises to court 
                                                 
1  Teubner, G (1993) Law as an Autopoietic System, London, Blackwell, p97.   
2  Teubner (1993) op cit n1, p87.   
3  Ministry of Justice (2009) Judicial and Court Statistics 2008, London, TSO, p85, p92. 
4  Cafcass (2008) Putting your Children First: a Guide for Separating Parents, London, DCSF, pp21-33. 
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hearings and now strongly promotes mediation and other alternative methods of 
dispute resolution.5   
 
The Children Act 1989 is the main piece of legislation for the regulation of disputes 
between parents.  It was a response to concerns that family law had become 
fragmented, complex and confusing, and, moreover, that the clean break model was 
flawed.6  Changes in terminology and classification were used to set out a new 
blueprint for the organisation of post-divorce family life.7   Custody and access 
orders, which had polarised parents by creating winners and losers, were replaced 
with a scheme of orders which separated the regulation of practical arrangements 
from the allocation of status.8    
 
Parental responsibility replaced the custody order; the Children Act also introduced 
the residence orders which will be the focus of the next chapter.  Parental 
responsibility is defined in s.3(1) of the 1989 Act as “all the rights, duties, powers, 
responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the 
child and his property”.   Parental responsibility is granted automatically to mothers, 
married fathers, and holders of a residence order.9   Although arguments for the 
extension of automatic parental responsibility to all unmarried fathers have yet to be 
successful, they can now acquire it through the comparatively simple administrative 
procedure of birth registration as well as through an agreement with the mother or a 
court order; proposals have also been made to extend further both joint birth 
registration and parental responsibility. 10   
 
                                                 
5  Hunt, J & Macleod, A (2008) Outcomes of Applications to Court for Contact Orders after Parental Separation or 
Divorce, London, TSO, p168. 
6  Diduck, A & Kaganas, F (1999) Family Law, Gender and the State: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, p244; van Krieken, R (2005) “The ‘Best Interests of the Child’ and Parental Separation: On the 
‘Civilizing of Parents”, 68(1) MLR, 25-48, p33. 
7  van Krieken (2005) op cit n6, p33.  
8  Law Commission (1986) Family Law Review of Child Law: Custody, Working Paper No 96, London, HMSO, 
[7.18]; Department of Health (1991) The Children Act 1989: Guidance and Regulations, Vol 1, Court Orders, 
London, HMSO, [2.25]. 
9  The Children Act 1989 s.2(1), s.2(2)(a) & s.12(1).   
10  Section 4(1) of the Children Act 1989 as amended by the Children and Adoption Act 2002, s.111; Bainham, A 
(2003) “Contact as a Right and Obligation” in Bainham, A, Lindley, B, Richards, M & Trinder, L (Eds) 
Children and their Families: Contact, Rights and Welfare, 61-88, p84; DWP (2008) Joint Birth Registration: 
Recording Responsibility, Cm 7293 as cited in Reece, H (2009) “The Degradation of Parental Responsibility” 
in Probert, R, Gilmore, S & Herring, J (Eds) Responsible Parents and Parental Responsibility, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 85-102, pp90-91. 
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When contact orders replaced access orders the change was one of terminology 
rather than substance.  The most common form of contact is direct, face-to-face 
contact, which can involve overnight stays.  Orders are sometimes made for 
reasonable contact, leaving parents to negotiate the details, but courts also have 
“wide powers” to make directions for contact or attach conditions to an order.11    
Where contact needs to be commenced or re-introduced supported contact can be 
ordered, while orders for supervised contact can be used to ensure children’s physical 
safety or emotional well-being.12  In cases where direct contact is not possible, orders 
for indirect contact are often made instead; this can range from Christmas and 
birthday cards screened by a third party to frequent email or telephone contact.13    
 
4.2 PERMANENT, PATRIARCHAL PARENTHOOD  
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
 
It was argued in the second chapter that when law initially distinguished itself from 
society’s first-order system of communications it inherited a patriarchal analytical 
framework, seen, inter alia, in the classification into dichotomies with the female as 
the inferior, and the clear division between public and private spheres.  Subsequent 
developments, including those induced by interference from political and other 
discourses, have been translated to fit the existing framework; thus, this form of 
patriarchy-within-law has remained.   
 
4.2.2 Patriarchy and the Nuclear Family  
 
England is often cited as a prime example of the traditional liberal state where it was 
widely agreed that the “road to equality and prosperity should be paved with a 
maximum of free markets and a minimum of state interference” but where the 
gendered and hierarchical middle-class nuclear family was, nevertheless, purposely 
                                                 
11  Harris-Short, S & Miles, J (2007) Family Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford, OUP, p864; The Children 
Act 1989 s.11(7).   
12  Re P [2008] EWCA Civ 1431.  
13  Ibid; Re P [2003] EWCA Civ 1797 per Thorpe LJ at [9]; National Association of Child Contact Centres, 
“Definitions of Levels of Contact”,   
http://www.naccc.org.uk/cms2/dmdocuments/Definitions%20of%20contact.pdf accessed 28th June 2009. 
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exported to the working classes to provide society with stability.14  Blackstone 
explained in 1775 that “the main end and design of marriage” was “to ascertain and 
fix upon some certain person, to whom the care, the protection, the maintenance, 
and the education of children should belong”.15   The law consequently granted the 
patriarch extensive rights and refused to “interfere with the natural order and course 
of family life, the very basis of which is the authority of the father”.16  Mothers’ vital 
role in raising future generations was recognised; but only where individual women 
conformed to the normative ideal of a good wife.17  Although significant proportions 
of the population were living in arrangements other than conjugal families, they 
were treated as deviant.18  The promotion of the nuclear family as the main locus of 
care also fitted well with liberal theorists’ condemnation of public welfare as causing 
rather than remedying the problems of thriftlessness and moral corruption.19    
 
When the welfare state was developed after the Second World War, its ambit was 
limited by liberal theory, and it was based on the breadwinner model.20   The law’s 
stance towards non-conjugal families became less overtly penal, yet law reform was 
hampered by a continuing concern not to do anything that might be seen as 
undermining the institution of marriage.21  Consequently, single mothers were 
problematised in moral as well as socio-economic terms and provoked “[a] degree of 
political concern … unique within western European countries”.22   This provides an 
example of how autopoietic subsystems may be closed, but are not immune to the 
concerns expressed by other systems, particularly where the latter are perceived to 
be more powerful.23      
 
 
                                                 
14  Creighton, C (1999) “The Rise and Decline of the Male Breadwinner Family in Britain”, 23(5) Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 519-541, p519.  
15  Blackstone, quoted in Morgan, P (1998) “An Endangered Species?” in Kiernan, K, Land, H & Lewis, J 
(Eds) Lone Mother Families in Twentieth Century Britain, Oxford, Open University Press, 65-82, p71 
16  Re Agar-Ellis v Lascelles (1883) 24 ChD 317 per Brett MR; O’Donovan, K (1985) Sexual Divisions in Law, 
London, Weidenfield & Nicholson, p2. 
17  Smart, C (1982) “Regulating Families or Legitimating Patriarchy” 10(1) International Journal of the Sociology 
of Law, 1-18, p7. 
18  Ibid.  
19  Esping-Andersen, G (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge, Polity Press, pp41-42.  
20  Ibid, p159. 
21  Hasson, E (2003) “Setting a Standard or Reflecting Reality? The ‘Role’ of Divorce Law, and the Case of the 
Family Law Act 1996”, 17(3) IJLPF, 338-365, p340.  
22  Lewis, J (1997) Lone Mothers in European Welfare Regimes, London, Jessica Kingsley, p50; Pascall, G (1999) 
“UK Family Policy in the 1990s: the case of New Labour and Lone Parents” 13(3) IJLPF, pp258-273, p266.   
23  Teubner (1993) op cit n1, p35, p73.   
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4.2.3 Public Patriarchy 
 
As in most industrialised nations, patriarchal strategies have shifted from exclusion 
to segregation: women have been allowed access to both spheres but continue to 
occupy inferior positions.24  Women’s entry into employment followed the pattern 
explained in the second chapter: part-time posts allowed mothers to tailor work 
around their domestic responsibilities so that business, law and other autopoietic 
subsystems were not forced to reconsider their understandings of families.25  If 
anything, the public/private dichotomy was fortified by the Conservative 
governments of 1979 – 1997.  In this Neo-Liberal discourse the falling popularity of 
marriage was again identified as the root cause of an emerging permanent underclass 
where single mothers raised their children into a culture of anti-social behaviour and 
welfare dependency.26  However, the liberal construction of poverty as the result of 
autonomous choices rather than social factors combined with ambivalent political 
attitudes towards women’s employment and the resistance to public intervention to 
hamper legal reform.27 These arguments remain influential, usually made in 
response to the latest release of demographic statistics.28  Although the divorce rate 
is falling and is now at its lowest level since 1979, marriage is in numerical decline, 
with a corresponding increase in cohabitation and births outside marriage.29  Single 
motherhood is also more common; the proportion of dependent children living in 
lone parent families (of which 90% are estimated to have a female adult) increased 
from 7% in 1972 to 24% in 2006.30  The debate about the perceived undesirability of 
these changes within the political subsystem generates “noise” or “interference” 
which exerts considerable influence on the legal system.31  
 
                                                 
24  Fox Harding, L (1996) “’Parental Responsibility’: The Reassertion of Private Patriarchy?” in Silva, E B 
(Ed) Good Enough Mothering? London, Routledge, 131-147, p139. 
25  Moffat, G (2007) “Work-life Balance and Employment Law: Cultural Change or Mission Impossible?” in 
Probert, R (Ed) Family Life and the Law: Under One Roof, Farnham, Ashgate Publishing, 135-158, p138; 
Barnett, H (1997) Sourcebook on Feminist Jurisprudence, p83.   
26  Murray, C (1996) “The Emerging British Underclass” in Lister, R (Ed) Charles Murray and the Underclass: 
the Developing Debate, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 27-53, p31.  
27  Walker, A (1996) “Blaming the Victims” in Lister, R (Ed) Charles Murray and the Underclass: the Developing 
Debate, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 66-74, p66.  
28  “Married Couples to be Minority within 20 Years”, The Daily Telegraph, 1st April 2009.  
29  Office for National Statistics, “Divorce: England and Wales rate at 29 year low”, 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=170, published on 28th January 2010; Office of National 
Statistics, “Population Estimates by Marital Status”, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=2312, 
published on 25th November 2009.  
30  Office for National Statistics (2007) Social Trends 37, London, ONS, p16. 
31  Teubner (1993) op cit n1, p103.   
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The gendered employment pattern has remained.  Approximately half of women 
with dependent children work in part-time posts; this statistic has been used to 
explain why the gender pay gap widened in 2008 to 12.8%, and is now one of the 
largest in the EU.32  As would be expected of a liberal model, there is comparatively 
little assistance provided to help with the reconciliation of work and family 
responsibilities.33   Although maternity leave is available for a generous 52 weeks, 
limited financial compensation is thought to prevent as many as three-quarters of 
eligible mothers from taking full advantage of this entitlement.34  Planned 
improvements have been postponed indefinitely, most probably due to the economic 
climate.35   The implicit assumption appears to be that each mother will have a 
breadwinner partner.  Since childcare has been conceptualised as a purely private 
matter to be regulated through market forces, Britain also has one of the lowest 
levels of publicly funded childcare in the European Union.36  Women who find their 
labour undervalued and their opportunities limited cannot be condemned for 
deciding to shoulder familial responsibilities, freeing their male partners to pursue a 
potentially more profitable career.  What has to be criticised, however, is the way 
liberal rhetoric presents this as a matter of individual choice, with the caring 
contribution to the family’s wealth and well-being hidden by the public/private 
dichotomy.37   It is explained in later chapters why this criticism can be used to argue 
against an increased use of the shared residence order.  
 
Although New Labour initiatives, influenced by post-liberalism and 
communitarianism, have to some extent “repositioned the family as a public 
                                                 
32  Office of National Statistics, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, as reported at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=167 accessed on 7th October 2009;  European Commisson: 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities Website:  
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=685&langId=en, accessed 7th October 2009; McKie, L, Bowlby, 
S & Gregory, S (2001) “Gender, Caring and Employment in Britain”, 30(2) Journal of Social Policy, 233-258, 
p242 ; Moffat (2007) op cit n25, p137. 
33  Land, H (2002) “Spheres of Care in the UK: Separate and Unequal”, 22(1) Critical Social Policy¸ 13-31, p26. 
34  Six weeks are paid at 90% of earnings, 33 at a flat rate of £123.06 per week, and the rest is unpaid.   James, G 
(2006) “The Work and Families Act 2006: Legislation to Improve Choice and Flexibility?” 35(3) Industrial 
Law Journal, 272, p272.  
35  Upcraft, K (2009) “Work and Families Act 2006 Phase Two – Will They or Won’t They?” 18(3) Tolley’s 
Practical NIC Newsletter, 21.  
36  Ferri, E & Smith, K (1996) Parenting in the 1990s, London, Family Policy Studies Centre, p9; Land (2002) op 
cit n33, p19; Equal Opportunities Commission (2007) Completing the Revolution: The Leading Indicators, EOC, 
London.  Available at: www.gender-agenda.co.uk/downloads/GenderEqualityIndex.pdf accessed 29th July 
2009. 
37  Frug, M (1992) Postmodern Legal Feminism, New York, Routledge p140.  
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space”,38 there is no clear consensus (neither within the political subsystem nor in 
law) that this is a legitimate use of law, perhaps due to the continuing influence of 
liberal theory, the public/private dichotomy and the conjugal ideal.39  For example, 
the decisions to pay EU-originated paternity leave at a low flat rate and make 
parental leave unpaid are likely to severely limit the number of parents who use 
these entitlements.40  Furthermore, parents have no more than a right to request 
flexible working (a reduction or change of their hours), and employers need only 
provide clear business reasons for a refusal.41   Reforms are restricted by the focus on 
maintaining economic efficiency.42  Interestingly, the right to request flexible 
working is to be extended from parents to all workers with caring responsibilities; in 
an aging society, the objective is to reduce strain on the welfare state and maintain 
productivity by allowing individuals with dependent family members to continue in 
paid work.43   Care is again seen as a matter of private choice and responsibility.  If 
anything, this is strengthened by political interest in communitarianism; the welfare 
state is to be a springboard rather than a safety net.44  Participation in the labour 
market is seen as vitally important in educating responsible citizens.45  
Communitarianism’s belief in benign community values results in a greater 
readiness to use law to send normative messages, and commentators have argued 
that measures encouraging single mothers into employment shade from persuasion 
into coercion.46  Thus, reforms are not intended to erode gender stereotypes, but to 
combat social exclusion.  Communitarian influences have not led to the complete 
abandonment of liberal thinking; the public/private dichotomy retains its normative 
power, as does the paradigm nuclear family.   
 
                                                 
38  Gillies, V (2005) “Meeting Parents’ Needs?  Discourses of ‘Support’ and ‘Inclusion’ in Family Policy”, 25(1) 
Critical Social Policy, 70-90, p79.  
39  Moffat (2007) op cit n25, p156; Creighton (1999) op cit n14, p528.  
40  Moffat (2007) op cit n25, p153. 
41  James (2006) op cit n34, p274.  
42  Land (2002) op cit n33, p26; Mahon, R (2002) “Gender and Welfare State Restructuring: Through the Lens 
of Child Care” in Michel, S & Mahon, R (Eds) Child Care Policy at the Crossroads: Gender and Welfare State 
Restructuring, London, Routledge, 1-27, p7.  
43  James (2006) op cit n34, p272.  
44  Brown, G (1994) “The Politics of Potential: A New Agenda for Labour” in Miliband, D (Ed) Reinventing 
the Left, Cambridge, Polity Press, pp120-122, as cited in Fredman, S (2006) “Human Rights Transformed: 
Positive Duties and Positive Rights”, Public Law, 498-520, pp508-509. 
45  Etzioni, A (1996) The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society, London, Profile 
Books, pp36-37, cited in Eekelaar, J (2001) “Family Law: The Communitarian”, 21(1) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, 181-190, p183. 
46  Reece, H (2003) Divorcing Responsibly, Oxford, Hart Publishing, p79; Spencer-Dawe, E (2005) “Lone 
Mothers in Employment: Seeking Rational Solutions to Role Strain”, 27(3-4) JSWFL, 251-264, p252. 
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4.2.4 The Binuclear Family and Gendered Constructions of 
Parenting  
 
Family law’s essentially patriarchal character has been confirmed by this 
“interference” from politics as much as it has been challenged; it continues to 
influence new law.  This can be seen, for example, in family law’s preoccupation 
with surnames.  It is, according to Herring, “striking” that there is a sizeable body of 
case law on this, when there are numerous, arguably more substantial, issues that are 
important to separated parents, but are not disputed in the courts.47  The 
conceptualisation of a surname as an immutable part of identity is essentially male; 
the insistence on its symbolic value patriarchal.48  Women change surnames, are 
more likely to see them as contingent, and to “depend on more substantial things” to 
feel close to their children.49   Family law’s patriarchal character has also resulted in 
law’s insistence that separated parents must retain links across a binuclear family.  
Collier and Sheldon have linked family law’s current focus on ensuring fathers’ 
continued attachment to a reconstituted binuclear family unit to “wider policy 
agendas”.50  In terms of autopoietic theory, the noise or pressure from the political 
subsystems has been sensed within law, and has led to a perception that law, the 
stabiliser of conflicts, should provide a solution.51  Unmarried and separated fathers 
have come to be viewed as a “problem” to be “managed” by law; it is felt more must 
be done either to instil a greater sense of responsibility in men or to help them 
“develop the relationships with their children that they want, deserve and are 
currently unfairly denied”.52   
 
Parental responsibility, which remains unaffected by changes in practical 
circumstances, was an important part of the legislator’s objective of turning 
parenthood from something dependant on marriage to an immutable status; it 
ensures “that men are firmly tied to families”.53 Approximately 90% of all applicants 
                                                 
47  Herring, J (2009) “The Shaming of Naming” in Probert, R, Gilmore, S & Herring, J (Eds) Responsible 
Parents and Parental Responsibility, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 105-122, p111.  
48  Ibid, pp120-121.  
49  Re R [2001] EWCA Civ 1344 per Hale LJ at [13]. 
50  Collier, R & Sheldon, S (2008) Fragmenting Fatherhood: A Socio-Legal Study, Oxford, Hart Publishing, p218.  
51  Teubner (1993) op cit n1, p70.  
52  Collier & Sheldon (2008) op cit n50, p176.  
53  Wallbank, J (2009) “Parental Responsibility and the Responsible Parent: Managing the ‘Problem’ of 
Contact” in Probert, R, Gilmore, S & Herring, J (Eds) Responsible Parents and Parental Responsibility, 
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are successful; most are likely to be unmarried fathers.54  Judicial observations that a 
father ought to be “entitled to play the natural role which fatherhood ordains for 
him”,55 suggest that despite the draftsmen’s deliberate choice of the term 
responsibility, law as a closed subsystem has gradually come to understand parental 
responsibility as yet another of the rights it is accustomed to adjudicate on.  Yet, it 
has been acknowledged that although a non-resident parent with parental 
responsibility has the same legal rights, he or she will “inevitably have less 
opportunity” to exercise them, particularly since there is no legal requirement of 
consultation on most decisions.56  It has been recognised judicially that this order is 
“mainly a matter of status”; it is frequently granted where it is not contemplated 
that the applicant will be actively involved.57  Reece has observed that the order 
sometimes appears to have been made on the basis that it does not really entitle the 
father to do very much.58  Consequently, fathers’ organisations have accused the 
current law of giving parents with residence a license to exclude the other parent.59 
Parental responsibility, they argue, is not powerful enough.  This argument has had 
considerable influence on political debate, adding to the pressure on law to find a 
solution to this perceived problem.60  It is very worrying that arguments for a shared 
residence presumption are made in this context; this point is explored in more detail 
in the next chapter.    
 
The description of the contact order in s.8(1) of the Children Act 1989 deliberately 
avoided phrasing this as the adult’s entitlement; part of a shift in terminology which 
was to signal that parental rights should be regarded as a thing of the past.61  Yet, 
children’s refusals are often dismissed as a sign of immaturity, and the fact that 
orders cannot be enforced against non-resident parents’ wishes provides further 
                                                                                                                                               
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 295-313, p30; Roche, J (1991) “The Children Act 1989: Once a Parent Always a 
Parent”, 13(5) JSWFL, 345-361, p357. 
54  Ministry of Justice (2009) Judicial and Court Statistics 2008, London, TSO, p95.   
55  Re J-S [2003] 1 FLR 399 per Ward LJ at [50].  
56  Bainham, A (1998) Children: The Modern Law (2nd Ed), Bristol, Jordan Publishing, p113. 
57  Re C [2004] EWCA Civ 513; Re H [2002] EWCA Civ 542; Re C and V  [1998] 1 FLR 392. 
58  Reece (2009) op cit n10, p95.   
59  Coe, T, Shared Parenting: The Right Starting Point? Equal Parenting Council website 
http://www.equalparenting.org/shared-parenting/index.php accessed 30th September 2007; Press Release: 
Society is Still Failing our Children, Children’s Rights to both Parents are still not being Supported”, 
http://fnf.org.uk.uk3.clientproof.co.uk/news-events/press-releases/2006-archive/060614  accessed on 30th 
September 2007. 
60  Teubner (1993) op cit n1, p71; Collier & Sheldon (2008) op cit n50, p141.  
61 Eekelaar, J (1991a) “Parental Responsibility: State of Nature or Nature of the State?” 13(1) JSWFL, 37-50, 
p37. 
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evidence of the hollow nature of what is sometimes referred to as the child’s right to 
contact.62  The Act’s objective was not to empower children, but to persuade courts 
to prioritise the link between children and biological fathers.   The granting of 
contact was to give substance to the principle of immutable parenthood expressed 
with parental responsibility.63  Thus, “[n]on-resident parents are usually successful 
in getting the type of contact sought”.64 The 2008 court statistics, which do not 
differentiate between types of applicants, showed that courts refused to order any 
contact in only 1,166 of 80,168 cases.65  In the sample analysed by Hunt and Macleod, 
fathers’ applications for direct or indirect contact led to orders being made in 86% of 
cases; a further 13% of fathers’ applications were abandoned.66  Furthermore, judges 
regularly enunciate that terminating contact is “a matter of last resort”.67  In Re P 
[2003] a father had applied for contact upon his release from a prison sentence served 
partly as a result of an earlier abduction of his son.  The Court of Appeal, allowing 
his appeal, held that although direct contact was not possible, limited  indirect 
contact would give the four-year-old boy an opportunity “to focus on the existence 
of a father, whose role in his past, although open to the severest criticism, does not 
remove the reality that he is [the boy’s] biological father”.68  This focus on biological 
fact to justify the making of orders further obscures the important issue of caring 
and constitutes another strong reason against court-ordered shared residence.  
 
The binuclear family is discussed in gender neutral terms, which obfuscate its 
essentially patriarchal character.  Empirical studies show that women’s entry into 
employment has not been matched by anything like a commensurate change in the 
division of domestic tasks.69  Men’s involvement is increasing, but is seen as 
                                                 
62  Re P [2006] EWCA Civ 964 per Wilson LJ at [21]; Re W [2001] EWCA Civ 1830 per Butler-Sloss P at [6];  
James, A, James, A, & McNamee, S (2004) “Turn Down the Volume – Not Hearing Children in Family 
Proceedings”, 16(2) CFLQ, 189-202, p201; Bainham (2003) op cit n10, pp74-75; Trinder, L (2003) “Working 
and Not Working Contact After Divorce” in Bainham et al (Ed) op cit n10, 387-406, p39. 
63 Family Law Today, January 1993, p5. 
64  Collier, R (2009) “Rethinking Fathers’ Rights” Family Law, 45, p45.   
65  Ministry of Justice (2009) Judicial and Court Statistics 2008, London, TSO, p95.   
66  Hunt & Macleod (2008) op cit n5, p240, p256.  
67  The Father v The Mother [2003] All ER 226 per Wall J at [6]; Re W [2007] EWCA Civ 786; Re O [2003] 
EWHC 3031. 
68  Re P [2003] EWCA Civ 1797 per Thorpe LJ at [10]. 
69  James (2006) op cit n34, p272; Lader, D, Short, S & Gershuny, J (2006) The Time Use Survey 2005, London, 
ONS; Pryor, J & Rodgers, B (2001) Children in Changing Families, London, Blackwell. 
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complementing women’s; the latter continue to shoulder primary responsibility.70  
Since the allocation of caring responsibilities is conceptualised as a private matter 
beyond the reach of public regulation, there is little focus on encouraging good 
practices.71   Instead, the continued gendered nature of parenting practices is hidden 
by the neutral language of the legislation.72  Law’s role as maker of normative 
pronouncements has led to a focus on expectations and abstract general assertions.73  
Legal reform and implementation remains “habitually based” on an unequal 
gendered allocation of parenting duties, without any acknowledgement of “the value 
of the [caring] work involved”, since the latter is in law’s self-created blind-spot.74     
 
This divergence between discourse and reality has made it possible to assert two 
diametrically opposed arguments, which are, nevertheless, both used to support legal 
recognition of the post-separation binuclear family.   The first of these two 
arguments centres on a crisis in fatherhood; marriage is said to have been robbed of 
any significance “beyond the dress, the cake, the speech and the drunk uncle”.75  It is 
alleged that men are either abandoning fatherhood due to role confusion or are being 
marginalised by mothers who prefer the welfare state safety net.   Communications 
about families are underpinned by assumptions concerning the superiority of the 
nuclear family, which they also serve to reinforce.76 This largely negative discourse 
has been complemented with a more recent and more positive strand.  This asserts 
that the majority have become ‘hands-on’; over-optimistic assumptions about 
fathers’ roles are made on the implicit understanding that the gender neutrality 
written into legislation has been achieved in practice.77   As is seen in this and the 
                                                 
70 Barnett, A (2009b) “The Welfare of the Child Re-Visited: In Whose Best Interests? Part II”, Family Law, 
135-141, p139; Burghes, L, Clarke, L and Cronin, N (1997) Fathers and Fatherhood in Britain, Family Policy 
Studies Centre/Joseph Rowntree Foundation, London, p85. 
71 Land (2002) op cit n33, p26; Lawler, S (1999) “Children Need but Mothers only Want: the Power of ‘Needs 
Talk’ in the Constitution of Childhood”, in Seymour, J & Bagguley, P (Eds) Relating Intimacies: Power and 
Resistance, Basingstoke, Macmillan Press Ltd, 64-88, p70; Smart, C (1999) ”The ‘New’ Parenthood” in 
Silva, E & Smart, C (Ed) The New Family?, London, Sage Publications, 100-114, p100.  
72  Barnett (2009b) op cit n71, p138. 
73 King, M & Piper, C (1995) How the Law Thinks About Children, Gower Publishing, Aldershot, p26.  
74  McKie et al (2001) op cit n32, p237; Luhmann, N (1989) “Law as a Social System”, 83(1) Northwestern 
University Law Review, 136-150p145.  
75  Geldof, B (2003) “The Real Love that Dare Not Speak its Name: A Sometimes Coherent Rant” in 
Bainham et al (Ed) op cit n10, 171-200, p176; Pryor & Rodgers (2001) op cit n70, p201.  
76  Morgan (1998) op cit n15, p71; Diduck & Kaganas (1999) op cit n6, p17. 
77  Pryor & Rodgers (2001) op cit n70 p200; Collier, R (2001) “A Hard Time to Be a Father? Reassessing the 
Relationship between Law, Policy, and Family (Practices)” 28(4) Journal of Law and Society, pp. 520-545, 
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subsequent chapter, both arguments have successfully been used to shape the legal 
regulation of parents’ disputes over children.   
 
4.3 THE PARAMOUNTCY PRINCIPLE  
 
 
A version of the welfare principle was first introduced in the Guardianship of 
Infants Act 1886.  According to Maidment, this test enabled the law to respond to 
complaints about paternal abuses of power without having to grant mothers a new, 
independent legal status.78   During the late 19th and early 20th century children’s 
needs for continuing relationships with their primary care-giver mothers were 
prioritised, unless the latter deviated too far from the semantic artefact of a good 
mother.79  Yet, by the 1980’s concerns were expressed that the law was biased within 
the political as well as legal subsystems; the pendulum was said to have swung too 
far away from the absolute legal rights granted to the Victorian pater familias 
towards maternal preference rules that demoted or even excluded fathers.80   There 
was an element of truth to this; case law precedents had come to be based on the 
assumption that couples would want a “clean break” so that both parents could go on 
to remarry and form new, reconstituted nuclear families unencumbered by past 
failures.81     
 
4.3.1 The Children Act 1989 and Interpretations of the Welfare 
Test  
 
The Children Act 1989 confirmed that courts determining questions relating to a 
child’s upbringing or property must have that child’s welfare as its paramount 
consideration.82  The term ‘paramount’ has been interpreted to mean first and only;83 
and despite academic arguments to the contrary, this has been stated to be 
                                                 
78  The Guardianship of Infants Act 1886; Maidment, S (1984) Child Custody and Divorce: the Law in Social 
Context, London, Croom Helm, pp107-108.   
79  Maidment (1984) op cit n79, p131.  
80 Richards, M (1986) “Behind the Best Interests of the Child”, Journal of Social Welfare Law, 77-95, p92. 
81 Baker, A & Townsend, P (1996) “Post-divorce Parenting: Rethinking Shared Residence”, 8(3) CFLQ, 217-
227, p219; Neale, B & Smart, C (1997c) “Experiments with Parenthood?” Sociology, 201-219, p203. 
82  The Children Act 1989, s.1(1) 
83  J v C [1970] AC 668. 
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compatible with the Human Rights Act 1998.84  The welfare discourse has now 
become dominant; parents’ prospects of success in making or defending applications 
can depend greatly on their ability to translate their arguments into the dominant 
welfare discourse.85  
 
In an attempt to avoid the idiosyncrasies that had often marred court decisions, 
s.1(3) of the  1989 Act provided a non-hierarchical and non-exhaustive checklist of 
factors, which was largely based on case law.86    The use of this checklist is only 
obligatory in relation to certain orders (including contact and residence orders), but 
the checklist has come to be influential also in relation to other applications, e.g. for 
parental responsibility, despite divergent views as to whether this is indeed an issue 
relating to the upbringing of the child.  The list begins in s.1(3)(a) by requiring 
courts to consider the relevant child’s wishes and feelings, making clear that the 
weight given to these will depend on the child’s maturity.87  S.1(3)(b) mentions the 
child’s needs, while s.1(3)(c) requires a court to consider “the likely effect of any 
change in circumstances”.  S.1(3)(e) focuses on whether the child is at risk of harm, 
and linked to this issue is the question in s.1(3)(f) of how capable each parent is of 
meeting the child’s needs.  Although the list was introduced to bring clarity and 
consistency, it has been described as “law at its most discretionary”.88   Indeed, it has 
been suggested that s.1(3) was in fact deliberately kept vague in order not to unduly 
restrict judicial discretion in an area of law where each case must be judged on its 
own merits.89    
 
The flexibility of the welfare test is not only a strength but also a weakness: there is 
great divergence of views as to what exactly is in a child’s best interests and courts 
have come to rely on welfare science expertise to both guide and justify decisions.90  
A specialised and self-referential child welfare autopoietic subsystem has developed 
                                                 
84  Any interference with parents’ rights is seen as justified to promote the child’s welfare, Gilmore, S (2007) 
“Re B (Contact: Child Support) – Horses and Carts”, 19(3) CFLQ, 357, p360. For the opposite argument see 
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85  See e.g. Re C [2007] EWHC 2312 per Sumner J at 148; Re B [2006] EWCA Civ 1574 per Wilson J at [19]. 
86  Roche (1991) op cit n53, pp347-348.  
87  Re P [2006] EWCA Civ 964.  
88  Pearce, J, Davis, G & Barron, J (1999) “Love in a Cold Climate - Section 8 Applications under the Children 
Act 1989", Family Law, 22-28, p26.    
89  Bradley, D (1996) Family Law and Political Culture, London, Sweet & Maxwell, p249. 
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in response to this.  While its objectives appear to have been adopted by family law, 
they are understood differently and there is a distinct hierarchy: courts seek advice 
from child welfare experts, but are not obliged to accept it.91   The processes of re-
entry and redundancy are used to convert the “complexities, ambiguities and 
differing theoretical perspectives” of the child welfare discourses into abstract, 
generalised legal certainties that fit with its inherently patriarchal cognitive 
framework.92   
 
Although the use of the welfare test is not mandatory for applications for parental 
responsibility, it is often used, and when it is applied the benefits to the child are 
stated in a general, abstract way, and are based on law’s patriarchal understanding of 
fatherhood.  The child’s self-esteem is said to be enhanced by the knowledge that he 
or she has a father who wants parental responsibility.93   The making of the order is 
said to show that a child “has two parents, both of whom, in very differing ways, 
have a manifest responsibility for her continuing well-being”.94  This demonstrates 
law’s concern with continuing the father’s responsibility for, and authority over, the 
child; and the conceptualisation of this role as very different from the mother’s 
caring one.  It appears that what a child needs from a father is often symbolic rather 
than practical; fatherhood is about caring “about”, rather than caring “for”.95    
 
The processes of redundancy and re-entry are also used to reduce individuals’ 
characteristics and circumstances down to family law’s limited set of semantic 
artefacts such as the vulnerable child, the supportive or implacably hostile mothers 
and the sincere or dangerous fathers who are described in the case reports.96   Yet, in 
this setting, s.1(3)(a) of the Children Act 1989 requires that a child’s wishes must be 
heard and must be given appropriate weight in the light of his or her maturity.   The 
understandable desire to protect children from parents’ conflicts means they are 
rarely heard in court; evidence is instead gathered by Cafcass.  According to its own 
                                                 
91  King & Piper (1995) op cit n74, p70; Clarkson  & Clarkson (2007) op cit n91, p273; Davis, G & Pearce, J (1999) 
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95  Tronto, J (1993) Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, London, Routledge, p158; Smart, 
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96  Barnett (2009b) op cit n712, p138; Kaganas, F & Day Sclater, S (2004) “Contact Disputes: Narrative 
Constructions of Good Parents’’, 12(1) Feminist Legal Studies, 1-27, p22.  
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literature, “Cafcass is now taking strides to engage with its younger users”.97  James 
et al have suggested, however, that law’s theoretical framework combines with 
cultural understandings of childhood to “turn down the volume” so that children’s 
views can neither be heard nor adequately represented.98   Their research found that 
reports and recommendations were based on an idealised model of childhood; 
children’s statements were interpreted through this filter and were moreover 
translated “into a legalistic code” that was thought to be easier for the court to use.99   
This child welfare science was again reinterpreted by the court using the two 
semantic artefacts of the child as a family member and the abstract child of a 
particular age so that children’s agency became “conceptually obscured”.100  S.1(3)(a) 
is consequently interpreted in a highly paternalistic way; the child’s needs as 
identified under s.1(3)(b) often outweigh his stated preferences.101  A child’s primary 
need is now understood to be the need for both parents, and in law’s self-restricted, 
simplified view the child welfare sciences can prove this to be true.102   Since 
mothering is hidden in the private sphere and taken for granted, and law is 
inherently patriarchal, law’s focus has been on encouraging fathers.  The second 
chapter asserted that law can be said to process information in the way associated 
with the “male” side of the dichotomies: its preference for the abstract and 
generalised has moved family law from the observation that a good relationship 
with a father is very important to some children to the assertion that all children 
need relationships with their fathers.103  Case law interpreting and applying the 
Children Act 1989 to disputes over parental responsibility and contact provides 
ample evidence of the successful use of child welfare rhetoric to emphasise the 
importance of fatherhood.104  Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with family courts has 
remained within the political subsystem; because previous reforms have had no 
measurable success in relation to the underlying goal of reversing the decline of the 
traditional nuclear family.  Since previous legal solutions are perceived to have been 
                                                 
97  Little, M (2009) “The Child’s View Counts” in Cafcass Children in Family Conflict, published as a 
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104 Ibid; Smart & Neale (1999) op cit n96, p177.   
 76 CHAPTER 4 
 
ineffective law is encouraged, through interference, to continue its search for a 
remedy.   
 
4.3.2 From Broad Discretion to Binary Codes 
 
In contested contact cases, law’s simplistic understanding of child welfare science, 
its preoccupation with encouraging fathers and its selective blindness to mothers’ 
efforts resulted in a prioritisation of the child’s abstract need to know both parents.  
Consequently, the welfare test was replaced in Re H [1992] with the question: “are 
there any cogent reasons why these … children should be denied the opportunity of 
access to their natural father?”105  Drug or alcohol addictions, psychiatric illness, 
domestic violence and allegations of child abuse were held to be outweighed, and an 
unwavering belief in the natural benefits of contact led to a judicial optimism which 
frequently failed to address the potential problems posed by inexperienced, 
incompetent or untrustworthy applicants.106 A similar interpretation of a 
presumption in favour of shared residence would undoubtedly expose children to 
unwarranted risks.   
 
Although courts have become more prepared to find the de facto presumption in 
favour of contact rebutted, particularly where there has been domestic violence, 
Smart and Neale have observed that cases where contact is denied are “not allowed 
to interfere with the general principle”.107   Thorpe LJ in Re L [2000] said domestic 
violence cases should not be isolated as an exceptional category, but this is how the 
case has come to be interpreted.108   F v R [2007], for example, was an exceptional 
case where the father had not only pleaded guilty to harassing the mother, but had 
also aimed “an unparalleled tide of abuse and aggression” at various professionals 
involved in the case, and had been overheard by the Cafcass reporter threatening to 
abduct the children.109  It could be argued that fathers like these are excluded in order 
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to dispel doubts about law’s general pro-father stance.110  A parallel can be drawn 
with Smart’s suggestion that “[t]he popularity of marriage has been preserved … 
because the grossest abuses of patriarchal authority are no longer condoned”.111 The 
identification of an exception has, if anything, served to strengthen the general rule.  
In addition, empirical research shows that although this new approach works well 
where adopted, some lower courts have continued to trivialise or ignore allegations 
of domestic violence “to the increasing frustration of the Court of Appeal”.112  From 
an autopoietic perspective, several comments can be made.  Firstly, an important 
explanation can be found in the House of Lord’s recent discussions on the 
‘significant harm’ threshold for public law care proceedings.113   In Re B [2008] Lord 
Hoffman explained that in law “there is no room for a finding that [something] 
might have happened”.114  “The law”, he stated, “operates a binary system in which 
the only values are 0 and 1”.115  Keating has commented that “it is fascinating to see 
such an illustration of autopoietic theory in the language employed by Lord 
Hoffman”.116   In private law cases, too, allegations of violence that are not proven 
are treated as having been unsubstantiated.117  Ryder J is quite correct to have 
observed, extra-judicially, that this reasoning is “legal fiction”.118  Indeed, Lord 
Hoffman’s observations fit well with Teubner’s assertions that regardless of 
pressure from external sources or even internal aspirations, law can only process 
information using its own language.119   
 
Secondly, it is possible to observe a further dichotomy in the courts’ classification of 
allegations in contact cases.  Violence is either interpreted as serious, in which case it 
will affect the outcome of the case, or not serious, in which case it can be dismissed 
as irrelevant.  In Re P [2008] Ward LJ observed: “Domestic violence, of course, is a 
term that covers a multitude of sins. Some of it is hideous, some of it is less serious, 
and it is probably into the latter category that this case fits.”  This case was not 
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categorised as a domestic violence case and, thus, there could be “no doubt of the 
secure foundation for the assumption that contact benefits children”.120  As Gilmore 
has convincingly demonstrated, no such firm foundation can be found in the child 
welfare sciences.121   There is still insufficient consideration of whether the benefits 
of court-enforced contact will actually outweigh the stresses of conflict and 
litigation.122  Hunt and Macleod found that where parents with residence voiced 
what they labelled “serious welfare concerns” unsupervised or staying contact was 
granted in approximately half of cases.123  They warned that the fact that courts in 
some cases fail to award or ensure the successful implementation of contact “should 
not tempt us into accusing the system of favouring resident parents” since “it would 
be easier to make the opposite argument.”124  
 
In conclusion, it can be seen that despite the aspirations of the draftsmen behind 
section 1 of the Children Act 1989, the welfare test has developed into a narrow 
enquiry.  In this instance, the tensionbetween external influence from child welfare 
science and internal information within law has been resolved in law’s favour; the 
more powerful system has refused to adjust to resolve this tension, just as Jake can 
refuse to listen to Amy in MacKinnon’s adaptation of Gilligan’s interviews.125  In all 
but a small minority of cases, both children’s objections and risks identified by 
resident parents are held to be outweighed by the supposed natural, abstract benefits 
of maintaining the father-child link.  A similar interpretation of section 1 in the 
implementation of a shared residence presumption would have similarly undesirable 
results, and this point is revisited in the conclusion.   
 
4.4 REASONABLENESS 
 
4.4.1 Non Intervention: not a Carte Blanche  
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The realisation that in this type of dispute, litigation often achieves little except to 
“entrench opposing viewpoints”,126 led to an explicit caution against unnecessary 
legal intervention in s.1(5) of the Children Act 1989 (often, somewhat misleadingly, 
referred to as the no order principle). The “general tenor” of subsequent 
implementation has been “to direct as many cases as possible away from the court 
system”.127  Hunt and Macleod found that only one in ten cases in their sample 
proceeded to a final hearing; and a third of that limited number settled in the course 
of the hearing.128 The advantages are said to be that parents alone have the detailed 
knowledge of their own circumstances which will enable them to draw up a suitable 
agreement, which they can not only implement but also renegotiate.129  
Consequently, the apparent primacy accorded to the welfare principle in the 
Children Act 1989 is deceiving, as it is “in reality subordinated to the new principle 
of non-intervention”.130  Private ordering is seen as an end in itself regardless of the 
substance of parents’ agreements.131   Although some have suggested cost-cutting as a 
primary motivation for this approach, it can also be seen as typically liberal and 
patriarchal in its insistence on non-intervention in the private sphere.132  The 
strategy has not been without its critics, who have warned that unscrupulous parents 
can abuse power imbalances to their own advantage and that children are likely to 
“become sidelined”.133  However, as second chapter noted, this emphasis on party 
autonomy stops short of giving parents free rein to settle their own terms.   The 
Family Law Act 1996 s.1(c), for example, stipulates that marriages should be brought 
to an end in such a way as to minimise distress to adults and children, “with 
questions dealt with in a manner designed to promote as good a continuing 
relationship between the parties and any children affected as is possible in the 
circumstances”.134  These statements are consistent with law’s role as maker of 
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normative pronouncements and, furthermore, characteristic of law’s focus on how 
things ought to be, rather on how things are.      
 
However, it is extremely doubtful that changes in formal orders and statutory 
aspirations have an impact on litigating parents.  When the Children Act 1989 was 
introduced it was hoped that since the new orders would leave fundamental parental 
rights/responsibilities unaffected, conflict would be reduced and children would 
benefit.135  However, it is now generally accepted that this reform failed to reduce 
parental conflicts.136  Instead, applications for section 8 orders have increased steadily 
since the Act’s implementation.137 Parental responsibility, in particular, was 
introduced to give both parents equal status; non-resident fathers would be 
reassured, mothers would be more willing to acknowledge fathers’ input, and there 
would be “less to fight over”.138  Thus, parental responsibility is often granted despite 
hostility between the parties.139  However, Diduck and Kaganas have reviewed 
research on parental responsibility and concluded that it is unlikely in practice to 
facilitate co-operative parenting.140  According to autopoietic theory, law’s normative 
expectations are filtered through parents’ cognitive frameworks as the latter 
reinterpret legal communications to fit their own moral values and versions of 
events.  When a relationship comes to an end, it is common for the partners to 
experience this as failure; the next logical step becomes to assign blame, and to 
construct a narrative of events consistent with this objective.141 Legal exhortations to 
behave reasonably are then rejected as incompatible.  However, law, which exists to 
restore order, cannot abandon its search for a solution where a problem has been 
referred to it by another subsystem.  
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4.4.2 Interference from Child Welfare, Mediation and Post-
Liberal Communitarianism  
 
The second chapter argued that law appears, superficially, to have absorbed the 
language and ethos of mediation and the child welfare sciences.  The task of finding 
the best solution for the child is undertaken as a joint venture by both parties’ legal 
representatives.142  Traditionally adversarial, adjudicatory processes have become 
conciliatory and forward-looking, while parents’ evidence is re-written to lessen the 
impact of past incidents and present both parents as “good enough”.143   Similarly, 
the influence of post-liberal and communitarian political thought can be seen in the 
Family Law Act 1996 as well as subsequent initiatives.144  Barnett has pointed to a 
mutually reinforcing relationship between the dominant construction of children’s 
best interests and the New Labour “ideologies and policies” which emphasise 
personal responsibility and citizenship.145  It was noted in the second chapter that 
post-liberalism’s welcome rejection of liberal autonomy is combined with Etzioni’s 
view that law can act as a transmitter of good community values; the result is a 
“coercive slide” where the initial value-neutral insistence that decisions must be 
made only after careful reflection is gradually complemented by a requirement that 
the right choices must be made.146    
 
The limitations of law’s cognitive framework have, as the second chapter explained, 
shaped its understanding of these external influences.  Child welfare science is seen 
to say not only that children need both parents, but also that conflict is always bad 
for children; mediation-within-law is recreated as a narrow focus on settlement on 
the immediate issues; and the post-liberal emphasis on responsible behaviour is used 
to insist that “[g]ood parents cooperate and do not litigate”.147 The result is the 
dichotomous classification of the “good” and “bad” divorce, which was first 
observed by Day Sclater in the late 1990’s and has subsequently become entrenched 
as the theme has been taken up and developed within law’s chains of 
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communication.148  The responsible parent is “self-regulatory, self-monitoring, 
facilitative, accommodating, flexible, self-sacrificing, conciliatory and giving”.149 
The observation made in the section on the welfare principle about law’s inability to 
“take full account of the complexities of human behaviour” applies with equal force 
to the new insistence on reasonable behaviour.150  Litigants are recreated as standard 
semantic artefacts: they are either good and cooperative or bad and unreasonable.  
Similarly, several studies by Piper, King, and Neale and Smart, have shown that 
specialist family solicitors structure their information to clients so as to convey 
dominant messages about bi-nuclear post-divorce families and to persuade their 
clients to “act sensibly”.151   A degree of manipulation was thought justified in 
persuading clients into settlements which were perceived to be in the long-term best 
interests of parents and children as understood in generalised abstract terms.152   
 
It has been noted that the new co-parenting model “makes emotional, cognitive and 
structural demands of both parents and children which they may not be able or 
prepared to meet”.153   However, law combines limited cognitive openness (managed 
through the processes of redundancy and re-entry) with normative closure.154  Since 
parents ought to cooperate over post-divorce contact, conflict is “bad” regardless of 
the increasing volume of cases involving entrenched inter-parental disputes.  Thus, 
law remains unaware of the misfit between its insistence on maintaining 
relationships and minimising conflict and the powerful, complex and contradictory 
emotions experienced by separating parents.155  
 
Contact cases tend to be “amongst the most bitter, protracted, and difficult 
encountered in family law”.156  The filtering mechanisms of restricted legal aid and 
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coercively conciliatory solicitors have meant that only the most entrenched disputes 
now reach the adjudication stage; but achieving lasting agreement is particularly 
difficult, since arrangements must be implemented over the long-term and often 
renegotiated in response to changes in circumstances.157   Happy endings are rare, 
and law’s refusal to consider whether its standards need to be adjusted casts parents 
who insist on a court hearing as the bad, litigious parties.  They have, thus, become 
the principal targets for judicial expressions of disapproval.   Sir Thomas Bingham 
MR in the oft-cited case of Re O [1996] warned lower courts not to give undue 
weight to short-term problems, or allow themselves to be “dictated to by obdurate 
parents”.158   The occasionally executed threats of committal for contempt or a 
transfer of residence have been used to secure parents’ compliance with contact 
arrangements.159  The label “implacable hostility” was initially used to describe 
resident parents whose objections were seen as having no reasonable foundation.  
However, during the 1990’s, probably due to law’s tendency to communicate using 
rigid semantic artefacts, it developed into an “umbrella term” attached to all un-
cooperative mothers, who were “pigeonholed” as selfish, bitter and unreasonable.160  
Fears have been expressed that if Parental Alienation Syndrome is given legal 
recognition it will be similarly misused, as the “predictions and fluid definitions” of 
psychiatry are converted into legal “oversimplifications, obfuscations and 
overstatements”.161 Furthermore, the new post-liberal “etiquette” is likely to make 
professionals reticent to focus on anything which makes a compromise less likely.162  
The domestic violence findings of fact hearings stipulated by Re L [2000] can, for 
example, be cancelled where the substantive issue is settled through party 
negotiation.163 In Re W-C [2005] Wall LJ observed that since the parties had “very 
sensibly” managed to reach a compromise, the judge had not needed to resolve the 
issue of violence, with no reflection on whether there had been violence and how 
this might have affected the judge’s decision in relation to contact.164   
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159  Bailey-Harris, R (1997) “A v N (Committal: Refusal of Contact)”, Family Law, 232-233, p233. V-P v V-P (1980) 
FLR 336; K v K [2003] All ER 388, Re M [2003] FLR 636.  
160 Re D [1997] 2 FLR 48 per Hale J at p53; Smart & Neale (1997) p333. 
161  Clarkson & Clarkson (2007) op cit n91, p267.  
162  Smart, C & May, V (2004) “Why Can’t They Agree? The Underlying Complexity of Contact and 
Residence Disputes”, 26(4) JSWFL, 347-360, p348; Reece (2003) op cit n46, p194-197.   
163  Re L, Re V, Re M, Re H [2000] 2 FCR 404.  
164   Re W-C [2005] EWCA Civ 575 at [10].  
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Since good parents do not litigate, parents paradoxically find themselves 
reprimanded by judges just for requesting their help.165  In Re J [2004] Wall LJ began 
his judgment by delivering what he himself described as a “lecture” to the parents; in 
Re T [2009] and Re J [2009] he reminded both parties that parents who continue “at 
loggerheads” cause their children “serious emotional harm”.166  Since law maintains 
its normative standards, debate around the “intractable problem” of how to teach 
parents to communicate is conducted on the assumption that this is not only 
possible, but would also provide a panacea for contact and residence disputes.167  The 
maintenance of social stability is such a vital part of law’s societal role that it is 
impossible for law to abdicate authority; law sees itself as existing to be obeyed and 
to impose order on an otherwise chaotic society (a perception which is perhaps also 
shared by a political system that turns to law to solve its problems).168  Law’s lack of 
success has led to a search for alternative ways of educating parents: counselling, 
therapeutic intervention, and particularly mediation. Many courts now adopt what 
is described as a robust approach, which comes very close to ordering parents to 
attend mediation.169   
 
Contact with both parents has come to be constructed, within law’s circular chains 
of communication, as essential for child development; parental cooperation, or at 
least the absence of conflict, appears increasingly to be constructed in the same way. 
Furthermore, use of the reasonableness discourse is increasingly becoming as 
important as formulating claims within the welfare discourse.170 
 
4.4.3 The Gendered Dimension  
 
This bifurcation into good and bad parents is applied to both sexes; in recent years 
the focus on compromise has made the judiciary more ready to condemn vengeful 
                                                 
165  Kaganas & Day Sclater (2004) op cit n97, p13; Johnson, S (2009) “Shared Residence Orders: For and 
Against” Family Law 131, p131 
166  Re J [2004] EWCA Civ 1188 at [5-6]; Re T [2009] EWCA Civ 20 at [66] & Re R [2009] EWCA Civ 358 at 
[123].   
167  Johnson (2009) op cit, n152, p131.  
168  Teubner (1993) op cit n1, p70.   
169  Roberts, M (2006) “Voluntary Participation in Family Mediation”, Family Law, 57-60, p57; Robinson, N 
(2006) “A New Model of Court-Directed Mediation”, Family Law, 2006, 139-144, p140.   
170  Collier (2009) op cit n65, p45.  
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fathers.171   There is, however, a clear gender dimension to the new insistence on 
reasonableness.  The construction of motherhood as responding to children’s needs 
has made it difficult for women to mention their own needs or rights without being 
labelled selfish.172  Moreover, a false link is produced between what is expected of 
mothers and children’s supposed intrinsic needs, which are constructed within a 
particular socio-political context.173  Since the semantic artefact of the child is now 
constructed as needing both parents, and a conflict-free environment, counselling is 
recommended to mothers, who must learn how to “assist in supporting contact”.174  
In contact cases, the identification of resident parents as the prime obstacle has 
resulted in a preoccupation with enforcement and consistent with the post-liberal 
emphasis on reasonableness, the Adoption and Children Act 2006 contains 
provisions, which aim to educate these parents.175  Being responsible has acquired a 
new meaning of recognising that you need this support to parent responsibly.176 
Thus, mothers who cannot bring their cases within the narrow domestic violence 
exception still find it extremely difficult to refuse contact.  At the same time, law 
does not seek to regulate and is uninterested in the apportionment of caring 
responsibilities within the private sphere.  It concerns itself with abstract 
aspirations; the ideal is now the ‘new’ involved man and law consequently assumes 
family chores are shared equally.177 Thus, mothers cannot now rely on their caring 
efforts and experience to argue for more time with their children.  Furthermore, 
where children raise objections based on what would previously have been 
recognised as the maternal preference rule, their views are often disregarded as the 
results of manipulation by bitter resident parents.178   
 
The normative expectations placed on mothers and fathers in relation to contact are 
markedly different.  The language of the statute is passive: under s.8(1) a parent with 
residence must “allow” contact to take place.179  Case law has, however, clearly 
                                                 
171  Vallance-Webb, G (2008) “Child Contact: Vengeful Mothers, Good Fathers and Vice Versa”, Family Law, 
678, p678.  
172  Lawler (1999) op cit n72, p65; Smart, C (1989b) “Power and the Politics of Child Custody” in Smart, C & 
Sevenhuijsen, S (Eds) Child Custody and the Politics of Gender, London, Routledge, 1-26, p23.  
173  Lawler (1999) op cit n72, p70.   
174  Re P [2008] EWCA Civ 1431 per Ward LJ at [36].  
175  Kaganas & Day Sclater (2004) op cit n97, p9; Vallance-Webb (2008) op cit n173, p679.  
176  Reece (2009) op cit n10, p102.  
177  Barnett (2009b) op cit n71, p138.  
178  Ibid, p139.  
179  Smart & Neale (1999) op cit n96, p123. 
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established that mothers must actively facilitate post-divorce fathering.180 Mothers 
may be called upon to give active assistance, e.g. in sending and in reading out 
letters.181  They must conceal their misgivings and are expected to “assist the 
children to come to terms with having contact”.182  As noted, the law has a clear 
objective of promoting father-child relationships, but a significantly hazier 
understanding of the substance of such relationships.  Consequently, law does not 
demand much in terms of parenting ability.  Instead, the law expects mothers to 
accept the additional burden of helping these fathers maintain relationships with 
their children.183   The efforts involved in sustaining intra-familial relationships, 
however, remain hidden from law within the private sphere.  Smart has observed 
that “the work of sustaining access is like housework: it is only visible when it is not 
done”.184  
 
This restriction of one parent’s freedom may be a price worth paying for the other 
parent’s positive impact on the children’s lives; provided, of course, that the latter 
will have a positive impact.  This can no longer be assumed given the strength of the 
pro-contact presumption.185   However, the voicing of complaints is a high-risk 
strategy which is likely to result in the mother being identified as obstructive.186   
Although the benefits of contact are sometimes weighed against the child’s need for 
stability there is very rarely recognition in this balancing exercise of the value of the 
care provided by the resident parent.  Instead, the highest accolades are reserved for 
mothers who support contact in difficult circumstances or despite fathers’ severe 
shortcomings.187  Consequently, it is not surprising that mothers seek to emulate the 
semantic artefact of the supportive mother.  In Re C [2007] the mother, who faced 
threats of a transfer of residence, explained to the court that she had now realised 
that she had previously been wrong in thinking that maintaining the relationship 
                                                 
180  Kaganas & Day Sclater (2004) op cit n97, p13. 
181 Jolly, S (1995) “Implacable Hostility, Contact and the Limits of Law”, 7(3) CFLQ, 228-235, p233.   
182 F v F [1998] 2 FLR 237 per Sir Stephen Brown P at p242. 
183  Wallbank, J (1998) “Castigating Mothers: The Judicial Response to ‘Wilful’ Women in Disputes over 
Paternal Contact in English Law”, 20(4) JSWFL, 357-376, p358. 
184  Smart, C (1991) “The Legal and Moral Ordering of Child Custody” 18(4) Journal of Law and Society, 485-500, 
p496.  
185 Collier, R (1995a) Masculinity, Law and the Family, Routledge, London, p283; Eriksson & Hester (2001) op cit 
n108, p780. 
186  Barnett (2009b) op cit n71, p138; Eriksson & Hester (2001) op cit n108, p787; Wallbank (1998) op cit n185, p367. 
187  Re W [2007] EWCA Civ 786 per Wall LJ at [4];  F v R, D, N [2007] EWHC 64 per Sumner J at [152]-[153]. 
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between the father and child was “up to the father”.188   “Being neutral”, she 
conceded “was not enough”.189  Even though suspicions were voiced regarding the 
genuineness of her change of heart, the mother in Re C [2007] successfully retained 
residence; but only as long as she continued to conform to the normative 
expectations of reasonable post-liberal co-parenting.   It will be argued subsequently, 
that in relation to shared residence, this is an even higher price to pay.   
 
In conclusion, it can therefore be seen that although the non-intervention principle 
in s.1(5) and the current reluctance of the courts to adjudicate disputes over children 
appear to give parents greater freedom, in reality the latter’s autonomy is greatly 
limited by a proscriptive and coercive legal discourse which, through its own rigid 
translations of child welfare, mediation and post-liberal arguments, insists that 
parents should only use their freedom of choice to make the ‘right’ decision to 
continue the family across two households.  Mothers, in particular, are implicitly 
expected to make considerable sacrifices in order for children to grow up in the 
supposedly essential collaborative bi-nuclear post-separation family.  Yet, high-
conflict cases continue to put an over-stretched family court system under pressure, 
and there is a perception within the political subsystem that the law is not working.    
 
4.5 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has examined how the three strands identified in the second chapter 
have influenced English law in relation to disputes between parents over children.  
The autopoietic and inherently patriarchal nature of family law can be seen in the 
conceptualisation of parental responsibility as a right and status bestowed merely by 
reason of biological fatherhood.  Law’s simplistic understanding of child welfare 
science has combined with its susceptibility to pressure or interference from the 
more powerful political subsystem and has led law to prioritise the child’s need for 
both parents, and to understand it in a general, “male” way, as can be seen in the 
understanding of parental responsibility as bringing great symbolic benefits to 
children. The traditional nuclear family retains a strong normative influence, 
bolstered by law’s responses to concerns around demographic change expressed in 
                                                 
188  Re C [2007] EWHC 2312 at [78].   
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political discourse, but law’s tendency to focus on abstract aspirations allows it to 
ignore the gap between gender-neutral legislation and gendered familial practices.  
Thus, ostensibly gender-neutral exhortations to parents to behave reasonably and 
responsibly coerce mothers into sustaining father-child relationships within a new 
binuclear framework and allows non-resident fathers to provide what is seen by law 
as a stabilising influence, with little practical involvement: a “reconstruction of 
patriarchy”.190   It is argued in the next chapter that a greater use of court-ordered 
shared residence would constitute a further, undesirable, step in this direction.  
 
 
                                                 
190 Smart, C (1989) Feminism and the Power of Law, Routledge, London, p19. 
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5 THE LAW ON SHARED 
RESIDENCE IN ENGLAND 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter first considers the residence order per se, and court decisions on sole 
residence.  It then focuses on shared residence, using the analytical framework from 
previous chapters to examine this order in relation to the ideal of permanent 
parenthood, the welfare test, and the emerging powerful ‘reasonableness’ discourse.   
English family law has moved from an earlier dislike of shared residence to a neutral 
stance in s.11(4) of the Children Act 1989 which expressly envisages, but does not 
encourage, the use of this order, and now to a view of it as benefitting children not 
only through the practical arrangements but also the symbolic messages the order 
can send.  It is contended that this order is becoming an increasingly important part 
of law’s strategy of making post-separation dual household families conform to a 
binuclear blueprint.  This use of the order is, in principle, contrary to s.1 of the 
Children Act 1989.  In practice, it is likely to expose both children and their mothers 
to risks of harm and unjustifiable emotional and practical difficulties.  It is 
submitted that these are decisive arguments against a shared residence presumption.   
 
5.2 RESIDENCE ORDERS 
 
A residence order is defined in s.8(1) as “an order settling the arrangements to be 
made as to the person with whom a child is to live”.  Although there were almost as 
many applications for residence as for contact in 2008, residence is a less contested 
issue and a significant number of residence orders are likely to have been sought 
merely as a confirmation of existing arrangements.1   The residence order was 
designed to fit with the 1989 Act’s objective of impressing upon fathers the 
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permanent nature of their commitment to their children.2  One assumption behind 
the Act was that replacing the custody order with residence would allow the non-
resident parent to retain equal status and provide an incentive for continued 
involvement with the child.3   The order does, however, bring some additional legal 
benefits.  Where it is made in favour of a father who does not have parental 
responsibility, the order must also grant the latter, and this parental responsibility 
will continue even if the residence order is subsequently terminated.4 Section 13 of 
the Act provides that where a residence order is in force neither parent can cause the 
child to be known by a new surname or leave the jurisdiction for more than a month.  
Fathers have attacked sole residence orders as an unjustified unequal treatment of 
two fit parents, and have complained of being made to feel like second-class 
citizens.5   
 
When family law moved away from the view that fathers had absolute rights over 
children, judicial “rules of thumb” developed whereby young children would be sent 
to live with their mothers.6   Mothers are still significantly more likely than fathers 
to be holders of residence orders and accusations of bias have consequently been 
made against the legal system.7    Empirical studies confirm judicial assertions that 
this is not gender bias but in fact a reflection of parents’ own preferences as well as a 
result of the judicial preference for continuity.8    Although there is no express status 
quo presumption, the likely effects of change are explicitly mentioned in s.1(3), and 
                                                 
2 Herring, J (2001) “Parents and Children” in Herring, J (Ed) Family Law: Issues, Debates, Policy, Cullompton, 
Devon, Willan Publishing, pp150-151; Bailey-Harris, R, Barron, J & Pearce, J (1999) “Settlement Culture 
and the Use of the ‘No Order’ Principle under the Children Act 1989", 11(1) CFLQ, 53-62, p53. 
3  Law Commission (1988) Family Law Review of Guardianship and Custody, No 172, London, HMSO, [4.5];  
Bainham, A (1990) “The Privatization of the Public Interest in Children”, 53(2)MLR, 206, p210; Smart, C & 
Neale, B (1999) Family Fragments?, Cambridge, Polity Press, pp37-38 
4  The Children Act 1989, s.12 and s.4.  
5  D v D [2001] 1 FLR 495 at p496; A v A [2004] EWHC 142 [3]; Geldof, B (2003) ”The Real Love that Dare 
Not Speak its Name: A Sometimes Coherent Rant” in Bainham, A, Lindley, B, Richards, M & Trinder, L 
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O’Connor, founder of Fathers4Justice, interviewed in Hill, D, The Guardian, 11th June 2oo3; Coe, T, Shared 
Parenting: The Right Starting Point? Equal Parenting Council website 
http://www.equalparenting.org/shared-parenting/index.php accessed 30th September 2007. 
6  Diduck, A & Kaganas, F (1999) Family Law, Gender and the State: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, p468.  
7  Hunt, J & Macleod, A (2008) Outcomes of Applications to Court for Contact Orders after Parental Separation or 
Divorce, London, TSO, p8; The Times, 9th December 2003; The Sun 19th December 2003. 
8  Re O [2003] EWCA Civ 915 per Thorpe LJ [12]; Smart, C, May, V, Wade, A & Furniss, C (2003) Residence 
and Contact Disputes in Court: Volume 1, Department for Constitutional Affairs, 
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very often there is felt to be such a considerable risk of harm that this determines the 
outcome of contested residence cases.9   
 
The residence order was also introduced to facilitate compromise and co-parenting.  
It, and the parental responsibility order, replaced the custody order as part of the 
1989 Act’s strategy to “lower the stakes” in inter-parental disputes.10   However, 
fathers’ groups have repeatedly complained that mothers are using sole residence 
orders to exclude fathers and that parental responsibility orders are useless in 
preventing this.11  In conclusion, there is no firm evidence that the introduction of 
residence orders has encouraged paternal involvement, benefited children or reduced 
parental hostility.  This is not surprising, given the difficulties the closed legal 
subsystem has in transmitting messages outside its own boundaries, where they are 
reinterpreted or rejected according to individuals’ cultural, religious or personal 
moral constructions of truth.  A “simple model of cause and effect”12 is unrealistic, 
and law cannot be used to make parents nicer to each other.  However, within 
political debate, this lack of success has amplified voices that insist that family law is 
failing.  Current practice is increasingly criticised as an overly simplistic “first past 
the post” system, which discards the vital role previously played by the “secondary” 
parent.13  While this criticism may be justified, it is far from clear that a shared 
residence presumption constitutes the solution.     
 
5.3 SHARED RESIDENCE: DEFINITION  
 
 
Shared residence is a comparatively recent and rare arrangement although its 
popularity is increasing; a recent survey estimated that between 9% and 12% of 
separated couples’ children now alternate between two households.14  There is no 
firm definition of shared residence in English law, no formalised requirements, and 
                                                 
9  Re F [2009] EWCA Civ 313; Re C [2007] EWHC 2312; Re M [2008] EWCA Civ 225.   
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no uniform agreement on terminology.15  S.11(4) of the Children Act 1989 merely 
states that where a residence order is made in favour of adults who do not live 
together, it “may specify the periods during which the child is to live in the different 
households concerned”.  Although there now seems to be judicial agreement that 
this arrangement should be described as shared, rather than joint, the courts at times 
use the terms shared care or shared parenting which could also mean sole residence 
with contact.16  The distinction between shared residence and sole residence with 
generous contact is essentially a question of degree, particularly as contact orders 
will now more often than not involve quite generous staying contact.  The Court of 
Appeal has confirmed that the two questions should be considered separately: a 
judge should first consider the optimum division of time and then weigh up whether 
to label the arrangement using a contact or a shared residence order.17  Unlike joint 
legal custody, however, shared residence does imply physical care of the child, which 
is significant in terms of quantity as well as quality.18  An order can contain detailed 
schedules, but courts may also leave the parties to agree: “the object of the exercise 
should be to maintain flexible and practical arrangements whenever possible”.19   
 
5.4 SHARED RESIDENCE AND PERMANENT, 
PATRIARCHAL PARENTHOOD  
 
The custody order was seen as an “all or nothing”, “winner takes all” order, and the 
change of terminology to residence was intended to remedy this problem.20  Yet, 
shared residence is now increasingly sought by fathers due to its connotations of 
equal status.21  District Judge Spencer has observed, extra-judicially, that many 
fathers are now aggrieved to have their time with the children labelled contact, 
which is seen as signalling that they are less important.22   They seek shared 
                                                 
15  Gilmore, S (2006b) “Court Decision-Making in Shared Residence Order Cases: a Critical Examination”, 
18(4) CFLQ, 478-498, p480.  
16  The first point has been made by Wilson LJ in Re W [2009] EWCA Civ 370 and Re  K [2008] EWCA Civ 
526; a less clear approach can be found in Re W [2005] EWCA Civ 1276; Re P [2006] EWCA Civ 964;  Re C-
P [2006] EWCA Civ 120.   
17  Re  K [2008] EWCA Civ 526  
18  Edwards, J (2006) “Presumption of Shared Residence - a Conundrum for the Government or the 
Judiciary?” Family Law, 30-35, p34.  
19  A v A [2004] EWHC 142 at [118].  In that case the schedules were, in fact, extremely rigid and detailed.   
20  As is the case now, a perception had developed within the political subsystem that families faced problems 
that law ought to solve. 
21  Spencer, S (2008) “Benchmarks: Family Residence”, 39 Law Society Gazette, 24; Re P [2006] EWCA Civ 
964; Re W [2005] EWCA Civ 1276; A v A [2004] EWHC 142;  Re C-P[2006] EWCA Civ 120 
22  Spencer (2008) op cit n21, p24.  
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residence in the erroneous belief that it will give them “more legal power in the 
child’s life”.23  Indeed, Ward LJ was prompted to observe in Re G [2008]: “A 
residence order gives the mother no added right over and above the father.  That is 
the lesson that has not yet been fully learned in the 19 years that the Act has been on 
the statute book”.24   This may seem to contradict what is stated above in relation to 
the residence order, parental responsibility and the rules against surname change and 
removal from the jurisdiction, but Ward LJ was substantially correct. These legal 
consequences are not particularly significant; the same outcomes can be achieved 
just as easily through different procedural routes; and it has always been clear that a 
residence order does not grant greater parental status.25    
 
5.4.1 Case Law after the Children Act 1989  
 
Initially, courts adhered firmly to the understanding of shared residence that was 
implicit in the Children Act 1989; residence orders were, “as their words indicate, 
practical orders”.26  The very important case of D v D [2001], which signalled a 
significant warming of judicial attitudes towards shared residence, was, nonetheless, 
decided on the basis of a near-equal division of the children’s time.27  Courts 
subsequently remained reluctant to grant shared residence to fathers who sought it 
solely for its symbolic benefits.28  In Re A [2001] Hale LJ observed that the law 
already grants parents equal, shared parental responsibility, while shared residence 
orders “are about where a child is to live”.29  In Re S [2002] the father’s appeal was 
denied; the court acknowledged that the categorisation of the order mattered greatly 
to the applicant, but observed that he “was asking for a label to be applied to the 
arrangements which belied their reality”.30   Similar comments were made by 
Thorpe LJ in Re W [2003].31  In Child-Villiers [2002] and P v BW [2003] the courts 
relied on s.1(3)(e) to reject applications made primarily to adjust child support 
liability.32   
                                                 
23  Ibid.  
24  Re G [2008] EWCA Civ 1468 at [17].  
25  Re M [1999] 2 FLR 334.    
26  Re H [1995] 2 FLR 883 per Ward LJ at p889.  
27  D v D [2001] 1 FLR 495. 
28  K v K [2003] All ER 388; Re A [2002] EWCA Civ 1343. 
29  Re A [2001]  EWCA Civ 1795 per Hale LJ at [17].  
30  Re S [2002] EWCA Civ 179 per Wilson J at [4].   
31  Re W [2003] EWCA Civ 116 at [7].  
32  Child-Villiers v Secretary for Work and Pensions [2002] EWCA Civ 1854; P v BW [2003] EWHC 1541. 
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However, there has also been a parallel line of cases like Re N [1994], where a shared 
residence order may have been made primarily to ease the father’s sense of loss 
when the two young daughters were moved to live with their mother.33  Similarly in 
Re R [1995] a mother who only spent three-quarters of weekends and some holidays 
with her children was given shared residence.34  This use of shared residence can be 
seen as consistent with the Children Act approach of avoiding any legal steps which 
may discourage a parent from maintaining a relationship with a child.     
 
5.4.2 D v D [2001] and the Dual Purposes of Shared Residence  
 
Further evidence of this approach can also be found in the leading case of D v D 
[2001] and subsequent cases.  It can be seen as law’s attempt to “silence the noise” it 
registers from the political subsystem, which insists that law must find new 
solutions to the perceived problems of discouraged or disengaged post-separation 
fatherhood.35  This powerful interference has led to a new use of shared residence 
orders to combat a problem that parental responsibility and contact orders are judged 
not to have solved.  An understanding of the autopoietic nature of the political and 
legal subsystems, and the difficulties of law reforms where these conflict with 
parents’ own motivations or understandings of right and wrong, leads to the 
conclusion that this use of the shared residence order is no more likely to be 
successful than previous strategies; this is not a productive use of the law.   
 
In D v D [2001] the applicant father argued that he was being treated “as a second-
class parent” and had cited this as a main source of his grievances.36   At first 
instance, Connor J had found that the mother was using the sole residence order as a 
“weapon” in the “war” with the father.37  The Court of Appeal cited two reasons for 
upholding the shared residence order.  Firstly, they applied the s.1(3) checklist and 
concluded that, since the order would reflect the practical realities, it would not 
confuse the children.  Secondly, the Court recognised that a shared residence order 
“removes any impression that one parent is good and responsible whereas the other 
                                                 
33 Re N, unreported, Court of Appeal, 2nd September 1994. 
34  Re R [1995] 2 FLR 612.  
35  Teubner (1993) op cit n12, p71; p141.  
36 D v D [2001] 1 FLR 495, at p495. 
37 Ibid, per Connor J at p497. 
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parent is not”.38   It was felt that the additional, largely symbolic, benefits this would 
bring to the father would allow him to “go away and make contact work”.39 
 
Applying D v D [2001], the judiciary continued to emphasise that a shared residence 
order must reflect practical realities, but, once this was established, became 
increasingly prepared to be swayed by arguments about symbolic messages regarding 
status.40  These dual purposes were again stressed in A v A [2004] where the father 
had initially applied for both contact and shared residence, admitting that his 
application for the latter was to counter the mother’s habit of making unilateral 
decisions.41   The shared residence order was said to signal that the parents were 
“equal in the eyes of the law”.42 According to autopoieticists, law is making 
successive minor modifications to its cognitive framework until the tension created 
by the clashing expectations of other subsystems has been resolved.43 Changes can 
only occur in ways which are compatible with the existing meaning-making 
machinery, and in this instance, adjustments to law’s truths about fatherhood have 
occurred in ways which are compatible with the normative influence of the 
public/private dichotomy.  In Re F [2003] a shared residence order was used to 
achieve an interesting solution in a case where both parents had sought sole 
residence and the father had abandoned his naval career to improve his prospects of 
success.44 It was held that, despite the mother’s shortcomings, a change of residence 
away from the primary carer mother would be too traumatic.  However, it was also 
found that the mother had attempted to exclude the father, and to prevent this from 
reoccurring, the court chose to make an order for shared residence, rather than 
contact (the two primary-school age daughters were to spend three out of four 
weekends and the larger share of school holidays with the father). At first instance, 
Bonvin J also advised the father to reconsider his decision to leave the Navy, 
suggesting a judicial reluctance to let him abandon his traditional breadwinner role.45  
She opined that the recognition of equal status was important in this instance to 
ensure that the father remained “sufficiently closely involved in [the children’s] 
                                                 
38 Ibid, per Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss at p503. 
39 Ibid. 
40  Re C [2002] 1 FLR 1136; Re A [2002] EWCA Civ 1343. 
41 A v A [2004] EWHC 142 at [3].  
42  Ibid, at [124].    
43  Teubner (1993) op cit n12, pp78-79.   
44  Re F [2003] EWCA Civ 592. 
45  Ibid, at [13]. 
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lives to provide a suitable example of good behaviour, appropriate guidance on moral 
issues, as well as to counteract any tendency of the part of the mother to be overly 
critical of [the older daughter]”.46  Her decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal.  
This compromise may have failed to satisfy either parent but suited law’s purposes 
(and success is evaluated internally)As an autopoietic subsystem, the law assigned to 
its semantic artefacts of mother and father the gendered roles of the patriarchal 
nuclear family; the mother was to continue providing care, while fatherhood was 
understood in terms of authority, guidance and discipline.     
 
The perception of shared residence as a ‘status symbol’ may have been bolstered by 
cases involving a non-biological parent, like Re G [2006], where there has been 
explicit use of shared residence to grant parental responsibility and equal status.47   
Re A [2008] was described by Bridge as “an elegant illustration of the expansion of 
the concept underlying shared residence orders”.48  The case granted shared 
residence to a man who had brought the child up thinking he was the father, but had 
subsequently discovered this not to be the case.49   The purpose of the order was to 
grant the step-father parental responsibility and also to signal that he was an 
important, permanent part of the child’s life.50  In this case, the order was indeed 
needed if the parties were to have equal status, but it is submitted that the question 
of status should not have been divorced from the issue of practical involvement.  
The case is considered further in later sections.     
 
It appears that the message about status originally enunciated in D v D [2001] has 
changed; the order was initially to be simply about practicalities, and then came to 
be seen as equally about confirming concrete arrangements and conveying symbolic 
messages.  In subsequent cases, however, the first purpose is no longer mentioned, 
and shared residence can be granted purely to achieve the latter; the judiciary, for 
example, have endorsed the making of shared residence orders where one parent is 
                                                 
46  Ibid at [13]. 
47  Re G [2006] 2 FLR 629; Geekie, C (2008) “Relocation and Shared Residence: One Route or Two?” Family 
Law, 446-448, p446.  See also Re H [1995] 2 FLR 883.  
48  Bridge, C (2008f) “Case Reports: Shared Residence: Re A (Shared Residence: Parental Responsibility)” Family 
Law, 1006.  
49  Re G [2006] UKHL 43; Re A [2008] EWCA Civ 867.  
50  Bridge (2008f) op cit n50, p1006; Bridge, C (2008e) “Case Reports: Residence: Re K (Shared Residence Order)” 
Family Law, 849.  
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emigrating to North America.51  In Re K [2008] the benefits of the shared residence 
order were seen to be largely symbolic; the district judge had been wrong to see the 
application for shared residence as irrelevant once he had denied the application for 
increases in contact since the two “do not stand or fall together”.52  In Re G [2008] 
Ward LJ had some sympathy for the first instance judge’s conclusions that the 
reality of the arrangement was quite obviously sole residence, and that a shared 
residence order was no more than “a little piece of paper”. 53  He noted, however, that 
this was “an emotive matter for the father”, and said the matter ought to have been 
adjourned for full consideration.54   
 
It is true that fathers who seem to preoccupied with their own rights, are unduly 
confrontational or make unsubstantiated accusations of bias, receive robust 
responses from the judiciary.55  Yet, overall, shared residence has developed “a 
special meaning” that is far removed from the statute”.56   Case commentaries and 
practitioners’ articles have observed that there are “psychological” benefits to 
children and parents in stamping the court’s official seal of approval on 
arrangements and “emphasising the equality” of parents.57  Shared residence orders 
are often combined with contact orders for one parent; a “contradiction in terms” 
justifiably criticised by Wilson LJ in Re W [2009].58  In Re T [2009] Wall LJ 
described equal division as “rare”, suggesting that most cases now depart from what 
had previously been presumed to be the standard shared residence arrangement of 
50/50 sharing.59   
 
It is interesting to note that this reinterpretation has occurred as members of the 
judiciary have linked their own comments with observations from previous cases 
into a self-reinforcing chain of communications that constructs shared residence as 
less about time and more about something that has always been a prominent feature 
of the legal cognitive framework: the sharing of power or status.   An autopoietic 
                                                 
51  CC v PC [2006] EWHC 1794; Re N [2006] EWCA Civ 872 
52  Re  K [2008] EWCA Civ 526 per Wilson LJ at [6].  
53  Re G [2008] EWCA Civ 1468 at [5].  
54  Ibid.  
55  See e.g. Re R [2003] EWCA Civ 597.  
56  Spencer (2008) op cit n21, p24.  
57  Ibid, p25; Bridge (2008f) op cit n50, p1006.  
58  Re W [2009] EWCA Civ 370 at [21].  See e.g. Re A [2008] EWCA Civ 867; Re G [2007] EWCA Civ 1497 ; 
V v V [2006] EWHC 2546; Re H [2004] EWHC 2064 per Baron J at [1].   
59  Re T [2009] EWCA Civ 20 at [35].  
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system constructs new meanings from old ones.  In Re W [2009] Wilson LJ quoted 
Sir Mark Potter P in Re A [2008]: “It is now recognised by the court that a shared 
residence order may be regarded as appropriate where it provides legal confirmation 
of the factual reality of a child’s life or where, in a case where one party has the 
primary care of a child, it may be psychologically beneficial to the parents in 
emphasising the equality of their position and responsibilities.”60   The two purposes 
identified in D v D [2001] have been separated; in the quote they are linked with 
“or”, rather than “and”.  It is no longer necessary for the order to reflect a practical 
arrangement close to equal sharing before the supposed benefits of emphasising 
parental equality can be considered.  Instead, it appears that the symbolic side of the 
order has become most important.  In Re W [2009] Wilson LJ stated that “the 
deliberate and sustained marginalisation of one parent by the other” constitutes a 
sufficient reason to make a shared residence order where what is being ordered is, in 
substance, contact.61   The Children Act’s focus on practical arrangements, and the 
earlier insistence that orders must not confuse children, appear to have gone, perhaps 
forgone in the search for a solution that can silence the complaints from the political 
subsystem that more must be done to address the problem of disengaged fathers and 
disintegrating families.  Counsel’s arguments based on the precise allocation of the 
daughter’s time (25/75) were rejected by the Court of Appeal.62  Comparisons can be 
made with an early 20th Century compromise technique, which sought to reconcile 
the competing demands of aggrieved fathers and the ‘best interests’ standard by 
separating legal custody from practical ‘care and control’.63  This would give fathers 
the desired status and authority, without unduly disturbing the mother-child bond.  
In both instances, family law’s preoccupation with preserving existing patriarchal 
structures is evident.   
 
Pro-fathers campaigners have warned that the current, supposedly biased, law risks 
creating “an unstable society of children and feckless adolescents”, and that, rather 
than addressing the symptoms of social disintegration, governments should seek to 
                                                 
60  Re W [2009] EWCA Civ 370 at [11]. 
61  Re W [2009] EWCA Civ 370 at [15] 
62  Ibid at [17]. 
63  van Krieken, R (2005) “The ‘Best Interests of the Child’ and Parental Separation: On the ‘Civilizing of 
Parents”, 68(1) MLR, 25-48, p30; Law Commission (1986) Family Law Review of Child Law: Custody, 
Working Paper No 96, London, HMSO, [2.35]; B v B [1978] 1 FLR  87.  
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reverse the fatherlessness that is its underlying cause.64  The arguments are almost 
identical to the warnings issued by the New Right in the 1980’s, examined in the 
previous chapter, and are easy to dismiss as exaggerated doom mongering.  
However, the autopoietic legal subsystem is inherently both patriarchal and 
conservative, ensuring a stable society by deflecting challenges to the current 
allocation of power.65   Consequently, these types of messages about fathers’ vital 
role in maintaining the stable families that are the basic building blocks of society fit 
comfortably into law’s chains of communications.   Fathers 4 Justice has said: 
“Whilst the traditional nuclear family may be an anomaly in today's contemporary 
society, children still need the love and care of both parents”.66  Similar statements 
are made by legal personnel.  In Re A [2008] Adam J had told the litigants that their 
son needed “a rounded future”, which he said was “achievable only with a father 
figure as well as a mother figure”.  It is not clear whether this prescription for 
healthy development applied solely to this boy; it is more likely to have been an 
observation of general application.  It is quoted, without further comment, by Sir 
Mark Potter in the subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal.67  In this particular 
case the courts appeared especially concerned to maintain the six-year-old boy’s link 
with the appellant step-father because the latter was “the only father figure known” 
to the boy.68    
 
In conclusion, this use of shared residence can be compared with the contact 
presumption, which has been described as resulting from law’s desire to make post-
separation families conform to the hierarchical structure of the traditional, nuclear 
family.69 Fathers are encouraged to provide a stabilising influence over children in 
mother-headed families, as part of a “reconstruction of patriarchy”.70   Contested 
shared residence cases almost all feature cross-allegations from parents where 
mothers allege that non-residents fathers are controlling and fathers respond that 
                                                 
64  Geldof (2003) op cit n5, p182; Fathers 4 Justice: “Your Family Matters”, http://fathers-4-
justice.org/f4j//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16&Itemid=40 accessed 22nd March 2009.  
65  Luhmann (1989) op cit n53, p144.  
66  Fathers 4 Justice: “Your Family Matters”, http://fathers-4-
justice.org/f4j//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16&Itemid=40 accessed 22nd March 2009.  
67  Re A [2008] EWCA Civ 867 at [35]. 
68  Ibid at [65]. 
69 Neale, B & Smart, C (1997b) “Arguments Against Virtue - Must Contact be Enforced?”, Family Law 332-
336, p336 
70 Smart, C (1989) Feminism and the Power of Law, Routledge, London, p19. 
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mothers are maliciously trying to marginalise them.71  It is impossible to speculate 
on how many of these accusations are groundless and/or tactical, but in Re G [2008] 
Shawcross J had, at trial, been “troubled” by “the father’s seemingly entrenched 
belief that he ought to have 50% of his child’s time” and his unwillingness to listen 
to arguments to the contrary.72   This father was by no means atypical of fathers 
who make repeated applications, and the fact that law’s definition of shared 
residence has altered significantly to focus on symbolic benefits leads to a real worry 
that fathers will, with judicial assistance, gain shared residence solely or primarily to 
enhance their status and assert their authority over their former partners and 
children.  This is a very poor starting point for a shared residence presumption; it 
will lead to a routine ordering of shared residence in circumstances where children 
are likely to be harmed by the arrangement.  It is also unlikely to provide solutions 
to any real or perceived problems in relation to fatherhood, as will be explored in the 
section on reasonableness.  In many cases, where fathers are genuinely interested in 
spending more time with their children, shared residence orders that merely bring 
symbolic benefits will disappoint fathers, cause mothers to feel resentful, have no 
impact on children’s situations, and will only be evaluated as a successful solution 
within the legal system itself.   
 
5.5 SHARED RESIDENCE AND THE PARAMOUNTCY 
PRINCIPLE 
 
Prior to the enactment of the Children Act 1989 orders were often made for joint 
legal custody, but practical arrangements where children alternated between both 
parents’ homes were extremely rare.73  In a 1985 survey for the Law Commission 
orders for “shared care and control” had been made in only 0.4% of cases in the 
sample.74  The greatest obstacle to shared residence is likely to have been judicial 
disapproval.75  Case law precedents had come to be based on the assumption that 
couples would want a ‘clean break’ and very little was done to encourage post-
                                                 
71  Re G [2008] EWCA Civ 1468 at [6]; Re  K [2008] EWCA Civ 526 at [6]; Re A [2008] EWCA Civ 867 at 
[6];  Re C [2007] EWHC 2312.  
72  Re G  [2008] EWCA Civ 1468 at [10].  
73  Harty, M & Wood, J (1991) “From Shared Care to Shared Residence”, Family Law, 430-433, p430. 
74  Ibid. 
75 Baker, A & Townsend, P (1996) “Post-divorce Parenting: Rethinking Shared Residence”, 8(3) CFLQ, 217-
227, p221. 
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divorce collaboration.76  In Riley v Riley [1986] the nine-year-old daughter had been 
alternating between her parents’ homes for five years, but the Court of Appeal 
allowed the mother sole residence, commenting that it was  “prima facie wrong” to 
deprive a child of the security of a fixed home.77   
 
5.5.1 The Children Act 1989 & Subsequent Cases 
 
The 1989 Act’s preference for giving parents freedom to negotiate their own 
arrangements meant that s.11(4) of the Act explicitly allowed shared residence and 
overruled the de facto prohibition in Riley v Riley.78  However, the Law Commission 
thought shared residence orders would remain unusual and the Department of 
Health guidelines confirmed that “most children will still need the stability of a 
single home”.79  Joint parenting was, instead, conceptualised in terms of increasing 
contact and co-operation.80  Judicial scepticism initially remained post-
implementation.81 Shared residence was seen as “an order which would rarely be 
made and would depend upon exceptional circumstances” since it risked subjecting 
the child to “stress and confusion”.82  The 1990’s saw a gradual lessening of judicial 
resistance, possibly partly because courts increasingly had to consider the issue of 
shared residence in cases where the arrangement was already being successfully 
implemented.83   
 
In A v A [1994], which at the time came to be seen as the leading case, the court was 
slightly less hostile, labelling shared residence orders “unusual” rather than 
exceptional.84  Nevertheless, Butler-Sloss LJ insisted firstly, that some “positive 
benefit” to the child must be demonstrated and secondly, that the risk of unsettling 
the child must have been eliminated.85 In G v G [1993] this “unusual order” was 
made, because the circumstances were unusual, but it was still more common for 
                                                 
76 Ibid, p219; Neale, B & Smart, C (1997c) “Experiments with Parenthood?” 31(2) Sociology, 201-219, p203.  
77  Riley v Riley [1986] 2 FLR 429 per May LJ at p431. 
78  Department of Health (1991) The Children Act 1989: Guidance and Regulations, Vol 1, Court Orders, London, 
HMSO, [2.23], [2.28].  
79  Ibid, [2.28]; Law Commission (1988) op cit n3, [4.12]. 
80 Neale, B, Smart, C & Wade, A (2001) The Changing Experience of Childhood: Families and Divorce, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, p126. 
81  Johnson, S (2009) “Shared Residence Orders: For and Against” Family Law 131, p131 
82 Re H [1994] 1 FLR 717 per Purchas LJ at p722. 
83  Baker & Townsend (1996) op cit n78, p227; Mitchell, J (2004) “Shared Residence: Panacea or Problem?” New 
Law Journal, 1642-1644, p1643 
84  Douglas, G (1994) “A v A (Minors) (Shared Residence Order)” Family Law, 431-432. 
85 A v A [1994] 1 FLR 669 at pp677-678. 
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fathers’ applications to be rejected on the grounds that shared residence would be too 
worrying and confusing for the children.86  Shared residence remained the preserve 
of parents who were enthusiastic and committed enough to voluntarily draw up such 
agreements and persuade the court to approve them.   This may have been under-
inclusive but had the firm advantage of not subjecting children to arrangements that 
might harm them.  The available research, explained in the second chapter, suggests 
that shared residence is more likely to last, and to be seen as beneficial, in families 
where the parents have themselves agreed to this arrangement.   
 
5.5.2 D v D [2001] & Subsequent Case Law 
 
D v D [2001] has been described as confirming an earlier softening of judicial 
attitudes towards shared residence and “taking the law further”.87   The dispute 
concerned three girls, aged between eleven and nine, who had during the six years 
following their parents’ separation spent 38% of their time with their father.88  At 
first instance, the father had been successful in obtaining shared residence.  This was 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal, who, overturning earlier precedent, stated that an 
applicant should not have to prove unusual or exceptional circumstances; courts 
should simply apply the s.1(3) welfare test to the “individual facts of each case”.89  
Here, the order reflected the reality of the children’s lives and would eliminate, 
rather than cause, confusion, while the positive benefit to the children lay in the 
court’s official recognition of their actual living arrangements.90  Nevertheless, 
Butler-Sloss P reiterated that “[a] shared residence order is not the standard order”.91 
Hale LJ appeared to sound a note of caution to other applicant parents, reminding 
them that under s.1(3)(c), which  requires the court to take into account the likely 
effect of any change in the child’s circumstances, “any application to change an 
existing order must be supported by good reasons”.92   According to Gilmore, shared 
residence orders continued to be made predominantly to parents whose children 
were already spending substantial amounts of time in each parent’s home.93   Courts 
                                                 
86  G v G (1993) Fam Law 615; Re M (Unreported) Court of Appeal, 6th December 1996; Re WB[1995] 2 FLR 
1023; Neale et al (2001) op cit n83, p126.  
87  Butterworths Family Law Service (Version 6), London, LexisNexis UK, [1706]. 
88 D v D [2001] 1 FLR 495 at p496. 
89  Ibid, per Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P at p503. 
90 Ibid, per Hale LJ at p501. 
91 Ibid, per Butler-Sloss P at p502. 
92 Ibid, per Hale LJ at p502. 
93  Gilmore (2006b) op cit n15, pp495-496.  
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may have been erring on the side of caution, but, as shown in the third chapter, the 
research evidence is that this is a highly demanding arrangement which does not suit 
everyone. A series of gradual increases in contact, followed by evaluation of how the 
child is coping, are more likely to be in children’s best interests than a sudden, 
dramatic change to shared residence.     
 
In subsequent cases, D v D [2001] is regarded as having significantly changed the law 
by removing any “gloss” from the welfare principle.94  Interpretations of 
communications, or constructions of meaning, are adjusted as communications are 
fitted within a subsystem’s discursive chains, and it is these new meanings that 
shape future legal discourse, rather than what was meant when the communication 
was originally produced.95 In Re A [2002] the Court of Appeal criticised the first 
instance judge for having failed to recognise how much the law had changed.96  In Re 
S [2003] the case similarly had to be sent back to the County Court for 
reconsideration.97   Considerable judicial emphasis was initially placed on the fact 
that, to avoid confusion and keep with the legislators’ intentions, shared residence 
orders must accord with the children’s own experiences and involve a substantial 
sharing of the child’s time.98  In Re S [2002] Wilson J felt that any symbolic benefit 
to the father of shared residence status would be outweighed by the uncertainty 
visited upon the young children by a label which did not reflect practicalities.99  This 
appears to be striking a sensible compromise which maintains a focus on how the 
order will directly affect the relevant child.   
 
However, law’s understanding of shared residence has, as outlined in the previous 
section, gradually altered from the paradigm of 50/50 sharing towards an 
arrangement which may just as comfortably be described as generous staying 
contact.   In D v S [2008] Charles J made the general observation that shared 
residence orders promote the child’s welfare by recognising that the child has two 
                                                 
94  Re S [2003] EWCA Civ 387, per Dame Butler-Sloss P; Geekie (2008) op cit n49, p446 
95  Teubner, G, Schiff, D & Nobles, R (2003) “The Autonomy of Law: Introduction to Legal Autopoiesis”, in 
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homes, regardless of the periods of time spent in each household.100 In Re W [2009] 
Wilson LJ stated that case law had changed substantially over the last eight years and 
that no gloss should be added to the welfare test.  He used this to reject the submission 
that shared residence orders should not normally be made in cases where there is a very 
unequal division of the child’s time.101  This is difficult to reconcile with earlier judicial 
demands that orders must reflect practicalities since they could otherwise confuse 
children; and is also contrary to the intention of those who drafted s.11(4) of the 
Children Act 1989 and clearly saw this as an order about where children actually live.    
 
5.5.3 Towards a Presumption?  
 
It is as yet unclear whether a presumption in favour of shared residence is 
developing.  Changes within autopoietic systems can be predicted, but never with 
absolute certainty.102  Although these orders “are not nowadays unusual”, shared 
residence is a long way from becoming the norm.103  Some empirical research 
suggests that since this is a comparatively new phenomenon, a clear professional 
consensus has yet to develop.104  However, two practitioners have commented that 
shared residence “has become the new vogue in parental disputes”.105  Applications 
for residence saw a greater increase than contact applications in 2008;106 although 
statistics say nothing about why these applications were made, it is not unlikely that 
a growing interest in shared residence is a contributory factor.  Campaigners are also 
working hard to hasten these developments, and their attempts to move their 
communications from the periphery towards the centre of political debate have had 
considerable success.  Families Need Fathers (FNF) has an EHRC-funded campaign 
for shared parenting, a concept seen as “wider” than shared residence and described 
in terms of a substantial sharing of time as well as both parents’ involvement in all 
important decisions.107   FNF has developed new shared parenting guidance, inter alia 
for Cafcass reporters; and although the precise status of these documents remains 
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101  Re W [2009] EWCA Civ 370 at [13] 
102  Teubner (1993) op cit n12, p97.   
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unclear, Cafcass has, according to its Chief Executive, “greatly valued the chance to 
work closely with Families Need Fathers”.108   The Guidance states that Cafcass 
Reporters should encourage “maximum interaction with both parents”, and ideally 
view an equal sharing of time as the default starting position.109  The FNF guidance 
has been criticised by Hunt et al with regard to the paucity of references to the s.1 
welfare test, the selective use of research evidence, and the misstatement of current 
law as incorporating a presumption of equal parenting time.110    It was removed 
from the Cafcass website in response to these concerns; but must still be seen as an 
influential contribution to the debate.111  The previous chapter discussed the way 
complaints by fathers’ groups have, through the process of interference when several 
subsystems participate in the same communicative event, been taken up into 
political and legal discourse and contributed to a modification of those subsystems’ 
understandings of their external environments.112 Although the FNF guidance has 
been removed, a new truth has been constructed within the legal system: law must 
do more to assist men’s efforts to parent and the shared residence order is a suitable 
tool to achieve this.   
 
Evidence of a developing presumption can also be found in case reports.  In Re P 
[2005] Wall LJ considered that where the child’s time is shared “more or less” 
equally, there must be good reasons against making an order of shared residence; this 
has been described by Douglas as “a presumption or assumption”.113  In what could 
be seen as a confirmation of autopoietic theory, Gilmore has commented that this 
dictum “is likely to be seized on by advocates” and may play an important role in 
shaping future law.114   In Re C [2006] the judge at first instance had (in a typically 
legal, rigid interpretation) understood recent case law as allowing for a shared 
residence order only where it either reflected the reality of caring arrangements or 
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where the parents were incapable of cooperating.115  These rigid categories were 
correctly rejected by Thorpe LJ.116  However, his judgment also cited, with approval, 
a list of eight “highly relevant circumstances” in favour of shared residence drawn 
up by the father’s counsel.  These were: “(1) This is a child with a strong attachment 
to both parents who was happy and confident in both homes; (2) There is a real 
proximity between the two homes; (3) There is a real proximity of the homes and … 
[the child]'s school; (4) [The child] has a real familiarity with both homes and a 
sense of belonging in each; (5) [The child] has a clearly expressed perception that he 
has two homes; (6) There is a relatively fluid passage of [the child] between the two 
homes; (7) There is a relatively fluid passage of [the child] to and from school from 
each home; (8) There is some post-separation history of [the child]'s care being 
shared between his parents”. 117 
 
Thorpe LJ opined that the “cumulative effect” of those circumstances made this a 
“classic case” for shared residence.118  Law, as any closed system, adapts new 
developments to its modus operandi; since law’s cognitive framework relies on lists, 
categorisations and binary determinations, these factors are likely to be raised and 
relied on by the legal representatives for other shared residence applicants, who will, 
by demonstrating that they can ‘tick the right boxes’, argue that this raises 
something akin to a presumption in favour of shared residence.   Comparing this list 
with the research evidence, the focus in (5) on how the child perceives the situation 
is welcome, and it may well be that the child’s subjective sense of belonging is much 
more important than the precise allocation of his or her time.  However, the 
specifications in (6) and (7) that there need only be “a relatively fluid passage” 
between the different homes are worrying.  The combination of the courts’ tendency 
to trivialise parents’ conflicts discussed in the previous chapter, and the inherent 
vagueness of the term “relatively”, creates a real risk that courts could order shared 
residence where parents are unable to sustain the kind of close cooperation that the 
research suggests is necessary to successfully share residence.  
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The previous section expressed concern that the benefits of shared residence are now 
seen primarily as lying in the symbolic messages transmitted rather than the 
division of the child’s time .  There is some evidence that this use of the order is now 
accepted as commonplace by judges and others involved in the family courts.119  For 
example, in Re A [2008], an application by a step-father, the Cafcass reporter 
observed:  “Had Mr A been H's biological father, it would have been reasonable for 
the Court to order shared residence, as a reflection of the equal status and the 
responsibilities of the mother and Mr A”.120  The logic, expressed in law’s binary 
code of certainties, is that if children need fathers, and shared residence helps to 
realise that goal by removing the artificiality of contact arrangements, then shared 
residence must be better than sole residence.     In relation to contact, Gilmore has 
justifiably criticised the way contemporary law uses the general assertion that most 
children benefit from contact to justify its starting preference for contact in 
contested cases, without any consideration of what may be different about the small 
proportion of cases, which proceed to a final hearing.121    This is a typical of this 
subsystem’s focus on the abstract and desirable.  There is a very real danger that, in 
shared residence cases too, the generalised need for a father under s.1(3)(b) is allowed 
to outweigh all other concerns.   
 
One example of where this seems already to have occurred is Re A [2008].122  The 
step-father had been led to believe the child was his until some time after the 
separation.  On appeal, the mother argued, unsuccessfully, that he was likely to use 
the shared residence order to try to “interfere in an officious and controlling 
manner” and furthermore that this could not be in her six-year-old son’s best 
interests since shared residence would therefore be “productive of strife rather than 
harmony”.123  The court, quite rightly, acknowledged that there was considerable 
force to her arguments; he had, inter alia,  admitted installing hidden CCTV cameras 
in the part of their house that was occupied by the mother.124  The shared residence 
order was, nevertheless, made since it would give the step-father parental 
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responsibility and would make it more difficult for the mother to exclude or 
marginalise him.125  In the welfare balancing exercise, the need for a father (or at 
least a father-figure), was accorded such great weight that it outweighed other 
concerns, such as the potential negative impact of attempts to undermine or control 
the primary carer.  It was in this case that Sir Mark Potter P uncritically repeated 
the trial judge’s assertion that healthy development hinges on a child having two 
parents.126   
 
A further parallel with contact can be drawn concerning the new dichotomous 
classification between good and bad (i.e. violent) fathers, which has occurred in 
contact cases. Re M [2004] was an unusual shared residence case since the first 
instance judge gave the mother sole residence in order to end the parents’ power 
struggles, and this was confirmed by the Court of Appeal.127  It is important, 
however, as Wall LJ observed, to “bear in mind that the background to this case was 
one of domestic violence”128; the father had also been obstructive and had denigrated 
the mother in discussions with the children. He had failed to comply with the 
expectations of the welfare discourse and was, in law’s binary language, found to be 
a bad father.  Excluding such bad fathers from shared residence can be said to 
strengthen, rather than undermine, any developing presumption.  It is worth noting 
that in this case Wall LJ also praised the mother for still realising how important it 
was that her children should “sustain a proper relationship” with their father.129   
This exceptional case did not lead to any questioning of the general rule.  As law 
applies its binary codes in its internal reconstruction of external information, fathers 
who cannot be proven to be this bad are likely to be judged good, i.e. good enough to 
deserve the law’s support.  In Re K [2008] the mother argued that the father, whom 
she described as controlling, would “feel empowered” by the shared residence 
order.130  Wilson LJ acknowledged that some parents could react this way, but did 
not think this father fell into that category.131  Autopoietic subsystem cannot deal 
directly with their environment; litigants and their children have to be recreated as 
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stereotypical semantic artefacts.  This leaves law unable to evaluate with sufficient 
sensitivity whether shared residence will benefit the children of a particular family.  
In relation to contact, fathers have to be obviously dangerous before they are judged 
to be bad, and the same assessments will be made in relation to shared residence.  
This, again, is a dangerous basis for a presumption; it is likely to leave children in 
situations where they are frightened, neglected or physically hurt.   
 
 
5.6 SHARED RESIDENCE AND REASONABLENESS  
 
5.6.1 Non-Intervention: but not a Carte Blanche  
 
As has been mentioned, it difficult to overstate the emphasis currently placed on 
parental agreement, co-operation and compromise, understood in the narrow legal 
sense of parents reaching agreement on the immediate issues.132 Baroness Hale has 
commented extra-judicially on family judges’ understandable, but problematic, 
“unwillingness to decide cases which could be agreed between the parties”.133  The 
imperative of moving on from a present impasse may override consideration into 
the suitability and viability of future arrangements.  In this environment, the 
attraction of shared residence is its superficial fairness: if you divide children’s time 
in half then both parents are equal, and they have nothing left to fight over.134  At the 
same time, this solution is compatible with the new paradigm of the binuclear 
family.   
 
Case reports increasingly refer to shared residence being the result of mediated 
compromises between parents, and the parties are usually back in court because the 
arrangement has broken down.135  In Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond LBC [2009] 
Baroness Hale appeared to criticise family courts’ current tendency to prefer consent 
orders and to accept these without adequate investigation.136 She noted that a 
“striking feature” of the case was “how little the family court appears to have known 
                                                 
132  Neale, B, Flowerdew, J & Smart, C (2003) “Drifting Towards Shared Residence?”, Family Law, 904-908, 
p905; Davis, G & Pearce, J (1999) “The Hybrid Practitioner”, Family Law, 547-555, p553.  
133  Hale, B & Hunter, R (2008) “A Conversation with Baroness Hale”, 16(2) Feminist Legal Studies, 237-248, 
p243.  
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136  Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond LBC [2009] UKHL 7, per Baroness Hale at [31]-[33].  
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about the family”.137   The Holmes-Moorhouses were, however, known to the local 
social services following allegations of domestic violence; the older children had at 
one point been placed on the child protection register and social workers had 
concluded that the mother not only worked but also met all the children’s material, 
physical and emotional needs.  Yet, there is no evidence of how this was considered 
prior to the shared residence order being made, predominantly to give the father a 
better chance of obtaining social housing.138  It appears that the paramountcy test is 
subordinated to the principle of non-intervention,139 and the pursuit of a solution 
that can remove the case from the court’s list without the risk of attracting further 
criticism from the political system regarding law’s inadequate treatment of separated 
fathers. 
 
5.6.2 A Reversal of the Causal Relationship 
 
There has always been a link between shared residence and good cooperation.  In the 
early case law good relations between parents were regarded as a pre-requisite; it was 
only parents who could agree well enough to design a shared residence schedule who 
were able to persuade a court to grant such an order.140  A v A [1994] provided judges 
in subsequent cases with authority for the view that shared residence is 
inappropriate where parents are yet to agree on significant matters.141 This sensible 
stance served to limit shared residence to parents who appeared able to implement it 
for their children’s benefit.   There is no doubt that shared residence can work well, 
but studies suggest that success is dependent on a variety of individual 
characteristics and circumstances; the best way to ensure that families are suitable is 
to restrict shared residence to families where neither parent objects.    
 
However, in D v D [2001] the Court of Appeal perceived shared residence as able to 
produce better parental co-operation rather than requiring it; the relationship 
between cause and effect was reversed.142  In this now highly influential case, the 
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case history was marked by a high degree of animosity, with judicial intervention 
required for every renegotiation of schedules, to ensure the return of passports and 
to help the father obtain information about the children’s health and education.  
Both parents were criticised for allowing conflicts to escalate where they ought to 
put their personal feelings behind them.143  According to Douglas, it is significant 
that the order was made partly to “lessen the parents’ animosity and apparent 
inability to resolve their differences outside the courtroom”.144  It was hoped the 
parties could use the shared residence framework to avoid further returns to court.145  
Empirical research suggests shared residence is unlikely to work this way.  Law is 
attempting to transmit normative communications to individual psychic systems, 
but can only create turbulence and the previous chapter’s section on reasonableness 
explained why changes in behaviour are unlikely to result.    Kaganas and Piper have 
noted that arguments for a lowering of the stakes in parental disputes which 
preceded the Children Act 1989 have been resurrected and used to argue for shared 
residence; yet this new use of formal orders is as unlikely to have an actual impact 
on parents’ conflicts.146  Where parents want to fight, new legal labels quickly 
become the latest weapons in those conflicts.147      
 
D v D [2001] is now commonly cited in judgments and articles as having established 
that shared residence, by emphasising equality of status, is likely to diminish 
conflict.148  In Re D [2004] Munby J, in a classification which he himself admitted 
was oversimplified, divided contact disputes into three categories: where mothers; 
fathers; or both parents are at fault.  He saw shared residence as the solution for the 
third category.149  If this kind of stereotypical thinking develops, it should be a cause 
for concern; autopoietic theory can be used to suggest this is likely, since these kinds 
of classifications are typical of law.  Within law’s circular chains of 
communications, the “binary system in which the only values are 0 and 1”,150 
predictions and possibilities are turned into certainties, and gradual changes in a 
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series of communications lead to refined, rigid definitions.   In A v A [2004] Wall LJ 
described the parents’ severe dispute as having “been about control” throughout 
court proceedings, and saw the shared residence order as the court making the point 
that the family needed co-operation rather than control.151  Repeating a phrase from 
D v D, it was hoped that an equal division of the children’s time would give the 
parents “nothing left to fight about” and could thus bring to an end the five years’ 
litigation, which had been described in the Guardian’s report as a “virtual state of 
war”.152  In Re R [2005] the Court of Appeal interpreted A v A [2004] as stipulating 
that a “harmonious relationship” between the parents was no longer a prerequisite 
for shared residence. 153   
 
Family law increasingly identifies exposure to conflict, alongside father absence, as a 
major risk of harm. This should have resulted in a more cautious use of shared 
residence, particularly since, as the third chapter demonstrated, research has shown 
that high conflict families usually fail to implement shared residence; arrangements 
are abandoned or left to deteriorate to inflexible stalemates. Indeed, in some 
contested cases child welfare science professionals have made recommendations 
against this order, on the grounds that it can exacerbate conflict.154  However, aw has 
“enslaved” child welfare science information to suit its own purposes.155  Law 
reinterprets and reuses child welfare science communications but the fact that it is 
perceived within both subsystems as the system with more authority means law can 
also choose not to listen.  Gilmore has expressed concern over the judicial tendency 
to refer only to other judgments and not engage specifically with the issue of how 
parental conflict is known to affect children.156   In Re A [2008] Adam J had taken 
note of the psychologist’s concerns, but chose to rely on case authorities which 
explained that parental conflict was not a bar, but rather a reason for granting the 
shared residence order.157    In Re R [2009] the psychiatrist had opposed shared 
residence on the grounds that it would increase the child’s exposure to the parents’ 
severe conflict.  Wall LJ, however, stated that the shared residence order under s.8 
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“is a legal, not a psychiatric concept, in relation to which; (a) there is now a 
substantial jurisprudence; and (b) a psychiatric opinion, however distinguished its 
source, is not determinative”.158  This fits well with Luhmann’s assertion that law 
asserts its power by deciding what it regards as relevant or irrelevant purely by 
reference to its internal criteria.159   Shared residence continues to be constructed as a 
cure for high-conflict cases so that, paradoxically, the recent emphasis on the 
harmful nature of conflict has increased its appeal.  Shared residence has also gained 
popularity because it is seen as a vehicle for teaching parents to cooperate.160     
 
5.6.3 Conflict and Co-operation as Semantic Artefacts  
 
Since law, as a closed subsystem, evaluates the success of its measures purely 
according to its own criteria, the assessment of whether shared residence helps 
parents cooperate will depend on law’s understanding of parental cooperation.  It 
appears that, consistent with autopoietic theory, the concept has taken on a narrow 
and limited legal meaning. It is defined in negative, rather than positive, terms: one 
parent must not interfere with the other’s exercise of parental responsibility in 
relation to day-to-day matters.161  There is no additional requirement of co-parenting 
where parents share residence.  This understanding of cooperation is likely to be 
used to order shared residence for parents who are either unwilling or incapable of 
working together to the degree that empirical research suggests is necessary to make 
this arrangement benefit children.  Parents, who have to reinterpret legal 
communications through the filter of their own normative frameworks, often reject 
the paradigm cooperative post-separation model as bad for their particular child.       
 
Law maintains epistemic authority, inter alia, by refusing to learn from its 
disappointed expectations.162  Although some parents repeatedly return to court, 
family law continues to insist on what has been described as “the New Labour 
dream of the responsible parent”: conciliatory, cooperative and committed to the 
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binuclear family.163   Teubner does not deny that law is, “to a considerable extent”, 
shaped by external influences.164  Thus, the pressure from the political subsystem to 
find a legal solution to the problems of disengaging fathers has led to several 
readjustments.  Just as the link between shared residence and a substantial sharing of 
time has been removed to facilitate its use, the previous insistence that parents must 
be able to get on has also been removed.  According to Teubner, subsystems’ self-
perceptions shape their development.165  Historically, law has existed to be obeyed, 
and this normative expectation (rather than empirically obtainable information 
regarding observance) continues to shape law’s responses to interference.  An 
acknowledgement that law is unable to help these families is, therefore, not an 
option.  Law’s search for a solution to the supposed problem of disappointed or 
disengaged parenthood must continue, and the attempt to use shared residence to 
teach parents to cooperate is the latest scheme.  The law is also, as a closed system, 
unable to take into account individuals’ diverse characteristics and circumstances; 
and since it is self-regulating it remains unaware that it recreates parents using its 
own stereotyped semantic artefacts.  The result is that all parents (except a small 
minority who are judged to be violent, implacably hostile or otherwise “bad”), are 
presumed to be unencumbered by past life failures and perfectly able to meet the 
high post-liberal standards of parenting.  Consequently, any divergence from the 
norm is conceptualised as wilful refusal.  Judicial warnings to parents regarding the 
harmful effects of exposure to parental conflict are now becoming commonplace.166   
In Re R [2009] Wall LJ went so far as to read to the parents the first four lines of 
Philip Larkin's poem This be the Verse.167  He then cautioned them that unless they 
could protect their son from their fighting they might well lose him.168  
 
5.6.4 The Gender Dimension  
 
This prescriptive approach applies to both sexes, but law’s expectations of sensible 
parenting are, at the same time, also distinctly gendered.   It appears that separated 
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fathers, in particular, fall far short of the reasonable parent ideal.  Research has 
shown that in intact families fathers’ involvement is largely mediated through 
mothers; thus, the transition to post-separation parenting is difficult given the 
demands for new levels of practical and emotional involvement.169  However, there 
is no discussion of this issue in legal discourse.170  Several reasons for this can be 
suggested.  Firstly, the emphasis on encouraging fathers means “virtually any 
involvement” by fathers, which is not violent or in other ways obviously dangerous, 
has come to be seen as “good enough”.171     Secondly, since mothering is constructed 
as a “natural outpouring” of love that is hidden within the private sphere, it is 
assumed that most aspects of parenting can in any event safely be left to mothers.172  
In this context, the use of shared residence orders for arrangements which are really 
generous weekend and holiday contact gives further cause for concern, since it 
allows fathers to opt out of the demanding primary carer role to merely spend fun 
time with children.   A restriction of shared residence to families where both parents 
agree could not rule out the extension of gendered inequalities, since law does not 
enquire into the private sphere; but a presumption, which would encourage the 
imposition of shared residence on reluctant primary carers, could result in an 
increase in such inequitable familial arrangements.  It should, therefore, be resisted.   
 
Where there is divergence between formal orders and real arrangements, the 
negative financial and practical costs are, as explained in the second chapter, likely 
to fall disproportionately on women.  Research by Smart et al has also highlighted 
the emotional costs of maintaining relationships across binuclear post-separation 
families.173  Yet these efforts, like housework, are not noticed until someone decides 
they are no longer prepared to perform them.174  In case reports, mothers are almost 
exclusively mentioned when they are lectured over their failures to support contact 
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or praised for their efforts in maintaining links with difficult fathers; references to 
single mothers’ efforts in raising children are rare.  Law, as a subsystem, prioritises 
normative expectations, judges according to how things ought to be, rather than how 
they actually are, and thus ignores the gap between the modern, dual-carer ideal and 
reality. This combines with the post-liberal emphasis on conciliatory behaviour and 
the much older construction of mothers as those who are responsible for meeting 
children’s needs, so that it is very difficult for mothers to voice objections.175  Those 
who do, attract the binary labels of implacably hostile, selfish and bad.   
 
Shared residence disputes are likely to provide another example where, as Luhmann 
has stated, “the system does not see that it does not see what it doesn’t see”.176    In 
Puxty v Moore [2005] Wall LJ sought to impress upon the mother that “the phrase 
'primary carer' has no meaning in this context”; parents have joint responsibilities, 
therefore, “[n]either is the primary carer.177  It is interesting to note here that law’s 
understanding has been limited by its existing cognitive framework; its 
understanding of ‘primary carer’ focuses on the allocation of rights and duties, while 
the practical aspects have been lost.    Previous sections have posited that the family 
courts’ new use of shared residence is law’s response to political demands that 
something is done to address the issue of fatherhood.  Unable to abdicate its duty to 
resolve conflicts, law has searched for a new solution.  The recent reversal of the 
causal relationship between good cooperation and shared residence has been 
necessary to impose shared residence orders on the difficult, high-conflict cases 
where fathers are complaining of marginalisation or exclusion.  This latest attempt 
at a solution is implemented at mothers’ expense, since the latter are expected to 
provide emotional, practical and sometimes financial support for the new binuclear 
families, regardless of whether they perceive this to be a price worth paying.  Where 
mothers, as individual autopoietic systems, reject this, law’s response is to restate the 
normative expectations, often with added threats of sanctions.   
 
5.7 CONCLUSION  
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In conclusion, law’s focus on permanent, patriarchal parenthood has shaped the 
definition of the shared residence order to reflect pre-existing notions of fatherhood 
as predominantly about status and authority. The process of redefinition is being 
hastened by law’s adjustments to interference from the political subsystem In order 
to preserve its self-image as authoritative, law must be seen to be doing something to 
address the problems of separated fatherhood.  Initially, courts refused to see shared 
residence as anything other than a practical issue; the order then came to be seen as 
having dual purposes, and recently it has been described as worth ordering merely 
for the symbolic messages it sends, which are aimed to stop mothers from excluding 
or marginalising fathers. Use of autopoietic theory casts doubt on this strategy; 
parents use the processes of re-entry and redundancy to reinterpret or reject these 
messages.  Moreover, it is submitted that this development is not only contrary to 
the provisions of the Children Act 1989, but is also an unwelcome attempt by law to 
preserve patriarchal power structures.   
 
There has been an equally striking change in family law’s application of the welfare 
test to shared residence applications.  From an initial view of shared residence as 
“prima facie harmful”, the Children Act’s ambitions of an unfettered discretionary 
test appeared briefly to have been realised around the time of D v D [2001], but there 
is worrying evidence that a new understanding of shared residence has developed, 
which is as rigid as the outright rejection in Riley. Consistent with law’s 
enslavement of child welfare science, courts have not taken adequate note of 
relevant research evidence.178   Instead, it is reasoned in law’s binary logic that 
children need fathers, that shared residence leads to greater involvement by fathers, 
and that shared residence is, therefore, better for children.  It is very probable that 
once a presumption develops, as occurred in relation to contact in the 1990’s, the 
perceived abstract benefits of the order will be held to outweigh all other factors, so 
that shared residence is ordered in situations where it has not been proven to benefit 
the particular child, and may even be dangerous.   
 
Contemporary law’s emphasis on settlement and compromise has increased the 
popularity of shared residence, but concern must be expressed over the use of shared 
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residence orders to reduce bitterness and improve co-parenting.  This fits with the 
post-liberal emphasis on education and reflection, and is also an example of law’s 
intrinsic tendency to prioritise abstract ideals over concrete reality. It is not, 
unfortunately, supported by the research evidence. However, family law, under 
pressure from the political subsystem, appears to have chosen to ignore the empirical 
evidence, just as it ignores the tension between the modern, dual-earner/dual-carer 
paradigm and gendered realities.   Thus, a shared residence presumption could not 
only place an unfair and disproportionate burden on one parent, it would also 
discourage mothers from raising objections based on their unique knowledge of their 
child.  Law, as a closed autopoietic system with an inherently conservative and 
patriarchal nature, may consider these sacrifices the price worth paying for 
maintaining a stabilising male authority over women and children.  This is, of 
course, incompatible with the statutory welfare test and should, therefore, be 
resisted.   
 
This chapter has not argued that shared residence is per se harmful.  It has, however, 
criticised contemporary law’s inability to engage with child welfare science, and the 
available body of empirical research which suggests that the successful 
implementation of shared residence depends on a large number of variables, 
including the characteristics of the individual child.  The closed subsystem of law, 
with its rigid ways of communication, is not equipped to carry out the multifactorial 
examination of the circumstances necessary to identify the families where this 
difficult arrangement is likely to benefit children.  It is better to restrict the order to 
cases where parents can agree on this arrangement.       
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6 ANALYSING THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK IN SWEDEN 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Swedish family law and policy has in many ways been considered groundbreaking, 
and has attracted much international attention.1   It is often praised for its social 
democratic reform programmes, and for policies which have deliberately sought to 
erode unequal gendered practices.2  It could, therefore, be thought that the 
preconditions for shared residence are better in Sweden, since separating couples 
should be better able to share the burdens of parenting.  An autopoietic perspective 
may lead to a less optimistic view, since separate subsystems of law, child welfare 
science, politics etc can be observed in Sweden as in England.3  While the next 
chapter considers this argument in relation to shared residence, this chapter 
examines the description of Sweden as gender-equal and child-focused, and finds a 
more complex picture, confirming Teubner’s assertion that while interactions 
between politics and law shape both subsystems, this cannot be predicted using “the 
simple logic of cause and effect”4  External influences are inevitably contradicted by 
internal information, so that change is resisted or reconfigured within the system.5   
After an overview of the Swedish family law regulating disputes between parents, 
this chapter focuses on the three themes identified in the second chapter: law’s 
patriarchal construction of permanent parenthood; its formulaic interpretation of the 
best interests test, which focuses on children’s needs for both parents, and for 
protection from conflict; and the contemporary emphasis on reasonable behaviour 
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Cambridge, Polity Press;.  
3  Rejmer, A (2003) Vårdnadstvister: En Rättssociologisk Studie av Tingsrätts Funktion vid Handläggning av 
Vårdnadskonflikter med Utgångspunkt från Barnets Bästa, Lund, Sweden, Lund Studies in the Sociology 
of Law, p8. 
4  Teubner, G (1993) Law as an Autopoietic System, London, Blackwell,, p35.   
5  Ibid, p103.   
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from parents.  This framework is also used to examine custody and contact orders, 
which are the two most important orders in the regulation of legal disputes between 
parents about children.  
 
6.1.1 The Courts, the Code, the Enquiries and the Case Law  
 
There are no specialised family courts; instead, family litigation is heard by the 
ordinary public courts:  the District Courts (tingsrätt), the Appeal Courts (hovrätt) 
and the Supreme Court (Högsta Domstolen).6  At first instance cases are generally 
heard by three lay judges and one professional judge, who has a varied caseload and 
no specialist knowledge.7  Courts tend to rely heavily on welfare reports from Social 
Welfare Investigators (social workers from the local social services known as Social 
Welfare Boards).  District courts can also ask for expert evidence, although how this 
is weighted is a matter for the judge (this can be seen as part of law’s assertion of 
authority over other subsystems).8   Family court procedure is structured so as to 
make it less adversarial, compromise is promoted, and it is estimated that nine out of 
ten disputes are settled before a final hearing.9  An increasing number of cases are 
now dealt with through cooperation talks: a form of mediation led by two social 
workers and provided free of charge by local Social Welfare Boards (SWBs).10   
Agreements reached through talks can be granted the same legal status as judgments 
through registration with the SWB, and successive governments have successfully 
promoted this form of dispute resolution.11     
 
The private law in relation to children is contained in the Parents Code 
(Föräldrabalken, FB), which was first enacted in 1949, and which has since been 
frequently amended.   Sweden has a civil law system; case law is less important but 
the Supreme Court often interprets terms in statutes in such as a way as to de facto 
alter the course of the law.  Government-appointed Commissions of Inquiry (Statens 
                                                 
6  Proposition 1997/98:7, p93.  
7  Ärendelagen §3; FB20§1; SOU 2005:43, p602; Ryrstedt, E (2009c) “Separate Representation and Family 
Courts – do we need them in the Nordic Countries?” 21(2) CFLQ, 185-196, p187. 
8  Carlsson, B & Rejmer, A (1998) "The Swedish Way of Dealing with Custody Disputes: Juridification and 
Professionalisation of the Private and Social Spheres" in Carlsson, B (Ed) Social Steerage and Communicative 
Action, Lund, Sweden, Lund Studies in Sociology of Law, 104-142, p112; Proposition 2005/06:99 p36.  
9  NJA2008 s.34, cases are cited by case report pages rather than parties’ names.   
10 Socialtjänstlagen 5§3(1). 
11  Proposition 1997/98:7, p37; Schiratzki, J (2006) Barnrättens Grunder (3rd  Ed), Lund, Sweden, 
Studentlitteratur, p1108. 
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Offentliga Utredningar, SOU) also have a very important role to play in law reform; 
parallels can be drawn with the Law Commission’s work, but enquiries are 
appointed ad hoc and their focus tends to be less exclusively legal, with expert 
opinion being sought from a variety of disciplines.12  This information is then recast 
within the legal framework, translated into legal discourse, to formulate proposed 
amendments to the Parents Code.  These enquiries have had a unique role to play in 
shaping the direction of family policy and legislative reform.13  
 
Swedish law retains the concept of legal custody, which must be distinguished from 
physical custody and can be exercised independently of the latter.14 Although 
custody is now seen predominantly as a responsibility, rather than a right, it does 
have important legal consequences; parents without custody do not, for example, get 
parental leave, and they cannot demand information from public bodies.15 Custody 
decisions also tend to determine the outcome of residence cases.16  Legal custody can 
be either sole or joint, and is automatically awarded to married couples and 
unmarried mothers.17   Unmarried fathers who cohabit with the mother 
automatically gain joint custody three months’ after the child’s birth, unless the 
mother has registered an objection.18  They can also obtain custody through a court 
order, a registered agreement, or a “simple” administrative procedure.19   
 
The Parents Code stipulates that a child has a right to contact with a non-resident 
parent and that both parents share a responsibility to see that the child’s need for 
contact is met.20  Swedish law’s emphasis on specificity means that detailed 
schedules must be provided, and although these are supposed to be tailored to 
individual children’s needs, in practice, certain standard models have developed.21  
These usually involve weekday contact, which is thought to give non-resident 
                                                 
12  Lundqvist, Å (2008) ”Familjens Kris”, Tidning för Genusvetenskap, 79-93, p80.  
13  Ibid, p81.  
14  FB6§11. 
15  FB6§2; FB6§11; Sekretesslag (1980:100); Föräldraledighetslag (1995:584); Schiratzki (2006) op cit n11, p90; 
Sandström, L & Wetter, I (1999) Barnet och Lagen: Lagtexter med Kommentarer Rörande Barn, Stockholm, 
Kommentus Förlag, p74. 
16  Socialstyrelsen (2004a) Glimtar av Barn från Vårdnads-, Boende- och Umgängesdomar 1999 respektive 2002, 
Stockholm, Socialstyrelsen, p17. 
17  FB6§3 
18  Ds 1999:57, p61.  
19  Ds 1999:30, p20; FB6§4. 
20  FB6§15.  
21  Ryrstedt (2007) op cit n1, p404.  
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parents a better insight into their children’s lives and thus enable them to play a 
greater part.22   This suggests that there is, in Swedish law, as a result of interference 
from the political subsystem, a welcome recognition of caring as an indispensable 
component of parenting.  Where contact needs to be supervised, this responsibility 
is given to one particular individual, known as a facilitator, who can be a relative or 
family friend, but is usually recruited through the SWB’s.23  Facilitators are often 
used during hand-overs, but sometimes also to reassure a child when contact is re-
established.24  Until comparatively recently, Swedish law did not provide for 
indirect contact, largely due to the general reluctance to legislate on matters which 
cannot be adequately specified and supervised.25  Courts are now able to order 
indirect contact, but this is to be used only in the most exceptional cases.26   
 
6.2 PERMANENT, PATRIARCHAL PARENTHOOD 
 
In the second chapter, autopoietic theory was used to suggest that law is patriarchal, 
since  patriarchal norms formed one of the original components law brought with it 
as it separated from the first order social autopoietic system, and that law’s 
stabilising role in society makes it inherently conservative and likely to support 
existing power structures.  This section will consider whether this patriarchal 
framework has been eroded by decades of interference from social democratic legal 
reforms which have targeted traditional gendered patterns.27    
 
6.2.1 Patriarchy and the Nuclear Family  
 
First, it can be argued that family law has sought to preserve the patriarchal 
public/private dichotomy despite the interference from the political system.  Indeed, 
Swedish commentators have noted that in private family law interventionist 
                                                 
22  Sandström & Wetter (1999) op cit n15, p95; SOU 2005:43, p167; NJA1988 s.559.  
23  SOU 2007:52, p208, p172; Andersson, G & Bangura Arvidsson, M (2008) 13(2) “Contact Person as a Court-
Ordered Solution in Child Visitation Disputes in Sweden” Child and Family Social Work, 197-206, p198; 
Ekbom, I & Landberg Å (2007) Innerst Inne var man Rädd, Stockholm, Rädda Barnen & Socialstyrelsen, p13.  
24  Schiratzki (2006) op cit n11, p120; ; Socialstyrelsen (2003b) Socialnämndens Handläggning av vissa Frågor om 
Vårdnad, Boende och Umgänge, Socialstyrelsens Författningssamling SOSFS 2003:14, Regeringskansliet, 
Stockholm, p52.  
25  SOU 2005:43, p186.  
26  FB6§15; Proposition 2005/06:99, p55; Schiratzki (2006) op cit n11, p118.  
27  Ryrstedt (2007) op cit n1, p398; Bradley, D (1990) “Children, Family and the State in Sweden”, 17(4) Journal 
of Law and Society 17, 427-444, p427. 
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regulation is often resisted.28  Successive governments have rejected proposals to 
introduce an equivalent to the prohibited steps or specific issue orders29, on the 
grounds that state interference would be counterproductive.30  This is reminiscent of 
19th century law’s construction of the nuclear family as a fragile yet vital institution.   
The construction of rights-bearing fathers’ as essential to healthy families can be 
seen in relation to contact.  The Parents Code defines contact as the right of the 
child31, but the statutory formulation has been attacked as little more than window 
dressing.32  Swedish law does place the responsibility to meet the child’s need for 
contact on both parents (rather than just the parent with residence), and although 
there are no punitive sanctions, SWBs increasingly often contact non-resident 
parents, encouraging them to respect their children’s right to see them.33  However, 
children have no right to apply for a contact order, and very few manage to refuse 
contact which has been deemed to be in their best interests.34   In practice, the 
supposed right has become a duty.35   Eriksson and Näsman found many of the 
children in their study spoke about the SWI investigation process in contested 
contact cases “as approximating a process of manipulation and of breaking down the 
child’s resistance”.36  Children interviewed by Ekbom and Landberg described their 
supervised contact as something which had to be endured regardless of how they 
felt; some had been told by SWI’s that their fathers needed to see them.37      
 
It has to be acknowledged, however, that this patriarchal construction of the family 
has waned in influence in Swedish legal discourse.  Although developments can only 
be slow and incremental, autopoietic systems are not fixed and unchanging; systems 
                                                 
28  Ryrstedt, E (2006) “Family Law and Social Law: Reciprocal Dependency in a Comparative Perspective”, 
20(1) IJLPF, 44-52, p45.  
29  The Children Act 1989 s.8.  
30  Ryrstedt (2006) op cit n27, p45; Proposition 1997/98:7, p53. 
31  FB6§15. 
32  Ryrstedt, E & Mattson, T (2008) “Children’s Rights to Representation: A Comparison between Sweden 
and England”, 22(1) IJLPF, 135-147, p137; Ekbom & Landberg (2007) op cit n23, p66.  
33  FB6§15b; Proposition 1997/98:7, pp60-62, p115; Schiratzki, J (2004) ”Högsta Domstolen Meddelar Dom om 
Umgänge med Barn – Kränks Europakonventionen?” 15(3) Juridisk Tidskrift, 642-652, p646; Proposition 
1997/98:7; Wickström, A (1998) 1998 Års Vårdnadsreform och Socialtjänsten, Stockholm, Norstedts Förlag, 
p143; Socialstyrelsen (2003b) op cit n24, p62.  
34  Schiratzki (2006) op cit n11, p118; Socialstyrelsen (2003b) op cit n24, p45 
35  SOU 2005:43, p514.  
36  Eriksson, M & Näsman, E (2008) “Participation in Family Law Proceedings for Children Whose Father is 
Violent to their Mother”, 15(2) Childhood, 259-275, p261.  
37  Ekbom & Landberg (2007) op cit n23, p43, pp47-48.  
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are moulded by their internal understandings of external expectations.38   Sustained 
interference from the political and cultural spheres mean that arguments premised 
on the superiority of the conjugal family can no longer be expressed.  They may, 
nonetheless, implicitly underpin other arguments within family law, and, as is 
explored later, remain influential in setting gendered standards for parenting.39    
 
6.2.2 Public Patriarchy 
 
In the second chapter it was asserted that patriarchal power is now predominantly 
expressed through segregation rather than exclusion; closed subsystems are said to 
have adapted to women’s entry into the public sphere in such a way as to allow the 
basic dichotomous, hierarchical frameworks to continue.  This observation is 
particularly apposite in relation to Sweden.  Sweden is frequently identified as the 
archetypal model of a social democratic welfare state negotiating a “middle way” 
between liberal laissez-faire capitalism and centrally planned socialism.40   The Social 
Democratic Party governed Sweden continuously from 1932 to 1976, with an explicit 
agenda of eradicating poverty and replacing the class society with folkhemmet (the 
folk home); a concept with connotations of nurture and equality that remains a 
source of national pride.41  It was a deliberate move away from traditional liberalism; 
rather than conceptualising the autonomous individual and the collective as 
conflicting interests, public involvement was seen as essential in securing personal 
welfare.42  This approach can be seen inter alia in the legal regulation of family 
formation; in the construction of children as a public concern; in the employment 
market; and in legislative measures deliberately designed to erode traditional male 
gender roles.   These communicative events are located within both political and 
legal discussions; consequently the interference, and its effects on law, have been 
significant.   
 
                                                 
38  Teubner (1993) op cit n4, p56.   
39  Ryrstedt, E (2009b) “Samarbetssamtal” Svensk Juristtidning, 821-842, p823.   
40  Ellingsæter (1998) op cit n2, p60.  
41  Kliman, J & Forsberg, G (1998) “American Welfare Reform and the Swedish Welfare State”, 10(1) Journal 
of Feminist Family Therapy, 47-68, p59; Bradley, D (1996) Family Law and Political Culture, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell p35.  
42  Bradley (1996) op cit n41, p259.  
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The social engineers of the 1930’s saw the traditional bourgeois nuclear family as an 
outmoded and potentially oppressive institution which stood in the way of the new 
welfare state.  Thus, they had no compunction about crossing the public/private 
boundary.43   Yet, simultaneously, family law has been characterised by an 
increasing tolerance towards different family forms and lifestyles, born out of the 
desire to eliminate discrimination and include all citizens within the regulatory net 
of the welfare state.44    Abortion was redefined as a woman’s right in 1975.45  
Homosexuality was legalised comparatively early in 1944; and the introduction of a 
legal status of cohabitant in 1987 included same-sex couples.46  Registered 
partnerships were introduced in 1994; from May 2009 marriage is open to same-sex 
couples and in October the same year the Church of Sweden voted to allow gay 
marriages.47   Marriage has become a matter of private contract, with divorce 
available as a right.48  The divorce rate is comparatively high, but stable, and studies 
have shown that divorce has now become so prevalent that it has been normalised.49  
Although external critics have announced the death of the Swedish family, domestic 
commentators have cited official statistics to assert that it is instead “alive and well 
– but partly in a different form”.50   While cohabitation is as common as marriage, 
the percentage of children living with lone mothers has remained relatively stable 
for decades, belying neo-conservative predictions about cumulative family 
disintegration.51  In contrast to the position in the UK and the United States, “a 
discourse on the decline of the traditional family has little resonance in Sweden”.52  
A 1999 Government Commission of Inquiry noted, quite correctly, that “the factual 
                                                 
43  Pylkkänen, A (2007) “Liberal Family Law in the Making: Nordic and European Harmonisation”, 15(3) 
Feminist Legal Studies, 289-306, p294.  
44  Oláh, L (2001) “Policy Changes and Family Stability: The Swedish Case”, IJLPF, 118-134, p127. 
45  Abortlag (1974:595). 
46  Proposition 1944:13 Förslag till lag om ändring i 18 och 25 kap. Strafflagen; Strafflagen 18§10; Lag om Sambors 
Gemensamma Hem (1987:232); Lag om homosexuella sambor (1987:813); Sambolag (2003:376).  
47  ; Lag om Registrerat Partnerskap (1994:1117); SOU 2007:17, p227; Proposition 2009/09:80 p11; Dagens Nyheter, 
22nd October 2009. 
48  Äktenskapsbalken 5§1.  
49 Schyberg, D (1998) “Barn med Skilda Föräldrar” in Rädda Barnen (Ed) Barnets Rätt till Båda Föräldrarna, 
Rädda Barnen, Stockholm, 91-101; Nilsson, E (1998) Att Dela Ett Barn – Tvistiga Vårdnadsmål, Stockholm, 
Stiftelsen Allmänna Barnhuset & Socialstyrelsen p47.   
50  Meisaari-Polsa, T (1997) “Sweden: A Case of Solidarity and Equality” in Kaufmann, F-X, Kuijsten, A, 
Schulze, H-J and Strohmeier, K (Eds) Family Life and Family Policies in Europe Volume 1, 302-347, p319; 
Popenoe, D (1992) "Family Decline in the Swedish Welfare State" 109 Public Interest (USA), p114.   
51  SOU 2007:52, p35; Ds 1999:57, p42; Saldeen, Å (2001) Barn och Föräldrar (4:e upplagan), Uppsala, Iustus Förlag 
p28; Meisaari-Polsa (1997) op cit n5045, p321. 
52  Hobson, B & Takahashi, M (1997) “The Parent/worker Model: Lone Mothers in Sweden”, in Lewis, J (Ed) 
Lone Mothers in European Welfare Regimes, London, Jessica Kingsley, 121-139, p131.  
 126 CHAPTER 6 
 
 
realities of family life are not determined by marital status”.53  Legal reform should, 
according to a 2008 cross-party Parliamentary committee, “provide practical 
solutions for family formation without making normative pronouncements”.54  
Successive governments from across the political spectrum have responded to 
societal changes predominantly by adapting law to fit, there being a broad political 
consensus that the law is an inappropriate tool for influencing adult private 
morality.55   
 
However, the approach taken to children within families has been diametrically 
opposed.56  In the creation of the welfare state, children were seen not only as equal 
rights-bearing citizens, but also as a vulnerable group who deserved protection 
through public intervention.57  Thus, in marked contrast to the liberal understanding 
of private families, child welfare was “treated as a communal responsibility”.58  
Successive Social Democratic governments, motivated initially by concerns over 
falling birth rates as well as class divisions, have aimed to redistribute the economic 
costs of childrearing across society.59  Sweden allocates a larger share of its social 
expenditure to families and children than other European countries, but (unlike 
some other welfare state measures) this redistribution has remained relatively 
uncontroversial; there is widespread agreement on this construction of children as a 
shared, public responsibility.60   This, too, has weakened the public/private 
dichotomy in political and consequently in legal discourse; it suggests that Swedish 
courts should be more prepared to enquire into and adjust the allocation of 
responsibilities under a shared residence order.   
 
Swedish women’s increased participation in the labour market, and the consequent 
relocation of much of the caring for children into the public sphere, is also rarely 
                                                 
53  Ds 1999:57, p60. 
54  Civilutskottets Betänkande Könsneutrala äktenskap och vigselfrågor, 2008/09:CU19, p10.  
55  Proposition 2008/09:80, p17; Kurki-Suoni, K (1995) ”Gemensam Vårdnad – Vad Döljer Man med Barnets 
Bästa?” in Nordborg, G (Ed) 13 Kvinnoperspektiv på Rätten, Uppsala, Iustus Förlag, 169-196, p185.  
56  Bradley (1996) op cit n41, pp71-72, p111.  
57  Tauberman, A-C (1999) “Swedish Family Policy – Main Steps and Present Concerns” in 
Socialdepartementet (1996) Slutbetänkande från Kommittén för FN:s Familjeår, SOU1996:37, Fritzes Offentliga 
Publikationer, Stockholm, Appendix 3, 23-26, p23. 
58  Bradley (1996) op cit n41, pp71-72, p111.  
59  Ryrstedt (2006) op cit n27, p48; Bradley (1996) op cit n41, pp249-250.  
60  Svallfors, S, Halvorsen, K & Andersen, J (2001) “Work Orientation in Scandinavia: Employment 
Commitment and Organizational Commitment in Denmark, Norway and Sweden”, 44 Acta Sociologica, 
139-156, p141.   
 127 CHAPTER 6 
 
 
criticised.  The need for a strong economy to fund welfare reform, the traditional 
Lutheran work ethic and concerns about dwindling nativity rates have all combined 
with political emancipation objectives to result in policies aimed to help working 
mothers.61  Reconciliation, the successful combination of work and home 
commitments, is a comparatively new concept in EU debate; in Sweden it has been a 
policy aim since the 1930’s.62  Swedish rights to maternity and parental leave 
compare extremely favourably on the international scale, in terms of time,63 wage 
replacement64 and flexibility in the way leave can be taken.65  Parents of young 
children also have a right to reduce their working hours to 30 per week,66 and can 
claim up to a maximum of 120 days per annum, paid at 80% of salary, to stay at home 
and care for a sick child.67   The dual earner family has undoubtedly become the 
norm, due both to financial necessity and a perception of housewifery as outmoded, 
isolated and non-productive.68  Single mothers have been discussed in terms of 
poverty rather than moral laxity and constructed primarily as working parents 
rather than women without men.  They have thus benefited from successive 
measures aimed to improve child welfare or encourage female employment without 
specifically being identified as a target problem group.69  This suggests that the 
Swedish political subsystem, and consequently the Swedish legal subsystem, ought 
to be less concerned about independent motherhood, particularly since Swedish 
women also find it easier to be economically self-sufficient.  A 2009 international 
comparison showed Sweden to have one of the narrowest gender pay gaps in the 
study’s sample of industrialised nations.70  While UK women were limited to part-
time and temporary positions, Swedish female employees have benefited from 
interventionist legislation, collective trade union agreements and subsidised state 
                                                 
61  Pylkkänen (2007) op cit n43, p294.  
62  Working and Caring: a Guide to Implementing the Council of Ministers’ Recommendation on Childcare, quoted in 
Caracciolo di Torella, E (2001) “A Critical Assessment of the EC Legislation aimed at Reconciling Work 
and Family Life: Lessons from the Scandinavian Model?” in Collins, H, Davies, P & Rideout, R (Eds) 
Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation, Amsterdam, Kluwer, 441-458, p443.     
63  480 days.  
64  The majority of leave is paid at 80% of income up to an index-linked ceiling.  
65  The leave can be taken until the child’s eighth birthday, and parents can take it in portions as small as one-
eighth of a day. Föräldraledighetslagen.   
66  With a pro-rata salary deduction.  
67  Aged 11 or younger. Föräldraledighetslag (1995:584) §3 as amended.  
68 Oláh (2001) op cit n44, p126; Ellingsæter (1998) op cit n2, pp65-66.  
69  Gähler, M (2001) ”Bara en Mor – Ensamstående Mödrars Ekonomiska Livsvillkor i 1990-talets Sverige” in 
SOU 2001:54, 15-99, p91. 
70  International Trade Union Confederation (2009) Gender (In)Equality in the Labour Market: An 
Overview of Global Trends and Developments, ITUC, London, pp16-17. 
 128 CHAPTER 6 
 
 
childcare.71  Although supply of the latter has never increased fast enough to actually 
meet demand, Sweden compares very favourably internationally.72  Most important 
is the comprehensive network of state-run, state-subsidised nurseries; in 2005, 89% of 
two-year-old children were registered users of public day care.73   Previously private 
caring has become paid employment carried out by women in the public sphere, and 
this, too, has eroded the public/private dichotomy.74  Although autopoietic 
subsystems are closed, and rely on their internally reconstructed versions of outside 
reality, change can be a response to turbulence in the form of communications from 
individual psychic systems.75   US feminist academics still debate the idea of care 
occurring in a public setting in terms of utopian abstractions.76 In Sweden, it is a 
well-established reality.77   
 
Debate on fatherhood has tended not to centre on a perceived crisis of fathering but 
has instead focused on removing structural obstacles and challenging restrictive 
traditional stereotypes.78  In an appendix to a 1996 report for the UN Year of the 
Family, a junior minister wrote:  “[W]hen confronted with the evidence that the 
double burden of work and parental responsibilities still falls heavily on women 
alone, the state has now undertaken to intrude in the internal negotiations of the 
family, instituting incentives to induce men to take their share of caring 
responsibilities...”79  Since the 1970’s, parental leave, the right to reduce working 
hours and leave to care for sick children have all been gender neutral.80   
 
                                                 
71  De Los Reyes, P (2000) “Folkhemmets Paradoxer”, Kvinnovetenskaplig Tidskrift, 27-47, p28; Ellingsæter 
(1998) op cit n2, p59; Bradley (1996) op cit n41, p82.  
72  Mahon, R (2002) “Gender and Welfare State Restructuring: Through the Lens of Child Care” in Michel, S 
& Mahon, R (Eds) Child Care Policy at the Crossroads: Gender and Welfare State Restructuring, London, 
Routledge, 1-27, p17.  
73  Local municipalities also employ childminders; provide breakfast/after-school clubs and pre-school 
playgroups. Statistiska Centralbyrån (2005) Barn och Deras Familjer, pp98-100.  
74  Esping-Andersen (1990) op cit n2, p159; Björnberg, U (2002) “Ideology and choice between work and care: 
Swedish family policy for working parents” 22(1) Critical Social Policy, 33-52, p35 
75  Teubner (1993) op cit n4, p65.   
76  Abrams, K (2001) “The Second Coming of Care”, 76(3) Chicago-Kent Law Review, 1605-1617, p1606.  
77  Lewis, J (2005) ”The Changing Context for the Obligation to Care and to Earn” in Maclean, M (Ed) 
Family Law and Family Values, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 59-77, p71.  
78  Parbring, B (2004) “Mjukismän och Velourpappor”, Genus, 10-12, p11; Kurki-Suonio,  K (2000) “Joint 
Custody as an Interpretation of the Best Interests of the Child in a Critical and Comparative Perspective”,  
14(3) IJLPF, 183-205, p189.  
79  Tauberman (1999) op cit n57, p23.  
80  Bradley, D (1990a) “Perspectives on Sexual Equality in Sweden”, 53(3) MLR, 283-303, p296. 
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Where UK governments have seen childcare responsibilities as a private matter, 
their Swedish counterparts have prioritised high wage compensation levels as a 
crucial part of the strategy to restructure gendered familial patterns.81  It does, 
indeed, seem to be a model worth emulating.  The best known and most successful 
measure has probably been the ‘daddy month’: one month’s paid parental leave 
reserved for fathers.  It was introduced in 1995 to give fathers a period of sole 
responsibility to encourage continued involvement.82  In 2002 this non-transferable 
portion of the leave was doubled, and there is a continuing strategy to increase 
fathers’ use of leave.83  According to Bergman and Hobson, this “construction of 
explicit norms for fathering” is not surprising “[i]n a society with a history of social 
engineering”.84 Sweden’s generous reconciliation policies have, according to di 
Torella, shown that “legislation can, if not change, then at least challenge 
stereotypes and influence attitudes in society”.85  If autopoietic closure is “a question 
of degree”, then this is true.86    It could, therefore, be deduced that the preconditions 
for shared residence are indeed better in Sweden; the transition from the dual-
earner, dual-carer intact family to its post-separation binuclear counterpart should be 
smoother.  These suppositions are examined in the next chapter.  At this stage, it is 
important to note that while external observers have generally commented 
positively, internal commentators have presented a more nuanced view.    
 
6.2.3 Gendered Constructions of Parenting & the Binuclear 
Family 
 
Although Swedish feminists are generally positive about the Social Democratic 
model, they have drawn attention to its inherent dilemma.  The welfare state has 
encouraged women into employment in the expanding and comparatively family-
friendly public sector; women have also tended to take advantage of work/home 
harmonisation measures more often than men.  The result is a labour market with 
“an extremely high degree of gender segregation” where women have poorer career 
                                                 
81  Pylkkänen (2007) op cit n43, p303; Ryrstedt (2006) op cit n27, p49; SOU 2001:24, p113, p316. 
82  Bergman, H & Hobson, B (2002) “Compulsory Fatherhood” in Hobson (Ed) Making Men into Fathers, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 92-124, p110.  
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prospects.87  While the welfare state has undoubtedly empowered women it has also 
reproduced patriarchal power relationships in a new form which serves to preserve 
traditional gender roles. There is a gap between the rhetoric of gender neutrality and 
a gendered, unequal labour market.88   Moreover, while care is no longer invisible, it 
remains neglected and undervalued, practised predominantly by women either in the 
home or in a comparatively poorly paid public sector.  The second chapter asserted 
that the power to label is an important aspect of patriarchy; men have categorised 
anything identified as female as different, inferior, or of lesser importance.  This 
gendered pattern of classification, entrenched in the meaning-making structures of 
the political and legal subsystems, may not be as important as it once was, but it has 
not been eradicated by the welfare state.  
  
There are a number of empirical studies, which have identified a parallel gap in the 
private sphere.89  Men’s contributions in the home have increased, but not 
sufficiently to match women’s increased working hours.90 Women consequently 
continue to adapt their work to the needs of their families, and retain their primary 
carer roles, with some studies suggesting that men use their superior earning power 
to their strategic advantage.91    Although statistics show sustained increases in 
men’s use of parental leave, leave is often taken to create long weekends and family 
vacations, and is conceptualised as a matter of choice, shaped by employment and 
individual preferences.92  Thus, when a father exercises choice in relation to parental 
leave, the needs remain, and the mother’s choice whether or not to stay at home to 
care for the baby is effectively removed.93   
 
Yet, in legal communications, gendered inequalities are obfuscated by the dominant 
gender neutrality rhetoric.94  This 20th century “segregationist” form of patriarchy is 
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more complex and more difficult to challenge.95  Moreover, the modern, 
emancipated family has become such a dominant paradigm that there is no room in 
legal (or political) discourse for arguments against it.96  Anything which is not based 
on equal sharing (such as the automatic allocation of child benefit to mothers) is 
attacked as outmoded and discriminatory.97  Mothers cannot attempt to assert 
themselves as better than fathers in interpreting and responding to children’s needs, 
even where this is based on experience rather than biology.98  This casts doubt on the 
assertion that there is, in Sweden, a greater recognition of the value of care, which 
should lead to a fairer sharing of residence.   At the same time, economic instability 
since the 1990’s has led to a re-evaluation and a contraction of the welfare state; and a 
renewed, perhaps post-liberal, emphasis on individual responsibility visible, inter 
alia, in changes to child support.99   Constructions of single parents as an 
irresponsible problem group who lack the will or ability to discipline their children 
have began to appear on the margins of political discourse.100  Although international 
comparisons show Swedish single mothers to be in a better position than most, they 
remain socio-economically vulnerable, and gaps have widened in recent decades.101  
Yet, this is obscured by the insistence on gender neutrality in legal discourse.102    
 
The second chapter asserted that law’s efforts to construct post-separation dual-
household nuclear families are its attempt to diffuse conflicts of power brought 
about by social change, as is consistent with its societal role and its autopoietic 
cognitive framework.  In England, this is done largely by relying on the enduring 
normative power of the conjugal family, but the changes wrought by the 
construction of the Swedish welfare state makes this strategy impossible.  Instead, 
arguments against single motherhood are framed using the construct of the modern 
hands-on father; since fathers now (supposedly) play an equal role in intact families, 
                                                 
95  Smart, C (1982) “Regulating Families or Legitimating Patriarchy” 10(1) International Journal of the Sociology 
of Law, 1-18, p8 
96  Bergman & Hobson (2002) op cit n82, p117; Eriksson, M & Hester, M (2001) “Violent Men as Good Enough 
Fathers? A Look at England and Sweden” 7(7) Violence Against Women, 779-798, p789.  
97  Andersson & Bangura Arvidsson (2008) op cit n23, p198; Proposition 2005/06:20, pp15-16; Open Letter from 
Senior Union Officials and the Minister for Social Security, Dagens Nyheter 31st January 2006.   
98  Eriksson & Hester (2001) op cit n96, p789.  
99  Mahon (2002) op cit n72, p16; Kliman & Forsberg (1998) op cit n41, p53, p56.  
100  Feministiskt Initiativ (2006) Enastående och Makalösa Mammor, Stockholm, Feministiskt Initiativ, p4.  
http://www.feministisktinitiativ.se/downloads/grasrot/enastående.pdf  accessed 15th December 2009.   
101  Lewis (2005) op cit n77, p71; Gähler (2001) op cit n69, p43.   
102  Wennberg, L (2001) “Ensamstående Mödrar – Försörjda av Män eller Rätt till Välfärd?” in Burman, M & 
Gunnarson Å (Eds) Familjeföreställningar, Uppsala, Sweden, Iustus Förlag, 231-249, p247.   
 132 CHAPTER 6 
 
 
it should not be taken away from them at divorce.   Swedish law achieves the same 
result of promoting permanent fatherhood, albeit in a slightly different way.  
 
As in England, parenthood has replaced marriage as the primary status relationship, 
and the legislator has sought to remove legal obstacles to co-parenting while also 
sending clear symbolic messages about the immutability of parenthood.103  The 
custody order has played a significant part in this strategy.  In 1977 separating 
couples were given the option of continuing to share custody and successive 
subsequent amendments have turned joint legal custody into the default position; 
since 1998 it can even be ordered where one parent objects.104  In a typical example of 
the dominant discourse, a 2007 commission of inquiry reiterated that “divorce brings 
the marriage to an end, but leaves the parent-child relationships unaffected”.105  In 
2005, 94% of parents who separated continued to share custody, making sole custody 
“very unusual”.106  There are a number of similarities with parental responsibility.  
Joint custody is used to encourage fathers and reassure them of their continued 
importance.107  It is undergoing a process of re-conceptualisation from a voluntary 
mechanism for co-operation to a universal right and badge of legal status,108  and it 
may well be that, as in England, this process is the subsystems’ response to 
interference from the political system regarding paternal disengagement.  Its content 
has also changed.  The legal term, vårdnad, is an abbreviation of omvårdnad, which 
means care in the sense of caring for, but successive reforms have resulted in a 
reconceptualisation of vårdnad and a separation of legal custody from the practical 
work of caring.109  Custody was traditionally understood to involve physical 
possession as well as authority, but as the availability of joint custody has been 
expanded, it is primarily conceptualised in terms of decision making.110   Travaux 
préparatoires stress that custody is primarily a responsibility, but since it is difficult 
to see how this could be enforced against a disinterested parent, custody de facto 
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becomes “a right, rather than an obligation”.111   Here, the laws of the two 
jurisdictions appear to start from opposite points: whereas the law in England takes 
independent decision making as the implicit norm, excepting only certain important 
decisions, Swedish law has joint decision making as the default position and 
generally permits derogation only in relation to very mundane or trivial decisions.112  
This leaves parents very limited room to act in response to fears that the other 
parent is abducting or harming the children.113  Women’s organisations have, 
accordingly, condemned joint custody as an extension of patriarchal power.114    
 
The problems caused by this non-resident parent veto have become particularly 
acute since 1998 when joint custody became the default position even where one 
parent objects.  Most controversially, non-resident fathers have successfully blocked 
treatment recommended to help children recover from abuse the former are alleged 
to have perpetrated.115  In response, a commission of inquiry has recommended 
reform which will allow courts to grant one parent unilateral powers of decision-
making within the limited areas of education, healthcare and assistance offered by 
social services.116  This was felt to be the best way of resolving particular impasses 
without unduly undermining the principle of parental cooperation or marginalising 
non-resident parents, and it was stressed that unilateral decision-making must be a 
rare exception.117  It can be argued that the underlying motivation is to safeguard the 
current patriarchal use of joint custody to maintain father-child links.118   
 
Empirical studies have also found a preoccupation with fairness towards fathers, 
which could explain why, in the samples, fathers’ applications for contact were 
refused in less than 10% of cases.  Law is also concerned not to discourage or alienate 
fathers, thus, refusals were predominantly justified by reference to older children’s 
                                                 
111  Ryrstedt & Mattson (2008) op cit n32, p137. 
112  FB6§13; Schiratzki (2006) op cit n11, p93.  
113  The only option is to seek sole custody, but applications are dismissed in all but extreme circumstances: 
NJA2006 s.708; NJA2007 s.326; RH1999:129; RH1996:144; Schiratzki (2006) op cit n11, p97.  
114  Eriksson, M (2004) “Socialsekreterares Syn på Mäns Våld i Vårdnadsärenden”, 2 Kvinnotryck, 
http://roks.se/kvinnotryck/2004/kt2_04_rep_maria_eriksson.html.  
115  Barnombudsmannen (2005) När Tryggheten står på Spel, Barnombudsmannen Rapporterar 2005:02, p58; 
SOU 2007:52, pp72-74; Pihl, A & Thunander, T (2003) Rätten till ett Barn, Stockholm, Prisma, p177. 
116  SOU 2007:52, pp12-13.  Proposed change to FB6§14a and FB6§13a.  
117  Ibid, pp103-104, p122.  
118  Ibid, p109.  
 134 CHAPTER 6 
 
 
objections and paternal shortcomings were euphemised.119  This legal 
reinterpretation of case facts to fit the normative expectations of enduring 
fatherhood and the creation of binuclear families has been sharply criticised.120  It 
appears that, as in England, the legal subsystem is attempting to ameliorate the 
anxieties engendered by demographic changes which challenge patriarchal 
components of its normative framework.  Swedish family law is not overtly 
patriarchal, but the hidden gap between the aspirational, gender-neutral legislation 
and continuing gendered practices makes it more difficult for mothers to challenge 
fathers’ attempt to use the law to reassert control across the binuclear family.     
 
6.3 THE PARAMOUNTCY PRINCIPLE 
 
Swedish law includes a paramountcy principle very similar to section 1(1) of the 
Children Act 1989; and it appears to have similar problems in its application.  The 
child’s best interests were established as an important consideration in 1920, although 
there was no overarching paramountcy principle in the Parents Code until 1998.121 A 
precise definition of the child’s best interests is thought impossible since the concept 
varies over time, and according to circumstances; a point reiterated by the Supreme 
Court.122   Consequently, as in most other jurisdictions, the best interests concept has 
been criticised for being easy to endorse, but more difficult to describe.123  Some 
further guidance is provided in the Parents Code: children have “a right to care, 
security and a good upbringing”, must be treated with respect, and are not to be 
subjected to corporal punishment or other humiliating or degrading treatment.124  
There is a list of factors similar to s.1(3) of the 1989 Children Act, but it is 
considerably briefer: FB6§2a instructs courts to consider particularly the risks of 
abuse, abduction or other harm, the child’s need for close and good contact with both 
parents, and the child’s wishes in accordance with his or her age and maturity.  The 
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list is, like s.1(3), neither exhaustive nor hierarchical, and was not intended to limit 
discretion.125   
 
6.3.1 A Narrow Legal Construction of Welfare  
 
The conceptualisation of children as a public concern has combined with the 
emphasis on “welfarism and social engineering” so that, from a global perspective, 
Swedish children are prioritised to an enviable extent.126  While this construction of 
children within policy discourse has clearly influenced family law, it has only done 
so as interference, outside disturbance, which has had to be translated to fit law’s 
pre-existing framework.127  Within family law, the focus is narrowed to individual 
family members, who are recreated as stereotyped semantic artefacts, and child 
welfare science knowledge has been enslaved, translated into binary codes 
determined by law’s cognitive domain.128   
 
Although there has been no overt restatement of the welfare test as occurred in 
English family law in Re H (1992),129 the Parents Code’s broad discretionary welfare 
test has, in both custody and contact cases, come to be reinterpreted so that courts 
weigh any identified risks against the child’s need for contact with both parents.130  
Law has, moreover, created a hierarchy of these factors where the child’s need for 
contact usually prevails.131   A 2005 National Insurance Board study on child support 
concluded its introduction by stating that “it is not possible to exaggerate the 
importance of a child having regular contact with both its parents”.132  It is 
submitted, however, that this is precisely what has occurred in current practice.133  
This fits well with Teubner’s observation that the meaning which a statement gains 
as it becomes part of the subsystem’s communications is more important than the 
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meaning intended by the original actor.134  Indeed, it has been repeatedly observed 
that there is a discrepancy between the rhetoric expressed in official documents, and 
district court practice.135  As in England, there is little discussion of the concrete 
potential benefits of contact; courts’ handling of disputes has been described as 
“mechanical”, and risk assessments are not only rare but also often inadequate.136   
This approach can also be found in appeal court decisions, notably NJA2003 s.372.137  
Ryrstedt and Schiratzki have both criticised the way the Supreme Court began by 
setting out the arguments against further contact rooted in the child’s specific 
situation, but then performed a “u-turn” and ordered further contact on the basis of 
general observations that a child should benefit from a close relationship with a 
father who “genuinely cared about her”.138    
 
A further example of family law’s autopoietic nature is provided by Swedish law’s 
increasing emphasis on barnperspektiv or child focus.139  According to the legislation 
and travaux préparatoires, the child’s best interests must be assessed both objectively 
(by looking at scientific and other expert knowledge), and subjectively, by 
attempting to ascertain how the child sees the situation and then interpreting what 
has been said.140  Ryrstedt has complained that in current practice, neither goal is 
met.   She analysed transcripts of cooperation talks and found the child was rarely at 
the centre of discussions; instead, agreements reached through cooperation talks 
were often the result of the parents’ desire to win, or to achieve a fair sharing of the 
child.141  At court, children are very rarely granted party status, since their interests 
are assumed to converge with their parents; and the same reasoning explains why 
children’s views are often never sought at all.142    Where children’s wishes are 
recorded, courts often depart from them without further explanation since, as in 
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England, “[t]he whole process relies on adult discretion to judge children’s 
developing competences”, and children are often said to be too young to fully 
appreciate the consequences of their decisions.143  The SWI interview with the child 
is not seen as an independent contribution but, rather, responses are converted into 
“results of measurement to be used as data in adults’ distanced evaluation of the 
child”.144  This data is then enslaved, re-created to fit the pigeonholes of law’s 
normative structure.  Rejmer has argued that despite the child focus rhetoric, law 
converts children into semantic artefacts.145  As a closed self-regulating system law 
is, however, unaware of its limited focus.146  In Rejmer’s sample of cases, only 6% of 
SWI reports were found to be adequately child focused, yet the professionals who 
responded to her questionnaire were overwhelmingly satisfied with this aspect of 
the legal process.147  Thus, a standardised, abstract understanding of welfare has 
developed within family law’s chains of communication; and, as in England, this has 
come to focus on the child’s need for a father, while mothering is taken for 
granted.148   
 
6.3.2 From Broad Discretion to Binary Codes  
 
The dominant construction of the welfare principle has resulted in a de facto 
presumption in favour of joint custody as the best way of keeping parents 
involved.149  This can be seen in the statutory stipulation that courts and social 
welfare boards should accept parents’ agreements to share custody unless “obviously 
incompatible with the child’s best interests”, whereas agreements for sole custody 
require positive proof that this arrangement will in fact be better for the child.150  
Although it is stressed in travaux préparatoires that courts must not override parents’ 
objections as a matter of routine, practice has departed substantially from these 
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guidelines and judicial applications of the welfare test are often at best perfunctory.151  
The emphasis on the child’s need for a father, moreover, means that risks are 
minimised and found to have been outweighed by the abstract benefits of continuing 
legal ties.152  In 2005, the Children’s Ombudsman warned that “fears regarding the 
child’s safety and well-being have become obscured”.153  Similar observations have 
been made about the strong de facto presumption in favour of contact.  Gumbel 
found that graphic accounts of systematic violence were translated in SWI reports 
and judgments into incidents of disagreement.154  This process hid and normalised 
the violence; disagreement is common and not a valid reason to terminate contact.155   
 
However, increased awareness of the harmful effects on children suffering or 
witnessing domestic violence, and resulting concerns about contemporary law, led to 
a 2006 amendment to the Parents Code.156  This was intended to “tighten up” 
practice; there is no presumption against unsupervised contact or joint custody in 
cases involving domestic abuse but courts are instructed to investigate thoroughly 
and apply the welfare test carefully.157  The subsequent Supreme Court case 
NJA2006 s.26 has confirmed the change of direction and the reform has been praised 
as a welcome acknowledgement that not all parents are good for their children.158  It 
should be noted, however, that harm in the 2006 reform appears to have been 
understood predominantly in terms of domestic violence.159  As in England, 
aggressive and abusive men are seen as a small, exceptional category, who should 
not be allowed to undermine the general principle. Domestic violence, too, is defined 
narrowly. Concerns have been voiced that district court judges and SWI’s wrongly 
apply the criminal standard of proven beyond reasonable doubt.  Law’s use of binary 
codes means that if only allegations that have resulted in a conviction can be labelled 
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proven or true then all other allegations are unsubstantiated or false.160  This 
reasoning was, for example, employed in NJA2007 s.272, where the Supreme Court 
also made the slightly worrying observation that allegations of domestic violence 
should be treated with caution where the parties are involved in a custody dispute.161  
Secondly, violence may also be dismissed as “isolated heat-of-the-moment 
incidents”.162  Sjösten, a prominent judge and commission of inquiry chairman, has 
suggested in his family law textbook that what he terms “mild violence” can be a 
father’s understandable and excusable reaction to a stressful time and should not 
disqualify a parent from having joint custody.163   Thus, the effects of the 2006 
reform have been limited.164  
 
Interestingly, something very similar can be observed in Swedish legal discourse in 
relation to the construction of immigrant fathers, although it is rarely expressed as 
overtly.  Sweden was ethnically and culturally homogenous for millennia, and the 
last five decades’ assimilation of migrant labour and refugees has not always been 
easy, particularly where there is divergence from the democratic, emancipated ideals 
of the welfare state.165   In legal discourse, fathers with immigrant backgrounds are 
constructed as another atypical problem group: their inability to understand the 
dominant welfare discourse is said to lead to disputes becoming entrenched or even 
violent.166 In this dichotomous construction, characteristic of law’s tendency to 
recreate information in its own binary code, immigrant fathers are aggressive, 
chauvinist, reactionary and unreasonable, while Swedish men are emancipated, 
reasonable and able to put their children’s interests first.  
 
In conclusion, a patriarchal element remains within family law despite seven 
decades of welfare state policies.  It is, however, less pronounced, and possibly 
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slightly less influential.  Presumptions in favour of joint legal custody and contact 
are justified by references to new, hands-on fathers, rather than the Victorian pater 
familias, and there is some recognition of the value of care.  Nevertheless, 
presumptions that are presented as benefitting children are de facto protecting men’s 
interests.167  A single mothers’ organisation has asserted that the paramountcy 
principle is never allowed to be drawn to a conclusion where it limits men’s freedom 
of choice in relation to parenting.168  Bradley has warned that, as in other 
jurisdictions, the emphasis placed on the continuing involvement of two parents 
“may operate as an alibi for dominant ideology and a means of regulation after 
divorce”.169   
 
6.4 REASONABLENESS 
 
Internationally, Swedish law is seen as a striking example of “an interventionist 
approach in family matters”, particularly when compared to the traditional liberal 
reluctance to regulate.170  Nevertheless, a preference for party negotiation is as 
pronounced a component of Swedish private family law as is the case in England.   
 
6.4.1 Non-Intervention, but not a Carte Blanche  
 
The Parents Code has no equivalent to s.1(5) of the Children Act 1989.   However, 
the legislation is written with the underpinning assumption that “parents will be 
able to agree on virtually everything”.171 The perception that party negotiated 
settlement is better than costly, stressful or even counterproductive litigation has 
resulted in successive law reforms and an energetic promotion of alternative dispute 
resolution in the shape of cooperation talks, SWB registered agreements and, most 
recently, court-ordered mediation.172  Cooperation talks were first introduced by 
local Social Services in the 1970’s primarily to explore reconciliation and resolve 
conflicts, but as these talks were “enslaved” or accommodated into the legal 
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framework, the focus was narrowed to agreement on the immediate issue.173 Parents 
are now encouraged, coerced or ordered into attending them at all stages in the legal 
process.174  As in England, the observation has been made that this preference for 
non-intervention has overridden the welfare principle.175   According to Singer, the 
legal system has abdicated its responsibility for solving parents’ disputes.176  That 
task has been delegated to parents, but not with a carte blanche; the search for 
settlement is very much a case of bargaining in the shadow of the law.177  Dominant 
messages contained in “largely pedagogical” legislative provisions are transmitted by 
all professionals.178   The reinterpretation of child welfare science as requiring 
children to have relationships with both parents, whilst also being protected from 
conflict, has led to a highly prescriptive approach to party-negotiated settlement: 
both parents should feel as involved as possible to minimise discord.179  It is noted in 
relation to the welfare test that the law tends to follow its abstract presumptions 
while ignoring the context of a particular case; families who appear before law are 
reduced to mere semantic artefacts.  Thus, the favoured model of amicable post-
separation is imposed on parents who are unwilling or unable to reach that ideal.180  
Furthermore, Rejmer has argued that this focus on compromise as “best for 
children” has led family law to adjust its internal understanding of custody, 
residence and contact cases.  She has asserted that any dispute can either be 
understood as a conflict of interests, a relatively superficial struggle over a scare 
resource; or as a conflict of values, a deeper or more fundamental disagreement 
around norms and morals.  While the former can be resolved through a mediated 
compromise, the latter requires an external body to prefer one party’s position over 
the other’s.  A meeting in the middle is impossible both in principle and practice.181   
Rejmer’s own analysis of District Court cases found that while both types of 
conflicts were present in the sample, conflicts of values were markedly more 
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common.  Yet, the courts treated all cases as conflicts of interests.  In accordance 
with received wisdom about avoiding the adversarial approach, both parents were 
described as good enough parents, who ought to be able to meet in the middle.   
Rejmer has asserted that the better starting point in relation to a conflict of values is 
that while one parent is right, the other is not.182 She has suggested that this provides 
an explanation for widespread parental dissatisfaction with the judicial process, and 
also for the 50% failure rate for compromise solutions reached at court.183   Law’s 
unwillingness to adjudicate leaves children and adults exposed to continuing 
conflicts.184  Law, a subsystem that is founded on the delivery of judgments to ensure 
compliance, cannot abdicate authority.  Moreover, since law is cognitively open, but 
normatively closed, it does not adjust in response to external interference but repeats 
the same admonishments to parents who repeatedly return to court.185  A similar use 
of shared residence in the English courts is likely to have equally disappointing 
results.     
 
Moreover, Schiratzki has noted that law’s use of abstract presumptions and binary 
codes means that the parent who is arguing for the outcome currently preferred 
within legal discourse is ‘right’, while the other is ‘wrong’.186  There is no recognition 
of the fact that a refusal to reach a compromise can be the more child-focused stance, 
if the other parent is dangerous or inadequate.187  Parents who appear ‘on message’ 
are commended for their sensible approach. Parents who “hold grudges and are 
determined to fight” selfishly disrupt courts’ efforts to improve the situation for 
their children.188  Indeed, parents who insist on a full District Court hearing are 
often reprimanded in relation to this apparent failure in parental responsibility.189 
Rejmer found this to be a significant reason for parents’ dissatisfaction with the legal 
system, illustrating the problems of communication across the boundaries of several 
autopoietic systems.  Parents expected a genuine resolution of their conflicts and 
when this was not the outcome their disappointment often led to a rejection of 
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formal judgments or, more commonly, judicial exhortations to stop fighting or 
behave more reasonably.  Thus, judgments had little practical impact.190  
 
 
6.4.2 The Gendered Dimension  
 
There are a number of reasons why this prima facie neutral insistence on reasonable 
behaviour becomes gendered.  Firstly, it is predominantly fathers who rely on the 
co-parenting paradigm to win cases, while it is predominantly mothers who find it 
difficult to express their view that it is better for their particular child to grow up in 
a stable one-parent family.  Secondly, law’s preoccupation with maintaining the 
father-child bond makes it reluctant to criticise or discourage all but the most 
dangerous or inadequate fathers.191  The final, and possibly most significant factor, is 
the “profound change” which the construction of fatherhood has undergone in 
Swedish legal discourse.192   The gender neutral rhetoric of legislation and travaux 
préparatoires combines with law’s construction of intact families along the dual 
worker/carer model to hide a gendered, unequal labour market and a gendered, 
unequal allocation of caring responsibilities.193  Although empirical works shows that 
gender roles may be changing, but “are still fairly rigid”, family law has adopted the 
construction of the new, involved father and gender equality is understood as a goal 
that has been reached.194  Thus gender is often dismissed as irrelevant.  Law’s 
gender-blindness combines with its inability to see the real individuals behind the 
semantic artefacts, so that law ignores all arguments based on mothers’ caring 
experience or paternal inadequacy.   
 
A 2007 commission of inquiry observed that mothers are statistically significantly 
more likely than fathers to be granted sole custody.195  It noted, in three sentences, 
that since the proposals it made were aimed at improving the conditions for joint 
custody, this ought to allow more men to retain custody, and thus the proposals 
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should improve gender equality.196   This is a formal and very simplistic 
understanding of gender equality as equal rights over the child, with no 
consideration of why it may be that women are currently more likely to gain sole 
custody, and how changed rules may impact disproportionately on one sex.   Yet, 
despite law’s self-imposed gender-blindness, gendered expectations continue to 
influence law.  Law is inherently patriarchal and conservative, and since a 
subsystems’ existing components continue to shape and limit new components 
autopoietic system have a tendency to revert to type.  Ryrstedt has suggested, for 
example, that professional intervention into parties’ negotiations is likely to be 
influenced by traditional understandings of motherhood and fatherhood.197 
Eriksson’s study found considerable disparity between the statute’s ostensible gender 
neutrality and constructions of “mothering” and “fathering” implicit within the 
SWI discourse.198  “Mothering” means shouldering the responsibility for meeting 
the children’s material and emotional needs; “fathering” is a back-up role which also 
involves providing a male role-model and doing ‘fun things’ with the children.199   At 
the same time, a combination of the employment law measures aimed to encourage 
gender equality and private family law’s pre-occupation with encouraging father-
child links had made law reluctant to discourage men; fathers should be allowed to 
“make their own mistakes”.200  In terms of responsible parenting, law’s expectations 
on fathers are, therefore, low.201  It is possible for a man to be described 
simultaneously both as a “good father” and a “bad parent”, while the same is not 
true for mothers.202   
 
6.4.3 Custody and ‘Reasonableness’  
 
Joint custody has been extended to almost all separated parents in order to remove a 
source of dissatisfaction and “aid a harmonious relationship between parents”.203   It 
is said to allow parents to share their parenting role on equal terms, and to provide a 
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helpful framework for collaboration.204   It is often hoped joint custody will bolster 
parental co-operation by either “mollifying” non-resident parents, or persuading 
resident parents not to ignore their former partners.205   A parallel can be drawn with 
English courts’ use of the shared residence order. The law’s recent, more cautious 
attitude towards violent fathers has combined with a post-liberal insistence on 
reasonable, child-focused behavior; the result is a partial re-assessment of the court’s 
power to order joint custody in the face of one parent’s opposition.206   In RH2005:38, 
the father, who was a second-generation immigrant, was portrayed in the case report 
as unyielding; recreated within legal discourse as the semantic artefact of the 
unreasonable, potentially harmful parent.  The mother, on the other hand, had told 
the court that she understood the children’s need for counselling, and would help 
meet their need for a relationship with their father.   She said she had recognised 
that at the time of the separation she had been going through a difficult time, and 
had been unable to put the children’s welfare first.  She had, however, reflected on 
this, and adjusted her life-style.  She thus presented herself as a reasonable parent, in 
the post-liberal sense, and was awarded sole custody.   In NJA2007 s.382 both the 
Appeal Court and the Supreme Court noted that legislative amendments required 
courts to evaluate, carefully and realistically, the prospects for good co-parenting 
under a joint custody order.207  The father’s appeal was on both occasions dismissed.  
The parents had been embroiled in legal disputes almost continuously since the birth 
of their now three-year-old daughter and this, coupled with the lack of mutual trust 
and the father’s somewhat inflexible approach, were strong indicators against joint 
custody.208   This more realistic approach should be praised, and it is encouraging 
that lower courts in subsequent cases followed it.  Fathers who have shown disregard 
for previous judgments, exhibited controlling behaviour, or denigrated their former 
partners in front of their children have lost custody because of their perceived 
unreasonableness.209   However, , this more demanding judicial stance is only 
adopted towards a narrowly defined minority of fathers who are seen as violent, 
aggressive or otherwise intransigent in their refusal to accept the dominant welfare 
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rhetoric.210  Recent law reform and precedent have confirmed that, in all other cases, 
joint custody remains the ideal.211   Moreover, the departure from the general rule 
does not mean a complete rejection of the dominant paradigm.  In NJA2006 s.26 the 
mother’s attempt to kill the father during a psychotic episode and his consequent 
anxiety had led to a sole custody order.  The father was, however, praised for his 
positive approach to contact.  The judgment contained the standard statements 
about how children benefit from close and frequent contact with both parents, with 
no real consideration about how these children, who had been in the flat during the 
attempted murder, might be affected.212    
 
The fact that divorce has now become so prevalent that it has become normalised 
has decreased interest in how this ‘ordinary’ event actually affects children and 
adults.213    Instead, the dominant rhetoric asserts that both divorce and custody 
disputes are life events which could happen to anyone and Rejmer found that 
custody investigations in her study were begun from this perspective.214   Yet, her 
analysis revealed these parents to be economically and socially disadvantaged, often 
“subject to at least two parallel crises”.215  However, courts often remained unaware 
of this; “the right questions” were “never asked” because law’s enslavement of 
welfare discourse meant that SWI’s had structured their information-gathering to 
suit law’s purposes.216  Moreover, it has been explained above how Rejmer’s research 
revealed law’s reinterpretation of parents’ disputes as mere conflicts of interests 
between two prima facie good parents.217   The result was ineffective legal 
intervention.  
 
Schiratzki has complained that joint legal custody is based on a presumption of 
cooperation, which was valid in 1977 when joint custody was voluntary, but is now 
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dangerously outdated.218  Yet, law’s narrow definition of conflict has led to a 
correspondingly wide definition of adequate parental cooperation; in a 2005 
commission of inquiry’s sample of custody cases, parents who refused to talk to each 
other, had threatened each other or regularly became abusive in front of their 
children were all told that their conflicts were not substantial enough to justify a 
termination of joint custody.219  Rejmer concluded from her study that the concept of 
custody had been reduced to a semantic artefact, a purely judicial concept.220   One 
father in Gustafsson’s study described joint custody as “a smokescreen” which 
creates an illusion of co-parenting and hides “the reality of most cases”.221  As is the 
case with the English parental responsibility order, the joint custody order appears 
not to have been successful in reducing conflicts by giving parents “less to fight 
over”.222   Legislative change seems only to have transferred conflicts; although there 
are no central statistics available, studies suggest that where the numbers of custody 
disputes have fallen, there have been corresponding increases in applications for 
contact or residence.223 
  
Joint custody is now underpinned by law’s unrealistic assumption of gender 
equality.224  A 1996 commission of inquiry was, for example, expressly directed to 
consider the impact of any proposed reform on gender equality.  The commission 
members explicitly chose to ignore this.225  Gender equality arguments were said to 
be counterproductive in “turning the issue into an emancipation battle” where 
legislation should seek to promote co-parenting.226   The commission, and the 
government that subsequently accepted its decision, have been criticised for ignoring 
gendered power structures in a way which de facto supported the very discrimination 
which had been dismissed as irrelevant.227   
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As in England, the pro-contact presumption has been accompanied by efforts to 
educate disinterested, hostile or recalcitrant parents.228  The comments made by 
Rejmer in relation to custody about the gap between family law’s abstract norms 
based on ‘ordinary’, ‘responsible’ parents and the reality of socio-economically or 
emotionally vulnerable parents, are equally valid in relation to contact.229     In a 
study of supervised contact by Ekbom and Landberg, the authors found that 
overambitious goals of establishing long-term contact were met in less than 15% of 
cases.230   These, too, were families with complex histories: one case report would 
often mention several interlinked problems, for example, violence, addiction or 
mental illness, as well as unemployment or social exclusion.231  Yet, judges failed to 
give these factors adequate weight and instead relied on non-resident parents’ 
statements of good intentions and generalised assertions that supervised contact can 
develop to greatly benefit children. Resident parents often complained that official 
gullibility had exposed their children to false hopes and further disappointments.232  
Yet, Ekbom and Landberg found widespread support for supervised contact among 
lawyers and social workers.  Current law was perceived to be working very well, but 
this assessment appeared to be based largely on abstract assertions of children’s best 
interests rather than experience from particular cases.233    Since law “doesn’t see that 
it doesn’t see what it doesn’t see” it can impose its normative expectations of gender 
equality and co-parenting on families, ignoring the evidence of gendered power 
imbalances, violence, or other problems.234   Ekbom and Landberg, writing from a 
child welfare science standpoint, were extremely critical of the way “[c]hildren were 
expected to react as though they were living in law’s ideal family, rather than their 
own”.235  The autopoietic system can, however, close itself off from a full 
understanding of the impact of its communications.  Consequently, continued 
insistence on adherence to its normative model can be preferred to an abdication of 
authority. 
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Contact, too, is discussed in gender neutral language while in practice the 
expectations placed on parents in contact disputes are highly gendered.236  Since 
contact fathers are departing from the traditional male stereotype, standards are 
relaxed and the comment is frequently made by professionals that “he is doing the 
best he can”.237   In NJA2003 s.382 the court said it did not matter that the father was 
at times erratic and unable to focus on his daughter, since he genuinely loved her.238  
This generous approach, based on the historical marginalisation of care within the 
private sphere, is based on the assumption that resident mothers will compensate for 
paternal shortcomings.  As in England, mothers have a duty to support contact.  
They must provide their non-resident counterparts with any information necessary 
to enable the latter to play an active part in their children’s lives and are, in practice, 
expected to give their children the emotional support necessary to implement 
contact in problematic circumstances.239  Those who refuse, risk being accused of 
’umgängessabotage’, contact-sabotage, the Swedish equivalent to English family law’s 
semantic artefact of the implacably hostile mother.240 Echoing English 
commentators, Nordborg has observed:  “When the best interests principle comes to 
be interpreted as contact with both parents, a mother who questions the father’s 
contact application automatically becomes a bad mother”.241   Research has also 
shown significant numbers of mothers feel caught in a ‘no-win’ situation.  If they 
agree to contact with a dangerous ex-partner they are taken to guarantee the child’s 
safety, and thus provide proof that their allegations are groundless; if they say no, 
they risk being labelled a contact saboteur, losing custody, residence and the ability 
to protect their children.242    
 
6.5 CONCLUSION  
 
Swedish family law can be seen to be inherently patriarchal and conservative.  
However, the imposition of the new binuclear pattern on separated couples cannot, 
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like in England, be justified by arguments built on the superiority of the conjugal 
family. The normative paradigm has been weakened by decades of sustained 
interference from the political subsystem, and consequent changes in behaviour.   
Marriage has been transformed to a private contract, no “better” than cohabitation, 
and single motherhood does not quite carry the same negative connotations.  , 
Instead, Swedish family law uses the semantic artefact of the new dual-worker, 
dual-carer family to justify its insistence that fathers’ legal ties to children must be 
maintained.    Legal custody has been transformed into an almost automatic 
confirmation of parental status with an accompanying right to participate in 
decision making.243   Contact has, similarly, become a de facto right for fathers.  
Although it is expressed in the Parents Code as the child’s right, law has enslaved 
communications from the child welfare subsystem to develop a rigid understanding 
of contact as being essential for a child’s healthy development into a well-adjusted 
adult.    Law has also created its own internal version of parents’ disputes, which 
empirical research has revealed differs substantially from real families.  As a closed 
subsystem, law has made itself unable to see parents’ deep-seated conflicts, often 
made more difficult because of their additional problems, such as addiction or ill 
health.  Law also ignores the gap between gender neutral rhetoric and gendered 
reality.  As a result, unrealistic expectations of compromise and cooperation are 
placed on parents, and mothers, in particular, are obliged to support and sustain 
father–child relationships.  It can also be argued that children’s welfare has been 
demoted below law’s desire to contain social change in a way that is unlikely to 
work, clearly contrary to the paramountcy principle, and also in practice likely to 
harm children through exposure to adult violence, resentment and inflexibility. 
These observations suggest that the implementation of shared residence in Sweden 
may not be as unproblematic as was suggested in the introduction; this will be 
examined in the chapter on shared residence in Sweden.   
 
                                                 
243  Schiratzki (1999) op cit n109, p1055. 
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7 SHARED RESIDENCE IN SWEDEN 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter begins with a brief consideration of the residence order, before 
examining the law on shared residence, which is known in Sweden as växelvis 
boende, alternating residence.   Having explored how the order is defined in Swedish 
family law and practice, it will then use the framework from previous chapters to 
analyse shared residence and the concept of permanent parenthood; the welfare test; 
and the emerging powerful ‘reasonableness’ discourse.   It is noted that Swedish law 
seems to rely to a lesser extent on shared residence to send symbolic messages and 
that the majority of orders involve a substantial sharing of children’s time, but that 
concerns similar to those raised in England have, nevertheless, been voiced in 
Sweden.  Commentators with a feminist perspective have criticised law’s use of the 
shared residence order to mould post-separation dual household families into the 
binuclear form.   
 
7.2 BOENDE – RESIDENCE 
 
The custody order has been retained in Sweden; it has been the primary means of 
resolving the issue of who should be the child’s primary carer. Residence orders were 
introduced relatively recently, as part of a 1998 family law reform which extended 
joint legal custody to cases where one parent opposed this, and where the parents 
could not be assumed to agree on where children should live.1  As in England, the 
statute stipulates that residence is a question of fact.2  The overwhelming majority of 
parents reach agreement on residence, and guidance from the National Board of 
Health and Welfare (NBHW) states that there is then no need for any investigation 
from outside agencies.3   It is only where the question of residence is disputed that a 
court will request a Social Welfare Investigator’s report, and then apply the welfare 
                                                 
1  Previously, disputes over residence would have been resolved by awarding one parent sole custody, Ds 
1999:57, p75; Proposition 1997/98:7, p57.  
2  FB6§14a; Proposition 1997/98:7, p58.  
3  Socialstyrelsen (2003b) Socialnämndens Handläggning av vissa Frågor om Vårdnad, Boende och Umgänge, 
Socialstyrelsens Författningssamling SOSFS 2003:14, Regeringskansliet, Stockholm, pp38-39.  
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principle.4    Research has shown that the most important factor for courts forced to 
choose between two parents is, as with custody, the status quo or continuity 
principle.5  Since mothers remain the primary carers in most families, it is judicial 
reluctance to unsettle a child, rather than gender bias, that has resulted in more 
residence orders being made in favour of mothers.6  Unlike in the UK, this does not 
appear to have resulted in widespread complaints that the system is biased against 
fathers, complaints that were shown in the fifth chapter to have influenced UK 
political discourse and forced the legal subsystem to respond to this powerful 
interference. Swedish equal parenting organisations tend to focus their attention on 
shortcomings in the system for the enforcement of contact orders, and Swedish 
courts’ reluctance to recognise parental alienation syndrome.7   It is possible to 
speculate that this is because the courts’ decisions on residence are not a major 
source of dissatisfaction; and this may well be because of the greater availability of 
shared residence.   
 
7.3 SHARED RESIDENCE: A DEFINITION 
 
When the formal shared residence order was introduced in 1998, courts were given 
authority to make the order where one parent objects.8  Swedish law places 
considerable emphasis on specificity, and it is, therefore, surprising that there is no 
statutory definition of shared residence.9  The difficulties in drawing a line between 
shared residence and generous staying contact have been noted in travaux 
préparatoires.10    Nevertheless, an order for shared residence has to be detailed 
enough to be judicially enforceable, and the starting point is an equal division of the 
child’s time.11  The leading Supreme Court case, NJA1998 s.26712, stipulates that 
                                                 
4  Socialstyrelsen (2003b) op cit n3, p39; Ewerlöf, G & Sverne, T (1999) Barnets Bästa (4th Ed), Stockholm, 
Norstedts Juridik AB, p55.  
5  Schiratzki, J (2006) Barnrättens Grunder (3rd  Ed), Lund, Sweden, Studentlitteratur,p107; Sjösten, M (1998) 
Vårdnad, Boende och Umgänge, Stockholm, Norstedts Juridik, p56.  
6  SOU 2005:43, pp757-758; SOU 1997:139, p151, cited in Gustafsson, M (2002) Vad som kan Dölja sig bakom 
Gemensam Vårdnad och Barnets Bästa, Mälardalens Högskola, Västerås p9.  
7  Föreningen Pappaliv: http://www.pappaliv.se; Umgängesrätts Föräldrarnas Riksförening: 
http://www.ufr.org/ accessed 13th October 2009.  
8  FB6§14a, introduced through Lag 1998:319; Proposition 1997/98:7, p113.   
9  Riksförsäkringsverket (2003a) Underhållsstöd: Ett Urval av Kammarrättsdomar, RFV Anser 2003:3, 
Stockholm, Riksförsäkringsverket, p13.  
10  Ds1999:30, p31; Proposition 1997/98:7, p68.  
11  SOU2007:52, p60; Socialstyrelsen (2004b) Växelvis Boende: Att Bo Hos både Pappa och Mamma Fast De Inte 
Bor Tillsammans (2a upplagan), Stockholm, Socialstyrelsen, p36; Riksförsäkringsverket (2003b) Underhållsstöd 
vid Växelvis Boende: Utvärdering av Reformen, RFV Analyserar 2003:1, Stockholm, Riksförsäkringsverket,  
p11.  
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arrangements with a less than equal split must generally be regarded as contact, 
“unless there are special factors pointing in the opposite direction”.13  Although the 
children in this case spent approximately a third of their time with the father, and 
this might have been sufficient, the Supreme Court could find no additional 
indicators leading to a conclusion of shared residence and thus the father’s appeal 
failed.  The court gave as examples of these factors whether accommodation has 
been adapted for the child, where the child keeps his or her possessions, and how the 
child is provided for financially.14  
 
As in England, shared residence is a comparatively new arrangement, and also one 
that appears to be gaining in popularity.15  In 1992/93 the official estimate was that 
only 4% of children with separated parents were alternating between two homes; the 
corresponding figure for 2007 was 21%.16  This figure is significantly larger than any 
English estimates.  In Ryrstedt’s study 7 out of 16 couples ended the cooperation 
talks by agreeing to share residence.17   Statistics, moreover, show that four out of 
five move on a weekly basis, and that most spend something close to half of their 
time with each parent.18  A number of reasons for this increase have been suggested.  
The extension of joint custody to almost all separating parents and the strong 
presumption have undoubtedly been important, particularly as courts can order 
shared residence against one parent’s wishes.19  Parental attitudes may have been 
influenced by the attention shared residence has received both in official documents 
and in the media.  The increase may also be attributable to the status quo principle.  
Although Sweden has not yet reached the goal of a completely equal distribution of 
private and public responsibilities, Swedish fathers have become more involved.  
They, their former partners, their lawyers and the judges, may thus perceive it as 
natural for this ‘hands-on’ involvement to continue after separation.20   Financial 
                                                                                                                                               
12  Cases are known by reference to the pages of the main reports rather than parties’ names. 
13   NJA1998 s.267, p274.   
14  Ibid.  See also Riksförsäkringsverket (2003a) op cit n9, p20. 
15  SOU2005:43, p507.  
16  Barnombudsmannen (2007) Upp til 18 – Fakta om Barn och Ungdom: Barnombudsmannen Rapporterar 
2007:04, Stockholm, Barnombudsmannen, p57.   
17  Although this is a small sample, it does show the arrangement’s increasing popularity, Ryrstedt, E (2009b) 
“Samarbetssamtal” Svensk Juristtidning, 821-842, p839.   
18  Barnombudsmannen (2007) op cit n11, p57.   
19  Pihl, A & Thunander, T (2003) Rätten till ett Barn, Stockholm, Prisma, p168; Schiratzki, J (2006) Barnrättens 
Grunder (3rd  Ed), Lund, Sweden, Studentlitteratur, p111; SOU 2005:43, p725.  
20  Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n11, p38; Emtestam, G (2001a) “Barn Lider i Onödan”, 3 Socionomen, 29-33, 
pp29-30. 
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factors may also influence decisions.   Child support rules were changed, for 
example, in 1997 and 2001, with the express objective of removing economic obstacles 
by extending the means-tested element to parents with shared residence.21  On both 
occasions, the number of children with shared residence receiving child support 
more than doubled in less than two years.22  These statistics do not show whether 
the total number of children sharing residence has changed, or whether a larger 
proportion of existing shared residence parents have become eligible for child 
support; nor can it shed any light on parents’ motivations.23  They can, however, be 
seen as confirming the general trend of an increasing use of shared residence.   
 
7.4 SHARED RESIDENCE AND PERMANENT 
PARENTHOOD   
 
The chapter on shared residence in England described how some fathers apply for 
shared residence because of its connotations of equal status and how courts have 
placed increasing emphasis on its symbolic value.  This was linked to law’s 
autopoietic and inherently patriarchal nature (amplified by pressure from the 
political subsystem); law hears fathers’ claims for equal authority, but is 
uninterested in mothers’ objections based on the unequal distribution of caring 
responsibilities.    In Sweden, however, the social engineers of the welfare state 
actively sought to reduce the influence of the public/private dichotomy and the 
nuclear family ideal; mothers were encouraged into the workplace, while alternative 
family types were recognised and brought within the regulatory net of the welfare 
state.  There is, consequently, little discursive room for arguments that link the 
decline of marriage to social disintegration; and fatherhood is conceptualised in 
terms of hands-on involvement rather than the imposition of discipline.  Although 
political reform can be no more than external turbulence, the level of interference 
has been such that Swedish family law has been forced to adjust.   As a result, the 
law is less sympathetic to another form of turbulence: fathers’ arguments that they 
need shared residence to correct power imbalances and prevent mothers from 
excluding them.  It may be that independent motherhood is more acceptable in a 
                                                 
21  Ds1999:30, p51; Riksförsäkringsverket (2003b) op cit n11, p19; Riksförsäkringsverket (2003a) op cit n9, p8.  
22  Riksförsäkringsverket (2003b) op cit n11,  p11.  
23  Ibid, p37.  
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jurisdiction where the traditional breadwinner model has deliberately been 
discarded.24  It is also likely that joint legal custody is perceived to be an adequate 
safeguard against this type of marginalisation.25  Furthermore, fatherhood is 
understood within political communications in terms of practical participation as 
well as discipline and financial provision.  Thus, the problem, as constructed within 
the closed political subsystem, is how to increase men’s hands-on involvement, not 
simply how to maintain men’s authority.      
 
Swedish courts have, thus, not had to adapt this order the way their English 
counterparts have, and are much less easily persuaded that an unequal split can be 
classed as shared residence.  This makes it more difficult for those who seek the 
order for symbolic or other reasons.  Emtestam, a vociferous Swedish campaigner on 
the importance of fathering, has sought to relax the definition of shared residence 
down to 10 nights per month, and has suggested that all children who have contact 
with both their separated parents should be seen as having two homes.26   However, 
these types of arguments have not attracted any media or academic attention 
(beyond a few articles on fathers’ groups websites), and do not appear to be 
particularly influential in legal discourse.27 In NJA1998 s.267, the Supreme Court 
insisted on significant additional factors to justify shared residence in a case with a 
30/70 split, and this approach has been endorsed by the government and has not been 
subjected to subsequent challenges.28   The construction of shared residence as equal 
division appears to have been firmly established through circulation in family law’s 
chains of communications.  Moreover, shared residence in Sweden does not, as in 
England, cover arrangements where one parent has the child during the school week, 
and the other’s time falls during weekends and holidays; four out of five children 
                                                 
24  Pylkkänen, A (2007) “Liberal Family Law in the Making: Nordic and European Harmonisation”, 15(3) 
Feminist Legal Studies, 289-306, p294; Bradley, D (1990) “Children, Family and the State in Sweden”, 17(4) 
Journal of Law and Society 17, 427-444, p429.  
25  Kurki-Suoni, K (1995) “Gemensam Vårdnad – Vad Döljer Man med Barnets Bästa?” in Nordborg, G (Ed) 
13 Kvinnoperspektiv på Rätten, Uppsala, Iustus Förlag, 169-196, p171.  
26  Emtestam, G (2001b) 16 Barn med Separerade Föräldrar, Stockholm, Socialstyrelsen, p32; Emtestam, G (2002) 
”Barn Flyttar Gärna mellan Två Hem”, 6 Socionomen, 20-21.  
27  See e.g. Föreningen Pappa-barn: http://www.pappa-barn.se/ accessed on 15th March 2008.   
28  Proposition 1999/2000:118.  
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who share residence alternate on a weekly basis, and some more frequently than 
that.29  
 
It may, therefore, be thought that shared residence in Sweden is not about fathers’ 
rights or status, but must involve a substantial sharing of the practical responsibility 
of caring for the child.  This may not, however, be the result of a greater recognition 
of the importance of care.  It is also likely to be due to the context in which these 
disputes have been decided.  The leading Supreme Court case, NJA1998 s.267, like 
the majority of cases on this point, was a dispute over child support payments rather 
than the allocation of a child’s time or definitions of residence per se.  These cases are 
appealed through the administrative court structure, and the strict definition of 
shared residence may be a result of fiscal considerations.30  In a 2000 Gothenburg 
case, where the Administrative Appeal Court determined that residence was shared, 
it highlighted the fact that both parents contributed equally to the children’s 
upkeep.31 
 
There are also contested shared residence applications in the district courts where 
disputes over contact or residence are heard.  In some cases schedules have been 
agreed and the dispute is over classification; in RH1998:85 and RH1999:13, the 
children spent just over a third of their time with their fathers, and in both cases the 
orders labelled this contact.32   However, these cases are now a decade old, and it has 
been suggested that judicial attitudes are changing.  Within legal discourse, the 
argument is often repeated that children need good and continuing contact with both 
parents, and that shared residence can help to ensure this as it allows both parents to 
participate in the child’s life on equal terms.33  This constructs granting equal status 
to parents as good for children, brings the equality argument within the dominant 
child welfare discourse, and allows fathers to rely on this to support their shared 
residence applications.   Social Welfare Investigators (SWI's) reported to a 2005 
commission of inquiry that they were increasingly asked to investigate cases where 
                                                 
29  Statistiska Centralbyrån (2002) Statistiska Centralbyråns Undersökningar av Levnadsförhållanden, Stockholm, 
SCB, cited in SOU2005:43, p507; Statistiska Centralbyrån (2007) Statistiska Centralbyråns Undersökningar av 
Levnadsförhållanden, Stockholm, SCB, cited in Barnombudsmannen (2007) op cit n11, p57.  
30  Widlund, H (2003) Barnets Bästa i Boendefrågan, Stockholm, Juridicum, p18.  
31  Gothenburg Adminstrative Appeal Court case 732-2000, cited in Riksförsäkringsverket (2003a) op cit n9, p19 
32  Wickström, A (2001) “Nyare Rättspraxis om Vårdnad om Barn”, Svensk Juristtidning, 666-675, p669.  
33 Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n11, p7.  
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one parent had applied for shared residence against the other’s wishes and expressed 
concern that many such applications appeared to be motivated predominantly by a 
quest for justice.34  The National Board of Health and Welfare (NBHW) carried out 
an analysis of sample cases from 1999 and 2002 and found that some district courts 
were far too willing to order shared residence, possibly to placate fathers and ensure 
their continued involvement in their children’s lives.35  In one such case, a two-year-
old girl was required to alternate between her father and mother on a fortnightly 
basis, although the distance was such that the journey had to be made by air.  The 
court reasoned that the girl appeared robust enough to cope with such frequent 
upheaval.36  The question that has to be asked is: for whose benefit? In an unreported 
case from February 2009, the Svea Appeal Court decided that shared residence ought 
to continue although the children (who were at school) had to commute 
approximately 70 km between Stockholm and Uppsala every day in the week when 
they were living with the mother.37   This could be seen as a sign that Swedish courts 
are moving in the same direction as their English counterparts.  It is more likely, 
however, that these are anomalous cases; the outcome in the 2009 case was largely a 
result of the members of the appeal court being split three ways.38    
 
Joint custody has been transformed from a mechanism to enable the sharing of legal 
and practical duties to an indicator of parental status, bestowed almost 
automatically.  In the chapter on shared residence in England, concern was 
expressed that this order is undergoing a similar change.   In Sweden, however, 
shared residence is still conceptualised as a practical matter.  There may be an 
emerging construction of shared residence as the only real indicator of equal parental 
worth, but it is not universally accepted.  Although autopoieticists warn against 
relying on simple causal models of input and output,39 it can be concluded that 
political interference, focused on increasing paternal involvement in caring for 
children, has strengthened the legal construction of shared residence as being about 
practicalities.    
                                                 
34  SOU 2005:43, p725.  
35  Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n11, p33.  
36  Ibid.  
37  Svea Appeal Court, Case No T4863-08, 20th February 2009.  Dagens Juridik, 27th February 2009.  
http://www.dagensjuridik.se/sv/Artiklar/Oenig-hovratt-faststaller-vaxelvis-boende/ 
38  Shared residence, residence with the mother, or with the father.   
39  Teubner, G (1993) Law as an Autopoietic System, London, Blackwell,, p35.   
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7.5 SHARED RESIDENCE AND THE PARAMOUNTCY 
PRINCIPLE 
 
The Parents Code expressly stipulates that the child’s welfare is to be the paramount 
question for any court or public body deciding a question of where the child is to 
live.40  The observation is also made that family courts have developed their own 
narrow and rigid interpretation of what is good and bad for children: the need for 
close relationships with both parents is balanced against risks of harm. The majority 
of shared residence orders are made with both parents’ consent, and research shows 
that courts and social welfare boards in such cases are content to assume that the 
parents’ themselves know what is best for their child, although more recent research 
has cast doubt on that assumption.41   The extension of joint custody to parents who 
object has, however, meant that courts are increasingly called upon to decide 
whether shared or sole residence is best for a child.42   As is the case generally, 
district court judges, who have no specialist expertise, rely heavily on external 
evidence, particular social welfare investigator reports.43    
 
7.5.1 Child Welfare Science – A Cautious Approach 
 
Shared residence is a comparatively new phenomenon also in Sweden, and in the 
1990’s there was public and parliamentary debate around allegations that parents 
were using shared residence selfishly in ways which harmed children.  Since 
communications within the first order subsystem are often also simultaneously 
“involved in a variety of different systems” such as politics and law,44 the 
government responded in 2001 by asking the department responsible for health and 
social services (including court welfare officers), the NBHW, to prepare a report on 
shared residence to guide legal developments.  The aim of the NBHW report, 
produced as an overview of knowledge, was to help improve practice for courts and 
                                                 
40  FB6§2a. 
41  Rejmer, A (2003) Vårdnadstvister: En Rättssociologisk Studie av Tingsrätts Funktion vid Handläggning av 
Vårdnadskonflikter med Utgångspunkt från Barnets Bästa, Lund, Sweden, Lund Studies in the Sociology of 
Law, p100, p147 ; Ryrstedt (2009b) op cit n17, pp822-823.  
42  SOU 2005:43, p761. 
43  Carlsson, B & Rejmer, A (1998) "The Swedish Way of Dealing with Custody Disputes: Juridification and 
Professionalisation of the Private and Social Spheres" in Carlsson, B (Ed) Social Steerage and Communicative 
Action: Essays in Sociology, Lund Studies in Sociology of Law, 104-142, p112.  
44  Teubner (1993) op cit n39, pp61-62.   
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social services involved in post-separation disputes.45   The report concluded:  
“Shared residence is neither good nor bad; it becomes what the parents make it.  
There are no ideal solutions”.46  Similar observations were made by the 2005 
commission of inquiry appointed to review practice in relation to custody, contact 
and residence.47  These types of enquiries and overviews of expert knowledge have a 
significant influence both on Swedish law reform and practice.48  Although these 
documents were written using child welfare science discourse, they were composed 
with a legal audience in mind and have been readily received by family law, 
particularly when compared to English law’s recent reluctance to engage with new 
child welfare science findings.   
 
The NBHW report is referred to extensively in SWI’s reports and as judges, too, 
have become aware of its findings it has played a significant part in shaping practice.  
Although the reports’ authors neither endorsed nor dismissed shared residence, they 
did identify a number of factors, which they felt would have a significant bearing on 
whether or not shared residence could be presumed to be in children’s best interests.  
These have been repeated in government documents and court judgments.49 The 
NBHW report commented that many of the children interviewed for this report had 
found shared residence to be a very demanding arrangement.  The authors, 
therefore, stressed the importance of consulting children.  Furthermore, children’s 
need for stability and a good range of relationships with both adults and other 
children was cited to support the recommendation against shared residence where 
there are substantial geographical distances which not only cause practical 
inconvenience but also make it difficult for children to maintain friendships.50  The 
report’s authors also stressed that parents must be able to contain their own conflicts 
and keep them away from their children.51  This reasoning was echoed by the 2005 
commission of inquiry; parental disputes were found to be likely to “colour, or even 
poison, the shared residence arrangement for the child”.52  In both documents, the 
                                                 
45 Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n11,  p3.  
46 Ibid, p42-44. 
47  SOU 2005:43, p158.  
48  Lundqvist, Å (2008) ”Familjens Kris: Fem Decennier av Svensk Familjepolitik”, Tidning för Genusvetenskap, 
79-93, p80.  
49  SOU2005:43, p507; RH2005:38.   
50 Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n11, pp41-43. 
51  Ibid, p8.   
52  SOU 2005:43, p160.  
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harm was identified as lying not only in the exposure to conflict, but also in the 
inflexibility of arrangements.  As noted, Swedish family law insists on scheduled 
arrangements that are precise enough to be enforceable.53  This may reduce parental 
interaction in conflicted cases, but also allows for obdurate insistence on adherence 
to rigid schedules. Indeed, both the NBHW Report and the 2005 commission’s report 
emphasised that since a child’s needs must, under statute, be paramount, and those 
needs change as children develop, shared residence arrangements must be child-
focused and flexible.54  Consequently, parents must be able to negotiate and make 
concessions without one party exerting undue pressure on the other.55   The report 
listed allegations of violence, abuse or parental unsuitability due, inter alia, to 
addiction as contra indicators in shared residence cases.56   In its conclusions, the 
report also warned that parents should not be allowed to use shared residence as a 
means of achieving justice inter pares.57  When compared to the list of relevant 
circumstances prepared by counsel in Re C [2006], the NBHW and 2005 
commission’s reports’ lists of important factors are more demanding, more 
compatible with current empirical evidence, and more likely to ensure that shared 
residence actually benefits children.   
 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which these guidelines are adhered to in practice.  
Although the NBHW report was written with a legal audience in mind, ensuring a 
better fit with existing legal chains of communications, a subsystem’s closed nature 
makes change slow.58 Moreover, Swedish family court statistics are generally 
considered to be poor, and shared residence is a topic which has received 
comparatively little academic attention.59   Nevertheless, it appears that, in the main, 
this advice is being followed.  Although there is no research specifically on shared 
residence, there are a number of studies on custody, contact and cooperation talks, 
which have shown that children are rarely given a chance to express their opinions.60  
Thus, it is unlikely that the report’s recommendation regarding the consultation of 
                                                 
53  Proposition 1997/98:7, p113.  
54  Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n11, p9; SOU 2005:43, p160.  
55 Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n11, p41. 
56 Ibid, pp41-43. 
57  Ibid, p43.  
58  Teubner (1993) op cit n39, p35.   
59  Pihl & Thunander (2003) op cit n19, p169.  
60  Ekbom, I & Landberg Å (2007) Innerst Inne var man Rädd, Stockholm, Rädda Barnen & Socialstyrelsen; 
Ryrstedt, (2009b) op cit n17.  
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children is being followed.  On the other hand, courts’ general reluctance to upset 
the status quo means that the judiciary are slow to order shared residence against one 
party’s wishes in cases where the children have previously been living permanently 
with that parent.61   Only one of the 31 interviewees in a 2002 study was 
implementing court-imposed shared residence.62 In RH1999:85 the father had applied 
to the district court for 50/50 shared residence, but his appeal was dismissed, and the 
order for extended staying contact upheld instead. The Appeal Court agreed with 
the expert’s opinion that the children, who were already experiencing stress from 
exposure to the parents’ fighting, needed a permanent base.   This reasoning has 
been followed inter alia in RH2005:38 and in an unreported Svea Appeal Court case 
from October 2008.63   
 
In practice, the requirement of an almost equal split, including weekdays in term-
time, has led to an insistence on geographical proximity.64  This is to be welcomed 
since it avoids one of the dangers which have been discussed in England in relation 
to shared residence; the removal of an insistence on a substantial element of practical 
caring for the child as an essential part of the parenting role.   However, as is 
mentioned in the section on permanent, patriarchal parenthood, the Svea Appeal 
Court, in February 2009, made an order for the continuation of weekly change-overs 
despite the fact that the two parents lived 70 kilometres apart, and the children had a 
long commute in the weeks they spent with their mother.65  In the short judgment, 
the children’s need for good and close contact with both parents, stated in abstract 
terms, was held to outweigh the specific “disadvantages” in relation to the time-
consuming travel.66  Three of the members of the court dissented, citing a 2005 
White Paper on the need for geographical proximity and preferring the district 
court’s view that one parent ought to be given sole residence.   The children’s need 
for continuity, security and “respect for their personal integrity” were said to be 
more important than the need for close contact with both parents.  It is submitted 
that this view is to be preferred; it sees the two children as individuals rather than 
                                                 
61  SOU 2005:43, p760; Ryrstedt, E (2003) “Kravet På Konsensus – Till Barnets Bästa?” 88(3) Sveriges Jurist 
Tidning, 340-344, p341; Eriksson, M (2003) I Skuggan av Pappa, Stehag, Sweden, Förlags AB Gondolin, p22. 
62  Riksförsäkringsverket (2003b) op cit n11,  p56. 
63  Svea Appeal Court, Case No T483-08, 28th October 2008.  
64  Proposition 2005/06:99, pp52-53; SOU 2005:43, p45.  
65  Svea Appeal Court, Case No T4863-08, 20th February 2009.  
66  Ibid, p4.  
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objects to be shared between the two adults.   This way of speaking about children as 
rights-holding agents can, as noted in the previous chapter, be found in Swedish 
political discourse.  State intervention is consequently justified where parents abuse 
their responsibilities by treating children as chattels.  However, empirical research 
has found that this construction of the child is not prevalent in legal discourse. The 
child is usually constructed as a vulnerable family member rather than an 
independent individual with agency.  It is encouraging to see the child portrayed this 
way in a case report (albeit by the minority), particularly since the available research 
shows that it is crucial that older children are consulted prior to any implementation 
of shared residence.  As noted, this case is the latest available reported case on shared 
residence.  It may turn out to have set a worrying trend in its insistence that the 
abstract benefits of equal time with both parents outweighed the travelling, a very 
concrete cause of stress.  As mentioned, it is an unusual case and, thus, less likely to 
be followed. The outcome was the result of a three-way split in the appeal court;67 it 
may also be that the majority were hoping that this order would make the mother 
move from Stockholm back to Uppsala, where the children’s school was and where 
she was still working.    
 
In the sample examined by the 2005 commission of inquiry, three-quarters of all 
contested applications for shared residence were dismissed, with district courts 
citing children’s objections and children’s need for continuity and stability as well as 
parents’ communication problems.68  The commission’s report concluded that the 
judiciary have adopted a cautious approach to contested shared residence 
applications, and was positive about this.69  However, a comparison of 1999 and 2002 
case samples carried out for the NBHW indicated that judges are increasingly 
comfortable with making shared residence orders against one parent’s objections.  In 
1999, shared residence orders were made in 3% of all custody cases that went to a full 
hearing, and against one parent’s wishes in only 1% of cases.  In the 2002 sample, 
shared residence orders were made in 7% of cases; a marked increase.70  It may be 
that district court judges are becoming more familiar with the shared residence order 
                                                 
67  Shared residence, residence with the mother, or with the father.   
68  SOU 2005:43, pp158-159.  
69  Ibid, p159.  
70  Riksförsäkringsverket (2003b) op cit n11, p9.  
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and thus more willing to make it in contested cases.  If this is the case, the linking of 
judicial communications into the subsystem’s chain of communications could 
entrench this understanding and lead to further orders against one parent’s wishes.   
 
Current practice has not been without its critics; the increased use of shared 
residence since the 1998 reforms has led to public and political debate.71  Calls have 
been made for a legislative amendment that would prevent courts from ordering 
shared residence where parents have failed to agree on either custody or residence, 
since this is a strong indication that the necessary enthusiasm and flexibility are 
likely to be lacking.72  Swedish academics have also drawn attention to a Norwegian 
commission of inquiry which concluded that forcing shared residence on reluctant 
parents exposed children to harmful conflict.73  It is submitted that these are all 
sound arguments; the research set out in the second chapter demonstrates that 
voluntary arrangements are more likely to last, and to be appreciated by children.    
The government has, however, rejected these suggestions on the grounds that each 
case must be judged on its own merits and that any restriction of the courts’ options 
would be undesirable.74  Although this statement is correct in principle, since the 
paramountcy principle is enshrined in the statute, the previous chapter showed that 
Swedish family law, too, has reverted to its preferred way of processing disputes: 
through the autopoietic processes of re-entry and redundancy generalisations are 
made, complex details ignored, and presumptions heavily relied on, while adequate 
investigations into children’s views and circumstances are usually lacking.  These 
observations were also made by the consultees who responded to the 2005 
commission of inquiry, but the Justice Department did not explicitly address any of 
them in its response.  Law, as a closed subsystem, is unaware that its own 
interpretations of the outside world are simplified and selective.  This, per se, is a 
very strong argument against any presumption in disputes involving children.   Yet, 
                                                 
71  See e.g. 2008 Private Member’s Bill submitted by Liberal Party MP: Motion 2008/09:So394 Barns bästa vid 
växelvis boende.   
72  Proposition 2005/06:99, pp48-49; Juridiska fakultetsnämnden (2005) Yttrande angående 
Justitiedepartementets Remiss: Vårdnad, boende, umgänge – Barnets bästa, föräldrars ansvar (SOU 
2005:43), Diarienummer SU 302-1311-05, dated 18th July 2005, accessed online. 
http://www.juridicum.su.se/jurweb/dokument/remisser/Barnets.pdf 
73  NOU 1998:17 p80, pp125-126.   
74  Proposition 2005/06:99, p53.  
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as in England, there is some evidence Swedish shared residence law is moving in 
this direction.  
 
7.5.2 Towards a Presumption?  
 
The NBHW study which concluded against a shared residence presumption also 
warned that joint legal custody should not lead to an assumption that the child ought 
to share its time equally between both parents.75  Nevertheless, there is evidence to 
suggest that the law is developing in this way.  Swedish family law, as a closed 
subsystem, creates the impression of order by treating very different cases as alike 
through the use of “rather blunt criteria”.76    Shared residence is said to be most like 
an intact family, thus minimising change and offering children maximum support.77 
In NJA1999 s.457 the Supreme Court observed: “Children can gain a lot from a more 
practically involved and participating father”.78  It is interesting to note that 
Swedish family law’s semantic artefact of father is defined in terms of practical 
involvement, probably because of interference from other subsystems, notably 
politics.  In contrast, in the English case Re F [2003], Bonvin J defined the father’s 
contribution in terms of moral guidance and the setting of a good example.  It seems 
that in England it is sufficient to care about, rather than for, the child.79  The 
Swedish construction appears to have a better balance of caring for and caring about.   
However, this quote (phrased in the language of abstract generalisation so typical to 
law) has been used by a men’s organisation to argue that shared residence should be 
the general rule and an entitlement for all fathers who have not been found to be 
unfit.80  Law’s binary classification of good and bad fathers sees the latter category as 
a small minority, so that most fathers are seen as good for their children.  
 
In RÅ2004:138 the father, who had obtained an interim order for joint custody and 
five nights’ staying contact per fortnight (36% of the child’s time), applied to have 
his child support repayment obligation terminated on the grounds that he was now 
                                                 
75 Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n11, p10, pp42-44.  
76  Singer, A (2007) ”Samarbetsförmåga och Gemensam Vårdnad” 0708(1) Juridisk Tidskrift, 148-155, p155; 
Rejmer (2003) op cit n41, p188.  
77  SOU 2005:43, p45; Socialstyrelsen (2003b) op cit n3, p41; Ds1999:30, p20 
78  NJA1999 s.457, p460.  
79  Re F [2003] EWCA Civ 592 per Bonvin J as quoted by Thorpe LJ at [13]. 
80  Mansjouren Website: http://www.mansjouren.nu/Domar, accessed online 20th September 2005.  
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sharing residence.  Although his initial application was refused, his appeal was 
successful, with the Jönköping Administrative Appeal Court (AAC), applying the 
Supreme Court’s definition of shared residence.81  More controversially, the AAC 
also held that where custody is joint, “the intention is that the parents should help 
each other raise and care for the child”, and that joint custody should consequently 
be taken as an indication towards shared rather than sole residence.82   This new rule 
of thumb is problematic, since it ignores the fact that joint custody has now become 
so prevalent that it is held by many parents who find it difficult to communicate, let 
alone to help each other.  It can be seen as another example of the law being more 
concerned with normative expectations than reality; with how things ought to be 
rather than how things are.  The Supreme Administrative Court did not explicitly 
contradict these remarks, although it should be noted that it disagreed with the AAC 
on the finding of fact.  As has been mentioned, there is relatively little case law in 
Sweden; it is a smaller jurisdiction with fewer cases, and a civil system which places 
less emphasis on the application and analysis of case law.  However, it is worth 
noting that the statements made by the AAC in RÅ2004:138 have yet to be repeated 
in other cases.   
 
A men’s organisation has heralded this case as an important victory, not surprisingly 
preferring to employ child welfare rhetoric rather than discuss the financial 
implications: “[t]his judgment should not be seen as a father being let off his 
responsibility to pay child support, but as a victory for the child who has a right to 
be looked after by her daddy”.83  It is difficult to agree, since other material on the 
webpage suggests a pre-occupation with equal status and financial equality rather 
than with the child’s best interests.  Nevertheless, this language fits well with 
dominant child welfare discourse’s preoccupation with the father-child link; there is 
still a risk that its simplistic linkage of shared residence, joint custody and good 
father-child relationships could be taken up into legal discourse and become widely 
accepted through repetition within law’s circular chains of communications.  
Widlund examined the Svea Appeal Court’s 29 residence decisions from 2002 in 
                                                 
81  NJA1998 s.267.  
82  Jönköping Administrative Appeal Court, Case No 1201-2002 
83  Letter from the father in RÅ2004:138 quoted at Mansjouren Website: http://www.mansjouren.nu/Domar, 
accessed 20th September 2005.   
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order to test Rejmer’s assertion that law uses its own narrow, autopoietic 
understanding of child welfare.84   She found that SWI’s adapted their reports to fit 
law’s expectations, so that recommendations were based less on current knowledge 
from behavioural sciences and more on abstract legal presumptions.85  The law did 
not see the individual child, but merely its own version of a generalised child, its 
semantic artefact.  Law is likely to be content to assume that if shared residence is 
generally good for children, then it will be good for any particular child, particularly 
since several empirical studies have warned of a lack of child-focus in SWI reports.86   
Social Welfare Boards’ responses to the 2005 commission argued that many parents 
now equate joint custody with equal division of children’s time and complained that 
the legislation is “lagging behind” practice.87  It was argued in the previous chapter 
that law ignores the gap between gender-neutral law reform and reality; if law 
thinks families are now based on equal sharing then the status quo principle will, if 
anything, point in favour of shared residence.  
 
Alternating residence on a weekly basis has become the most widespread or even 
default shared residence arrangement and the criticism has been made that it is 
recommended by social workers and courts, with no consideration as to individual 
children’s needs.88   As is currently the case with joint legal custody, this shared 
residence standard model could come to be exported to larger numbers who differ 
markedly from the model’s paradigm cooperative parents.   In the third chapter, it 
was concluded that children’s experiences of shared residence appear to depend 
greatly on their own personalities, experiences and resources, and that shared 
residence is a demanding arrangement, which should not be imposed without regard 
for the individual child’s views.  It is, indeed, a little worrying that 80% of children 
who share residence move every week; these frequent transitions may place too great 
a strain on many.  If family lawyers, judges and SWI’s view this as the norm, and 
recommend it on that basis, recent research by Ryrstedt suggests that parents caught 
                                                 
84  Widlund (2003) op cit n30, p3; Rejmer (2003) op cit n41, p134.  
85  Widlund (2003) op cit n30, p26.  
86  Rejmer (2003) op cit n41, p146; Åkerman, I & Fagerlind, S (1998) Familjerätt i Besparingstider, Socialstyrelsen, 
Stockholm, p5; Eriksson, M (2004) “Socialsekreterares Syn på Mäns Våld i Vårdnadsärenden”, 2 
Kvinnotryck, http://roks.se/kvinnotryck/2004/kt2_04_rep_maria_eriksson.html.  
87  SOU 2005:43, p735.  
88  Nordström Å (2004) ”Växelvis boende ökar”. 2004(3) Välfärd: SCB:s Tidning om Arbetsliv, Demografi och 
Välfärd, 4–5, p4; Jonsson, M, “Varannan Vecka Stressar Barnen”, Expressen, 19th January 2006. 
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up in distressing separations will be unable to fully consider whether this 
arrangement is, in fact, the best for their child.89  This suggests that a shared 
residence presumption should not be introduced; parents should not be encouraged 
to choose this arrangement without having first considered how it will actually 
affect their children.  
 
In current Swedish district court practice, the benefit afforded by natural everyday 
contact must, however, be balanced against the risks of harm, either through the 
inconvenience and disruption or through exposure to the parents’ conflict.90  The 
NBHW report advised against shared residence in cases where one parent has been 
violent or abusive.91  Current NBHW guidance to social workers (who inter alia 
write SWI reports, hold cooperation talks and scrutinise parental agreements) 
cautions that shared residence may exacerbate the harmful effects of domestic 
violence or parental disagreements because of the high level of co-operation 
required.92  This is sound advice.  However, as observed in the previous chapter, 
district courts have created their own legal understanding of severe conflict, which 
has become entrenched into legal discourse.  The tendency to ignore or trivialise 
violence has been empirically documented in relation to both custody and contact.93  
In law’s binary coding, conflicts are either severe or not severe enough, and if they 
fall in the latter category they can be ignored.   
 
There is evidence that suggests the same re-conceptualisation process takes place in 
relation to shared residence applications.  The Appeal Court in RH1999:85, for 
example, discounted the mother’s argument that the parents’ conflict was too severe 
for shared residence to be appropriate, although it eventually declined to make the 
order for other reasons. In one district court case examined by Widlund, the mother 
and SWI objected to the father’s application to continue shared residence on the 
grounds that the arrangement had left the child caught in the middle of the parents’ 
                                                 
89  Ryrstedt (2009b) op cit n17, p831.   
90  RH1999:85.  
91  Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n11, p41.  
92  Socialstyrelsen (2003b) op cit n3, pp40-41.  
93  Barnombudsmannen (2005) När Tryggheten står på Spel: Barnombudsmannen Rapporterar BR2005:02, 
Stockholm Barnombudsmannen, p36, p44, p50; Eriksson (2004) op cit n86; Gumbel, I (2003) “Språket i 
Vårdnadsutredningen påverkar Domen”, 3 Kvinnotryck, http://www.roks.se/kvinnotryck/kt3_03_rep.html; 
Åkerman & Fagerlind (1998) op cit n83, p5.  
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dispute.  The district court did not feel these arguments weighed heavily enough to 
deny the father’s application, but changed the schedule from weekly to fortnightly 
hand-overs in order to reduce parental interaction.94  Shared residence was said to 
have been working well.  This is another example of how law asserts its epistemic 
authority by choosing to reject external information, or refusing to adjust its 
normative expectations in response; law’s evaluation of the situation determines the 
outcome.   Similarly, the Northern Norrland Appeal Court dismissed a mother’s 
objections to shared residence by stating that the conflict was not as severe as she 
asserted, since contact had been successfully implemented.95  A mother’s appeal 
against shared residence on the ground of the order’s disruptive effects on her son 
was dismissed by the Svea Appeal Court, which merely repeated the district court’s 
generalised assertion that the boy needed close contact with both parents.96   A 
parallel can be drawn with a contested contact case, NJA2003 s.372, where the 
Supreme Court began by acknowledging the fears expressed by the child welfare 
experts, which were based on the girl’s specific situation; but then appeared to ignore 
these as contact was ordered on the basis of generalised statements.97   The lack of 
references, in this part of the judgment, to the individual characteristics of this 
father and child, provided a clear illustration of how law recreates litigants and 
children as stereotypical semantic artefacts.  
 
Although the 2005 commission of inquiry found that judges were generally cautious 
in their approach to shared residence, they also found that where the order was made 
against a parent’s wishes, this was justified both by abstract references to the need 
for good and close contact listed in FB6§2a, and by a finding that the parents’ 
conflicts were not as severe as the opposing parent had alleged.98 In the Children’s 
Ombudsman’s 2002 sample of contested cases involving domestic violence, shared 
residence was ordered against mothers’ wishes in four cases.99  In all four instances, 
it must be doubted that the necessary conditions for child-focused, flexible 
arrangements would be present.    
                                                 
94  Falun district court, 2003-11-27, T2607-02, pp3-5. 
95  Appeal Court for Northern Norrland, 1998-12-08, T87-98, cited in Widlund (2003) op cit n30, p27.  
96  Case T5912-02, cited in Widlund (2003) op cit n30, p24.  
97  Ryrstedt, E (2007) “Tvistlösning mellan Separarade Föräldrar – för Barnets Bästa”, 0708(4) Svensk 
JuristTidning, 389-414, p407; Schiratzki, J (2004) ”Högsta Domstolen Meddelar Dom om Umgänge med 
Barn – Kränks Europakonventionen?” 15(3) Juridisk Tidskrift, 642-652, p646.  
98  SOU 2005:43, p761. 
99  Barnombudsmannen (2005) op cit n93, p31.  
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In conclusion, there are some signs of a reinterpretation of the welfare test in 
contested shared residence cases, where the courts will presume that shared 
residence will best meet children’s need for relationships with their fathers and 
accordingly minimise risks that weigh against it.  The next section explores how the 
post-liberal emphasis on collaborative parenting has influenced judicial attitudes to 
shared residence.   
 
7.6 SHARED RESIDENCE & REASONABLENESS  
 
The previous chapter observed that Swedish, like English family law, has come to 
place great emphasis on compromise, negotiation and out-of-court dispute 
resolution.100  There is a general perception of compromise solutions as more likely 
to be adhered to, and thus better for children.101  The law does not, however, give 
parents complete freedom to reach their own agreements.  Instead, law’s rigid 
understanding of good reasonable behaviour has become entrenched as its messages 
have circled the chains of legal communications; parents are placed under 
considerable pressure to reach the ‘right’ agreement; one which is compatible with 
the dominant paradigm of the binuclear family.102  Previous chapters have used 
autopoietic theory to question the effectiveness of law’s attempts to transmit its 
normative expectations and affect individuals’ behaviour, and, furthermore, to 
explain family law’s continued insistence that its advice must be followed and its 
standards must be met.   
 
In England, Hale et al suggested ten years ago that there could be a connection 
between the use of shared residence orders and the non-intervention principle; the 
imperative of moving on from a present impasse may override investigation into the 
viability of future arrangements.103  Similar observations have been made in Sweden.  
The 2005 commission of inquiry noted that shared residence can seem to provide an 
instant ‘everybody wins’ solution: it is presumed to benefit children; offers an 
                                                 
100  Åkerman, I (1998) ”Förändrad Lagstiftning” in Rädda Barnen (Ed) Barnets Rätt till Båda Föräldrarna, 
Stockholm, Rädda Barnen, 23-25, p23.  
101  SOU 2005:43, p226.  
102  Björnberg, U (2001) “Cohabitation and Marriage in Sweden – Does Family Form Matter?” 15(3) IJLPF, 350-
362, p354; Kurki-Suoni (1995) op cit n25, p191. 
103  Hale, B, Pearl, D, Cooke, E & Bates, P (2002) The Family, Law and Society, London, Butterworths, p597.  See 
also Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond LBC [2009] UKHL 7, per Baroness Hale at paras 31-33.   
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ostensibly fair compromise for parents; and district courts avoid the full hearing.104    
Shared residence can, thus, be used as a way of suppressing or postponing rather 
than resolving disputes, often in circumstances where it must be presumed not to be 
in children’s best interests.  The 2005 commission, for example, found cases where 
shared residence had been agreed despite distances of more than 1000 kilometres, 
with handovers taking place at motorway service stations.105  The commission’s 
report warned that compromise had, in some district courts, become not the means 
to an end but a goal in itself.106   Yet, it is a goal that appears to be slipping ever 
further away.  Parents, as individual psychic autopoietic systems, have no direct 
access to legal communications, but reinterpret and modify these on the basis of 
what they already know, the problems they are already struggling with, and what 
they believe to be the best for their children.  This often leads to a belief that their 
own case is an exception to the general rule that parents should not fight.107  As in 
England, changes to the framework of formal orders appear to have little or no affect 
on litigation; there are indications that the greater use of joint custody may only 
have transferred, rather than resolved, conflicts.  Where parents can no longer 
disagree over custody, due to the strong joint custody presumption, they elect 
instead to fight over residence.108  Statistics show that the courts’ caseload on 
custody, residence and contact increased by 35% between 2004 and 2007.109   Within 
this context it is clear that shared residence can become another way to promote 
compromise; a way out of an impasse.   
 
7.6.1 A Framework for Co-Operation?  
 
In the English leading case on shared residence, D v D [2001], the shared residence 
order was made partly to “lessen the parents’ animosity” and the order has 
subsequently come to be seen as a useful way of improving co-parenting.110   In 
Sweden, the role of providing a framework for parental cooperation which will 
remove the need for further recourse to the courts is ascribed primarily to the joint 
                                                 
104  SOU 2005:43, p735, p163.  
105  Ibid, p735.  
106  Ibid, p259.  
107  Rejmer (2003) op cit n41, p43.  
108  Schiratzki (2006) op cit n19, p111. 
109  Domstolsverket (2007) Domstolsstatistik 2007, Jönköping, Domstolsverket. 
http://www.domstol.se/templates/DV_InfoPage____868.aspx 
110 Douglas, G (2001) “D v D (Shared Residence Order)” Family Law 183-184, p184; Butterworths Family Law 
Service (Version 6), London, LexisNexis UK, §1707. 
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custody order (which has not undergone the devaluing process criticised in the case 
of the Parental Responsibility order).  In relation to shared residence, several 
influential, large academic and government studies have confirmed the NBHW 
study’s description of good parental cooperation as an essential prerequisite for 
shared residence rather than as a possible consequence.111   It seems that some parents 
are persuaded into sharing residence even though they do not have a particularly 
good post-separation relationship. A small qualitative study carried out for the 
NBHW report found that parents who had been persuaded to try shared residence 
during co-operation talks did not generally feel the arrangement had worked well for 
them; in fact, half of this group had abandoned the order within its first year.112  A 
Green Party member’s Parliamentary Bill succinctly observed that while the 
arrangement does last: “There is … a very real risk that the children end up living 
with a balance of terror: cold war rather than peace.113  It is clear that in such 
circumstances the sharing of residence can neither help parents learn to cooperate 
nor benefit children; this is another weighty reason against greater use of court-
ordered residence.   
 
As noted in relation to both English and Swedish law, warnings from child welfare 
science and other discourses on the potentially harmful nature of coerced or court-
imposed arrangements for children have been imperfectly translated into law, as law 
has created its own internal narrow understanding of conflict, and often does not 
enquire sufficiently into the actual levels of parental cooperation in individual 
cases.114     Case T307-01 from the Göta Appeal Court provides an illustration.  The 
Appeal Court overturned the district court’s finding that the parents’ conflict was 
too severe for shared residence.  It observed that the core of the dispute was 
financial, and that this should not cause problems, since both parents have a duty to 
contribute to the child’s upkeep, regardless of living arrangements.115  The bare 
assertion that these parents ought not to quarrel was not rooted in the real 
                                                 
111 SOU2007:52, p99; Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n11, p41;  SOU 2005:43, p157; Riksförsäkringsverket (2003b) 
op cit n11,  p9, p57. 
112 Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n11, p8.  
113  Ångström (Green Party), Motion till Riksdagen 2002/03:mp833, accessed online,  
http://www.mp.se/files/39200-39299/file_39293.pdf 
114  NJA1999 s.451; Schiratzki  (2006) op cit n19, p109; Rejmer (2003) op cit n41, p153; Wickström (2001) op cit n32, 
p666. 
115  Göta Appeal Court, Case T307-01 of 14th March 2002, accessed online. 
http://www.nj.se/NJAB/Nyhets/dokdb.nsf/byadjmalnummer/GHRT307_01/$file/GHRT307_01.pdf?Op
enElement 
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circumstances of the case and their impact on the child.   The autopoietic legal 
subsystem sees the families who appear before it as mere semantic artefacts, and is 
unaware that it has restricted its own vision so that it cannot see the reasons why 
this particular family may not fit its normative pattern.116  The section on shared 
residence and the welfare test noted that the Administrative Appeal Court in 
RÅ2004:138 saw joint custody as a legislative statement of intent that parents should 
work together in raising the child; the court held that joint custody should 
consequently be taken as an indicator towards shared, rather than sole, residence.117   
An alternative starting point could have been that the parents’ extensive 
involvement in two law suits indicated that they were actually not cooperating; 
indeed, the father’s interim joint custody order was later terminated for that 
reason.118   The AAC’s stance is, however, consistent with law’s tendency to focus on 
how law thinks things ought to be rather than on how things actually are.   Since the 
legal subsystem’s self-image is founded on its position as neutraliser of conflicts and 
source of authority it cannot depart from its insistence that parents must cooperate.  
Instead, it searches for further methods to achieve its desired result.  Indeed, in the 
case discussed immediately above, Case T307-01 from the Göta Appeal Court, the 
Court not only made the shared residence order against the mother’s wishes but also 
observed that shared residence would force the parents to learn to cooperate in order 
to make their everyday lives workable.119  The similarity with the English Court of 
Appeal’s reasoning in D v D [2001] is both striking and alarming.120   Law, 
prioritising its normative expectations, reverses the causal relationship between 
good cooperation and shared residence, setting a very dangerous precedent.  Case 
T307-01 may fortunately be another anomaly; in other reported cases judges have 
insisted on the appropriate causal relationship between cooperation and shared 
residence.   
 
                                                 
116  Rejmer (2003) op cit n41, p135.  
117  Jönköping Administrative Appeal Court, Case No 1201-2002.  Although the Supreme Administrative Court 
disagreed with the AAC on the finding of fact, it did not discuss the AAC’s linkage of joint custody and 
shared residence. 
118  Mansjouren Website: http://www.mansjouren.nu/Domar/.  Sole custody was granted to the mother by 
the district court.  The change of custody status is not discussed in this way on the website, but merely 
admitted as an irrelevance, since custody was indisputably joint at the material time.   
119  Göta Appeal Court, Case T307-01 of 14th March 2002, accessed online. 
http://www.nj.se/NJAB/Nyhets/dokdb.nsf/byadjmalnummer/GHRT307_01/$file/GHRT307_01.pdf?Op
enElement 
120 D v D [2001] 1 FLR 495 at p496. 
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A 2005 White Paper stipulated that parents must be able to renegotiate arrangements 
with flexibility rather than insist on what is rather aptly referred to as “millimetre 
justice”.121   Furthermore, it was stipulated that since shared residence places 
particular burdens on the adults, parents’ post-separation relationships must be 
“particularly good”.122  This communication, within a document that can be seen as a 
structural coupling of politics and law, is founded on an understanding of parenting 
(and fathering in particular) as involving a considerable level of practical 
involvement and frequent communication over the minutiae of caring for a child. It 
leads to a more realistic use of shared residence within the legal system.  The phrase 
“particularly good” has often been repeated in judgments, and appears to have 
resulted in a new semantic artefact, the particularly good interparental cooperation 
necessary before a shared residence order can be made.123  The Övre Norrland Appeal 
Court in Case T146-00, for instance, dismissed the father’s shared residence 
application on the grounds that this arrangement requires frequent face-to-face 
contact; something these parents had in the recent past been unable to manage 
without the conversations descending into confrontations or even physical fights.124    
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that shared residence orders can only be made where 
the parents both have custody.125   Thus, the recent re-evaluation of joint custody 
explained in the previous chapter has also served to restrict the availability of the 
shared residence order; fathers who are inflexible, obstinate or controlling are denied 
both custody and residence even where law’s emphasis on the promotion of father-
child links leads to a very generous contact order.  In another unreported 2008 case, 
the Svea Appeal court made an order for contact, rather than for shared residence, 
despite the fact that the daughter was likely to spend 40% of her time with her 
father.126  This was because the court had also made an order for sole legal custody in 
the mother’s favour, on the grounds that the parties’ conflict was so longstanding 
and severe that there was no realistic prospect of co-parenting; it was not envisaged 
                                                 
121  Proposition 2005/06:99, p53.  
122  Proposition 2005/06:99, p53.  
123  Svea Appeal Court, Case No T483-08, 28th October 2008; RH2005:38.  
124  The Court instead extended the father’s fortnightly contact from two to four days. Hovrätten för Övre 
Norrland, Case No T146-00 of 1st June 2001.    
125  Proposition 2005/06:99, p53.  
126  Svea Appeal Court, Case No T483-08, 28th October 2008.  
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that the parents would be able to communicate other than through text messages.127  
This case can be seen as an example of what Ryrstedt has praised as the new, 
pragmatic approach: formal orders can no longer be used to teach parents to 
cooperate.128   This appears to be a lesson that has been learnt through the over-
optimistic extension of joint custody, which was implemented in 1998 but revised in 
2006 in response to the media attention generated by the very real problems it had 
created, inter alia, where abusive fathers used custody to veto their children’s 
treatment (a good example of the interference that results when several autopoietic 
subsystems share the same basic units of communications to create meaning and 
“make order” from the “noise” of external turbulence).129   
. 
 
This more cautious approach to joint custody resulted in an award of sole custody in 
RH2005:38, and this, in turn, meant a shared residence order could not be made.  
What is noteworthy about this case, however, is that the appeal court also refused to 
make a consent order to approve the parents’ compromise on contact.  The levels of 
contact were so high that this was de facto shared residence, with handovers taking 
place at school to avoid confrontations.  Although the mother had agreed, the appeal 
court held that the required particularly high levels of cooperation and mutual trust 
were lacking; the order would not be in the three children’s best interests.  Contact 
was instead limited to one long weekend per fortnight.  This father was seen by the 
legal subsystem through the semantic artefact of an unreasonable, bad father, and 
the welfare principle appears to have been prioritised over non-intervention.  
Implicit in the judgment is that the children would benefit not only through 
lessened exposure to conflict, but also by having a primary carer who could focus on 
meeting their needs without harassment from her controlling former husband.  It is 
submitted that this is a better approach to take in high conflict cases.  It is, of course, 
far from perfect: the law is still recreating the family members as semantic artefacts 
and assumptions are made about what the children need.  Furthermore, it appears 
from the judgment that this father was from a different ethnic background, 
something which might have contributed to the court stereotyping him as 
                                                 
127  Ibid, p5.  
128  Ryrstedt (2009b) op cit n17, p822.   
129  Teubner (1993) op cit n39, pp61-62, p103.   
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unreasonable.  This approach is still, however, to be preferred to an unquestioning 
belief that shared residence can be used to teach this type of parent to become more 
cooperative and reasonable.  In the fourth and sixth chapters, autopoietic theory was 
used to describe how parents reject or reinterpret legal communications so that 
changes in behaviour are unlikely to result, and how the legal subsystem’s 
combination of cognitive openness and normative closure leaves it unaware of this.  
This theoretical perspective, therefore, leads to the conclusion that the shared 
residence order should not be used in this way.   
 
7.6.2 The Gendered Dimension  
 
Shared residence is more common in Sweden than in England, despite a relatively 
strict definition of the arrangement.  This can be praised as a genuine increase in 
involvement on the part of fathers.  Indeed, it was contended in the previous chapter 
that although the situation is far from perfect, men and women in Sweden are more 
equal than in many other countries.  For many, who willingly choose it, shared 
residence is a welcome sharing of domestic duties, particularly since all Swedish 
women are now expected to combine motherhood with employment. A small study 
by Carlsson and Öhrn showed that shared residence mothers, in particular, 
described it as empowering to have more time available to pursue their own 
interests.130   
 
However, complaints have also been voiced that shared residence orders obfuscate 
and exacerbate existing gendered inequities.  It has already been noted that the 
Parents Code and associated rules are gender neutral. Law’s focus on the abstract and 
the desirable renders it blind to the particular and the real and allows it to treat 
gendered imbalances as irrelevant.131   There is a widespread perception, particularly 
within legal discourse, that Sweden has now achieved gender equality.132  This serves 
to obfuscate the older patriarchal expectations that cast fathers as a stabilising 
influence over unruly youth and mothers as the primary “meeters” of children’s 
                                                 
130  Carlsson, L & Öhrn, M (2004) “Med tiden i fokus”, C-Uppsats, Luleå, Luleå Tekniska Universitet. 
http://epubl.ltu.se/1402-1773/2004/001/index-en.html 
131  Luhmann, N (1989) “Law as a Social System”, 83(1) Northwestern University Law Review, 136-150, p145.  
132  Eriksson, M & Hester, M (2001) “Violent Men as Good Enough Fathers?: A Look at England and Sweden” 
7(7) Violence Against Women, 779-798, p789.  
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needs.133  Although these constructions of parenthood are perceived to be outmoded 
and can no longer be expressed without the speaker being labelled unreasonable, they 
form the hidden basis of many legal communications, particularly as law is an 
inherently conservative autopoietic system.  Caring remains associated with the 
feminine, and thus undervalued and often invisible, while contemporary law’s 
preoccupation with maintaining the father-child bond renders it reluctant to 
discourage fathers.134  Studies on contact have found that legal professionals place 
lower expectations on fathers, in terms of their ability to care for the children, and 
there is no reason to suggest that the same does not also occur in shared residence 
cases, placing a disproportionate burden on mothers.   
 
In England, the construction of shared residence orders as pronouncements about 
decision-making and the privilege of having access to your child, rather than the 
responsibility of meeting children’s needs on a daily basis, has been criticised as 
patriarchal.  The same academic criticisms have been detailed in the previous 
chapter in relation to the Swedish joint custody order.135  Very similar arguments 
have also been made by shared residence mothers.  It is asserted that while mothers 
in shared residence arrangements are expected to put their children’s needs first at 
all times, fathers are praised for doing a small fraction of what the mother does.136  In 
order to fit their gendered stereotype, the semantic artefact of the good post-
separation mother, women must become more accommodating, “picking up the 
slack” where fathers fall short.137   This may not only involve arranging all medical 
appointments, liaising with schools or coordinating sports activities, but also often 
involves paying for everything the child needs.  While contemporary Swedish law 
seems more able to recognise the caring involved in parenting, it is also based on the 
assumption that parents with joint custody and/or shared residence are able to 
negotiate financial and practical issues on an informal basis.  This assumption, 
originally correct when these arrangements were voluntary, has not been adjusted 
                                                 
133  Lawler, S (1999) “Children Need but Mothers only Want: the Power of ‘Needs Talk in the Constitution of 
Childhood”, in Seymour, J & Bagguley, P (Eds) Relating Intimacies: Power and Resistance, Basingstoke, 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 64-88; Ryrstedt (2009b) op cit n17, p825.   
134  Eriksson & Hester (2001) op cit n132, p792.   
135  Rejmer (2003) op cit n41, p190.  
136  Brors, H (2003) “Kvinnan får Alltid Anpassa Sig”, 530 Offensiv, Rättvisepartiet Socialisternas Veckotidning, 
3rd January 2003 available at http://www.socialisterna.org/offensiv/arkiv/530/vardnadstvist.html 
accessed on 17th November 2009. 
137  Ibid; Bekkengen, L (1999) ”Män som ’pappor’ och kvinnor som ’föräldrar’” Kvinnovetenskaplig Tidskrift.  
 177 CHAPTER 7 
 
 
despite the increased availability of both joint custody and shared residence.138   Law, 
however, sees only its ideal family; it ignores that shared residence can be both 
sought and resisted for financial reasons and can also be a source of conflict and 
injustice where the financial burdens are not shared in an equitable way.139  The third 
chapter detailed how empirical studies have found that discrepancies between formal 
orders and practical arrangements tend to impact negatively, and disproportionately, 
on mothers and children.  Although Swedish single mothers may have fared well, 
from an international perspective, they are still an economically vulnerable group.  
They have been among those worst affected by economic downturns, have lower 
average incomes, and are almost twice as likely to be unemployed or depend on state 
benefits.140  It can therefore be surmised that where, as in Case T307-01 discussed 
above, the district court merely instructs parents that costs must be shared equally, 
gendered power inequalities and gendered expectations mean that mothers will bear 
a disproportionate burden.  Law’s rigid insistence on conciliatory and child-focused 
behaviour (understood as adherence to the new binuclear family norm) means that 
criticising these inequalities carries a serious risk of being labelled selfish with the 
consequent threats of losing custody and residence.141   
 
It is true that Swedish courts demand more from parents before an order imposing 
shared residence is made, and that recent reforms have been based on a more 
pragmatic view of parents’ abilities to learn cooperate.  There is, nevertheless, 
evidence that shared residence orders are being made with reference to law’s 
aspirations for the cooperative, and implicitly gendered, binuclear family rather than 
a real enquiry as to whether sharing residence will work for this family and benefit 
this particular child.  It is submitted that if this happens in Sweden, where the law 
takes a more balanced approach and the preconditions for shared parenting are better 
                                                 
138  Ds1999:30, p30.  
139  Mothers who have sole residence are unwilling to halve their child support by sharing residence, and some 
fathers apply for shared residence predominantly as a way of escaping their child support repayment 
obligations.  Socialdepartementet (2004b) Promemoria om Slopat Underhållsstöd vid Växelvis Boende, 
Stockholm, Regeringskansliet; Emtestam (2001b) op cit n26, pp29-30; Socialstyrelsen (2003b) op cit n3, p42.  
140  Jämställdhetsombudsmannen, Remissyttrande angående Promemoria om slopat underhållsstöd vid 
växelvis boende S2004/4656/SF, Ärendenr 525/2004, accessed online 
http://www.jamombud.se/dokument/yttrandeoverpro.asp; Gähler, M (2001) ”Bara en Mor – 
Ensamstående Mödrars Ekonomiska Livsvillkor i 1990-talets Sverige” in SOU2001:54, 15-99, p15; 
Wennberg, L (2001) “Ensamstående Mödrar – Försörjda av Män eller Rätt till Välfärd?” in Burman, M & 
Gunnarson Å (Eds) Familjeföreställningar, Uppsala, Sweden, Iustus Förlag, 231-249, p231.   
141  SOU 2005:43, p205.  
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(in terms, inter alia, of fathers’ acquisition of the requisite skills within intact 
families), then it will certainly happen in England, and to a far greater extent.  
Shared residence orders should not be made against one parent’s wishes.  
 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
 
Interference from a political subsystem affected by decades of welfare state reform 
has led to a legal system that constructs parenting in terms of caring for as well as 
caring about or decision-making.  Swedish courts are stricter in their insistence on a 
near equal division of the child’s time than their English counterparts.  This makes 
the question of who is to care for the child more visible, and is also likely to 
discourage fathers who seek the order purely for its symbolic benefits.   Shared 
residence is, nevertheless, more common than in England.  This could be because 
decades of interventionist policies have left Swedish fathers better prepared for a 
substantial sharing of the child’s care.  If so, the fact that these preconditions are 
lacking in this jurisdiction must caution against the increased use of shared 
residence.   
 
The NBHW report recommended a cautious approach to court-ordered shared 
residence and this appears to have significantly influenced district courts.  Shared 
residence is relatively rarely ordered where one parent objects, although there are 
signs that suggest a shared residence presumption may be developing.  The Parents 
Code’s paramountcy test has come to be interpreted in a very narrow way; in most 
cases the child’s need for contact with his or her father is often prioritised over 
trivialised risks of harm.  However, recent law reform has stressed the importance of 
adequately investigating allegations of violence, and this is likely to have made 
courts more reticent to order shared residence against the wishes of a mother who 
has established that the father has harassed or abused her.     
 
The Swedish family law subsystem is on a par with its English counterpart when it 
comes to the vigorous promotion of compromise and settlement; parents must be 
reasonable and able to prioritise the child’s need for the other parent above their own 
wishes.  In both jurisdictions, statistics and empirical studies confirm 
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autopoieticists’ assertion that so much is lost in translations across several systems’ 
boundaries that social regulation through law is only possible in “extremely indirect 
and rather uncertain ways”.142  Family law reforms have not decreased parental 
propensities to litigation.  Within this context shared residence becomes a very 
attractive compromise, and this can lead to a tendency to order it where it is hoped it 
will work without any real investigation, particularly since Swedish family law has 
been criticised for being marred by an unquestioning belief in abstract principles.  It 
is encouraging, however, that most recent appeal cases do not endorse this approach.    
Instead, there is a sensible insistence that parents must be able to cooperate before 
shared residence is imposed through a court order.  Unlike in England, shared 
residence has not been transmuted by family law in an attempt to solve the 
perceived problem of increasing fatherlessness.   
 
As in England, the demand for reasonable, conciliatory parenting is applied to both 
sexes, but is, nevertheless, gendered.  The imposition of the binuclear blueprint is 
justified by references to new, hands-on fathers, but family law has no interest in 
investigating whether this is actually what happens in binuclear families.  There is a 
curious contradiction in Swedish family law in that it is both ostensibly gender 
neutral, with an insistence on formal equality, and simultaneously highly gendered, 
as its normative expectations for mothers and fathers remain cast in a traditional 
mould.  As in England, “virtually any involvement by fathers with their children 
has increasingly come to be considered good-enough fathering”.143  In an intact 
family, mothers are expected to take primary responsibility for caring.  Yet, at the 
point of divorce, this comes to be perceived as an unfair advantage.144  Swedish 
mothers find it as difficult as their UK counterparts to use their unique experiences 
of caring for the child to argue against shared residence.  Since Britain is moving, 
albeit more slowly, towards a dual-earner model, it is submitted that if a shared 
residence presumption is introduced, primary carer mothers will face dual obstacles: 
the obfuscation of caring that results from the public/private dichotomy as well as 
law’s tendency to focus on its aspirations of gender neutrality and to assert its 
                                                 
142  Teubner (1993) op cit n39, p97.   
143  Eriksson & Hester (2001) op cit n132, p791.  
144  Eriksson (2003) op cit n61, p70; Feministiskt Initiativ (2006) Enastående och Makalösa Mammor, Stockholm, 
Feministiskt Initiativ, p13.  http://www.feministisktinitiativ.se/downloads/grasrot/enastående.pdf.    
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epistemic authority by imposing this aspiration on real families.  This not only 
denies children agency, but also ignores something that is likely to be very 
important to them; the care they receive.  A presumption cannot, thus, be seen to be 
in children’s best interests.  
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8 CONCLUSION 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In previous chapters, it was argued that law’s autopoietic nature, its self-imposed 
inability to see the value of care, and its consequent patriarchal preoccupation with 
parenthood as power and authority, had caused the law regulating disputes between 
parents to develop in undesirable directions.  The chapters on Sweden confirmed 
common trends in legal discourse, such as law’s tendency to focus on how things 
ought to be rather than how they actually are in individual families. They also 
highlighted some differences between the two jurisdictions in general (such as 
Swedish family law’s greater ability to see parenting in terms of practical care), and 
between shared residence case law in particular (notably the absence in Sweden of 
political pressure to use shared residence to solve perceived problems unrelated to 
the allocation of a child’s time between parents).  These differences point against 
greater use of shared residence in England.   
 
This chapter asserts that the arguments made in support of a shared residence 
presumption have no foundation in fact.  Shared residence can in many cases help 
committed parents do the best for their children, but a presumption would not affect 
such cases, since parents are already free to choose to share residence.  The first two 
sections assert that court-ordered shared residence neither helps parents cooperate 
nor impacts positively on children.  The final section of this chapter, therefore, 
considers what a greater use of the shared residence order against resident parents’ 
wishes is likely to achieve: to reassert male authority over mother-headed families.   
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8.2 CAN SHARED RESIDENCE HELP PARENTS 
COOPERATE?  
 
8.2.1 Introduction  
 
Although a shared residence presumption appears to fit very well with the current 
emphasis on compromise, the settlement culture is in fact a strong reason against a 
presumption.  Family law’s preference for party-negotiated compromise over 
adjudication has been noted in the chapters on both jurisdictions.  “[T]he aspiration” 
is that the child should be “the only winner”.1   The reality is, however, that the 
search for the best solution for the child is often “subordinated to the new principle 
of non-intervention”.2  One mother interviewed for the NBHW study said:  “It felt 
like we could have made whatever decision we wanted, as long as we came to an 
agreement”.3   However, earlier chapters have shown that this is unlikely to be true.  
Law, as a closed and inherently patriarchal autopoietic system, has selected and 
manipulated external information so that the private family law of both jurisdictions 
is built on a strong assumption of on-going involvement by both parents.  Parents, 
psychic autopoietic systems, can be said, like law, to be cognitively open but 
normatively closed.  They admit new information (albeit reinterpreted through the 
filters of re-entry and redundancy) but rarely let this challenge their existing 
normative frameworks.4  Lectures from judges cannot prevent parents from 
repeatedly returning to the courts. Yet, does not lead law to abandon its expectation 
of obedience.  Instead, the focus has shifted from punishment to education, and all 
professionals are involved in the transmission of law’s normative messages to a 
degree where persuasion shades into coercion.  Parents who do not conform to the 
“norm of the responsible and collaborative parent” are labelled bad and selfish.5    
 
8.2.2 Parents’ Experiences  
 
                                                 
1  London Borough of Sutton v Davis [1994] 2 FLR 569 per Wilson J at pp570-571. 
2  Bainham, A (1990) “The Privatization of the Public Interest in Children”, 53(2) MLR, 206-217, p208. 
3  Socialstyrelsen (2004b) Växelvis Boende:  Att Bo Hos både Pappa och Mamma Fast De Inte Bor Tillsammans (2a 
upplagan), Stockholm, Socialstyrelsen, p27.  
4  Teubner, G (1993) Law as an Autopoietic System, London, Blackwell,, p65.   
5  Wallbank, J (2009) “Parental Responsibility and the Responsible Parent: Managing the ‘Problem’ of 
Contact” in Probert, R, Gilmore, S & Herring, J (Eds) Responsible Parents and Parental Responsibility, 
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 295-313, p311.  
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Shared residence not only seems to provide an ostensibly fair solution and an 
attractive way out of a stalemate; it is also said to be a useful framework to teach 
parents to cooperate and thus maintain the binuclear family.6   The current 
settlement culture makes more attractive the argument that shared residence could 
reduce the number of entrenched disputes that are placing the overstretched family 
court system under stress.7   
 
This thesis argues that the current focus on consensus and settlement is, if anything, 
a reason against a shared residence presumption.  English and Swedish parents are 
now given a great deal of encouragement to compromise by lawyers, social workers 
or mediators.   Yet, as autopoietic theory has been employed to explain, many 
parents involved in entrenched disputes reinterpret the welfare discourse to justify 
their decisions to continue litigation.8   Moreover, those parents who have still failed 
to agree, in the current climate, are likely either to have valid objections or such 
problems in cooperating that they should not be considered for shared residence.9  
Shared residence, according to parents who have chosen it, involves constant 
communication about school, sports, music lessons, friendship problems, and “the 
difficult task of getting a teenage son out of bed in the morning”.10   Even committed 
parents with excellent post-separation relationships admit that there have been times 
when their patience and cooperation skills have been stretched to the limit.11  Thus, 
mutual respect, frequent communication, flexibility and good cooperation are 
essential prerequisites.12  Where these are lacking, shared residence will either be 
abandoned or deteriorate to a point where direct communication stops and the 
arrangement becomes split, rather than shared.  Gähler, a Swedish researcher, has 
observed that there are reasons why parents separate and that consequently 
                                                 
6  Coe, T, Shared Parenting: The Right Starting Point? Equal Parenting Council website 
http://www.equalparenting.org/shared-parenting/index.php accessed 30th September 2007.   
7  Ibid.  
8  Wallbank (2009) op cit n5, pp310; Laing, K (2006) “Doing the Right Thing: Cohabiting Parents, Separation 
and Child Contact”, 20(2) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 169-179, p173; Kaganas, F & Day 
Sclater, S (2004) “Contact Disputes: Narrative Constructions of ‘Good’ Parents”, Feminist Legal Studies, 1-
27, p22. 
9  Freeman, M (2000) “Disputing Children” in Katz, S, Eekelaar, J & Maclean, M (Eds) Cross Currents: 
Family Law and Policy in the US and England, Oxford, OUP, 441-470, p460; NOU 1998:17 §12.4.1. 
10  Interview with Marre Ahlsén and Ulf Lindberg, shared residence parents, in Carling, M, “Flyttcirkus med 
barnen i fokus”, Svenska Dagbladet, 19th October 2005.   
11  Ibid.   
12  Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n3, p9.  
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“sometimes no detail is too trivial to prompt another argument”.13  NBHW 
personnel interviewed for his study told inter alia of angry telephone calls from 
parents who wanted to know who was to pay for the second pair of swimming 
trunks that were needed when their child started to share residence.14  In the NBHW 
Report sample of parents with court-ordered shared residence many reported that 
the order had had no effect on their poor cooperation.15  One mother commented:  
“The way it is now, this has dragged on and cost us money, but things are the same 
as they were before the court case: we can’t talk to each other”.16   
 
Within a year, half of the NBHW study families with court-ordered shared 
residence had abandoned the arrangement.  The researchers found that the persisting 
parents had had the better relationships prior to the order.17   In the second chapter, it 
was shown that the research evidence does not support the use of shared residence to 
improve co-parenting.  If anything, the frequent communication required is likely to 
exacerbate existing disputes; and the one result reliably confirmed by most studies is 
that exposure to parental conflict impacts negatively on children’s educational 
attainment and emotional well-being.  Furthermore, shared residence is less stable 
than other orders; a shared residence presumption is likely to prove 
counterproductive in actually increasing litigation.  
 
8.2.3 Law’s Response  
 
English family law has maintained epistemic authority over child welfare science by 
prioritising its normative expectations over empirical evidence from experts.  
According to Wall LJ in Re R [2009] the shared residence order “is a legal, not a 
psychiatric concept”; consequently decisions should be guided by the now 
“substantial jurisprudence” and judges are free to reject inconsistent psychiatric 
opinion, “however distinguished its source”.18   This is law’s response to interference 
from the political subsystem, where separated fatherhood is understood as a problem 
                                                 
13  Interview in Asker, A, “Allt fler barn flyttar varje vecka”, Svenska Dagbladet, 20th October 2005.   
14  Ibid.   
15  Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n3, p8.  
16  Ibid, p33.  
17  Ibid, p32.  
18  Re R [2009] EWCA Civ 358 at [30].   
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that requires a legal solution.19  Law “senses” this conflict in its social environment, 
understands it as dictated by its own cognitive framework (with law’s historic focus 
on the maintenance of social order through the distribution of rights), and responds 
to political expectations through normative legal communications addressed to 
parents: shared residence is now primarily about equal status.20 According to 
Teubner, the closure of autopoietic systems does not render the issue of power 
irrelevant.21  The extent to which one social subsystem can enslave another or, 
conversely, ignore interference from another system, depends on subsystems’ 
internal perceptions of other systems’ relative power and authority.22  Law 
constructs itself as less powerful than politics and more powerful than both child 
welfare science and individual parents.  The result is that shared residence has 
become law’s latest attempt to impose a binuclear post-separation family blueprint 
on reluctant litigants.  The ultimate aim is to restore the popularity of the nuclear 
family and halt demographic and attitudinal changes within the wider population.  
This overambitious use of the blunt tool of law is indubitably futile.  It is unlikely 
even to persuade individual parents to conform to the binuclear paradigm, due to 
parents’ resistance to this turbulence (explored in previous chapters in relation to 
law’s insistence on reasonableness).   
 
Swedish studies of custody and contact disputes have very usefully explored how 
law, first, ignored the multiple problems these families usually face and, secondly, 
reinterpreted serious conflicts of values into mere conflicts of interests.  Courts 
avoided adjudicating or investigating allegations by stereotypically describing both 
adults as capable and committed parents who ought to be able to meet in the middle.  
In consequence, resident parents and children complained of the wasted efforts, risks 
and disappointments caused by law’s failure to see how their actual families differed 
from its ideal.23  This shows how law, as an autopoietic system, is unable to make a 
sufficiently detailed and sensitive evaluation of individual cases to separate those 
                                                 
19  Collier, R & Sheldon, S (2008) Fragmenting Fatherhood: A Socio-Legal Study, Oxford, Hart Publishing, p141.  
20  Teubner (1993) op cit n4, p70.   
21  Ibid, p73.   
22  Ibid, p103.   
23  Rejmer, A (2003) Vårdnadstvister: En Rättssociologisk Studie av Tingsrätts Funktion vid Handläggning av 
Vårdnadskonflikter med Utgångspunkt från Barnets Bästa, Lund, Sweden, Lund Studies in the Sociology of 
Law, p106, p175; Ekbom, I & Landberg Å (2007) Innerst Inne var man Rädd, Stockholm, Rädda Barnen & 
Socialstyrelsen, p29. 
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families that can benefit from shared residence from those that will not.  It is, 
therefore, encouraging that Swedish courts are more cautious when ordering shared 
residence in contested cases.  Recent developments suggest that Swedish family law 
has taken note of the difficulties caused by the over-optimistic use of joint custody 
after the 1997 amendments which made it the preferred solution.24  According to 
Ryrstedt, formal orders can no longer be used to teach parents to cooperate.25  Shared 
residence is only ordered where cooperation is already particularly good.26   
 
English family law has yet to learn this lesson in relation to shared residence; and 
the combination of law’s normative closure and powerful pressure from the political 
subsystem to solve the perceived problem of paternal disengagement means this is 
likely to take a long time. The legal subsystem, founded on the pronouncement and 
enforcement of rules, cannot depart so far from its existing “programme” that it 
abdicates authority and admits an inability to solve these families’ problems.27  
“Compromise”, according to Wall LJ, “is an art that every separated parent ought to 
master”.28  The fifth chapter traced how, since D v D [2001], the initial suggestion 
that shared residence orders can be used as a remedy in high conflict cases has 
solidified into a certainty as successive cases have emphasised the symbolic granting 
of equal status and perceived consequent reduction of bitterness over the practical 
benefits to children.  The question of why exactly shared residence orders are being 
used in this way will be considered further in the third section of this chapter; at 
present it will only be observed that problems with contact are currently 
conceptualised as caused by uncooperative mothers (recreated through the semantic 
artefact of the implacably hostile resident parent) and that law is likely to attribute 
blame for failed shared residence arrangements the same way. 
 
In conclusion, a shared residence presumption would not be effective in reducing 
litigation, reducing conflicts or teaching separated couples how to parent together.  
Instead, as the next section asserts, it could be harmful to children.   
                                                 
24  Law, as an autopoietic system, is known to react to external interference; in this instance the cases where 
abused children was denied medical treatment by fathers who were also the suspected perpetrators caused 
media outrage and political responses which led to the appointment of an official enquiry, SOU 2007:52, 
pp12-13. 
25  Ryrstedt, E (2009b) “Samarbetssamtal” Svensk Juristtidning, 821-842, p822.   
26  RH2005:38.  
27  Teubner (1993) op cit n4, p59, p102.   
28  Re G [2008] EWCA Civ 1468 at [7]. 
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8.3 IS SHARED RESIDENCE THE BEST ARRANGEMENT 
FOR CHILDREN?  
 
8.3.1 Introduction  
 
The second chapter used autopoietic theory to explain why family law has developed 
its own, narrow understanding of the welfare test, also reconciling this with feminist 
assertions that law’s refusal to listen to more complex or nuanced languages is “part 
of its power”.29  This explanation is confirmed in later chapters’ analyses of both 
jurisdictions.  The supposedly broad and discretionary welfare tests provided in 
section 1 of the Children Act 1989 and FB62§a of the Parents Code are applied as 
exhaustive, hierarchical lists.  Law’s focus on the general and desirable, its concern 
not to discourage fathers, and its self-imposed blindness in relation to the private 
sphere, combine so that the assumed benefits of relationships with a father are 
generally held to outweigh any risks.30  There is also no recognition of how the child 
benefits from the care provided by the parent with residence, who is usually the 
mother.   
 
Presumptions have the general disadvantage of deterring courts from a full enquiry 
into the facts of the case, or alternatively to dismiss or trivialise evidence that could 
otherwise make it necessary for the court to consider a departure from the 
presumption.  Smart and Neale have observed that “finding a ‘good enough’ 
principle, law then applies it with all the sensitivity of a sledgehammer”.31  The 
chapters analysing the legal frameworks of both jurisdictions provided ample 
evidence to confirm this.  Law, as a closed subsystem, recreates external knowledge 
using its binary codes and its stereotypical semantic artefacts, including the generic 
child.  In particular, a cautionary tale is provided by the judicial development of an 
English pro-contact presumption, now recognised to have gone too far, and to have 
                                                 
29  Finley, L (1989) “Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: the Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal 
Reasoning” Notre Dame Law Review, 886, p892.  
30 The overviews of case law showed that courts in both jurisdictions have become more willing to reach a 
different conclusion in cases where there is evidence of domestic violence, but it was also noted that the 
creation of these narrow exceptions has served to strengthen, rather than undermine, the general rules in 
favour of fathers’ applications, Smart, C & Neale, B (1999) Family Fragments?, Cambridge, Polity Press, 
p180; Proposition 2005/06:99, pp42-43. 
31 Smart & Neale (1999) op cit n31, p180.   
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exposed children to neglect and domestic violence.  Kaganas and Piper have warned 
that the same mistakes could be repeated with a shared residence presumption.32 
 
8.3.2 Shared residence only suits some parents...  
 
The fifth chapter revealed that shared residence is increasingly seen as best for 
children, since it most closely resembles the nuclear family.  It can be disputed 
whether nuclear families are the optimum environment in which to raise children; 
but even if that is accepted, it is far from clear that shared residence is the best post-
separation alternative.  The second chapter showed that available research evidence 
on shared residence is equivocal:  as the NBHW report concluded “[s]hared 
residence is neither good nor bad; it becomes what the parents make it”.33   
 
The third chapter showed that early research samples made up exclusively of shared 
residence enthusiasts cannot be used to advocate court-ordered shared residence; 
these adults’ excellent co-parenting is more likely to have been the cause of the 
decision to share than an effect of the arrangement.  Recent, more sophisticated, 
studies suggest that whether shared residence benefits children will depend on a 
number of variables; the most important are probably the parents’ commitment and 
the children’s individual characteristics.   Smaller studies from England and Sweden 
have suggested that for shared residence to benefit children, it has to be based upon 
“a flexible and respectful partnership”.34  Where parents had managed this, 
interviewed young people were for the most part positive. They felt the 
arrangements were for their benefit; good relationships outweighed practical 
inconveniences, and transitions were bearable since they were not burdened by 
“conflicting loyalties and a sense of guilt”.35     
 
One mother interviewed for the NBHW Report observed that shared residence 
required “a lot of give and take”; parents must contain their own conflicts and 
                                                 
32  Kaganas, F & Piper, C (2002) “Shared Parenting – a 70% Solution?” 14(4) CFLQ, 365-379, p372. 
33 Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n3, p44.  
34  Smart, C (2004) “Equal Shares: Rights for Fathers or Recognition for Children?”, 24(4) Critical Social 
Policy, 484-503, p500.  
35  Ibid, p490.  
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develop new, post-separation ways to negotiate.36  They are required to make 
considerable material sacrifices, and often find the frequent changes as emotionally 
demanding as their children do.37  In addition, they must also be sensitive to 
children’s changing needs and the things that the latter find difficult to say, because 
of fear of hurting either parent’s feelings.38  These requirements are not easily 
metarents who are both willing and able to make these kinds of efforts for their 
children’s sakes are likely to be a small, exceptional group.  Whilst their 
achievements should be admired, it is not reasonable to expect that they can be 
emulated by all.  Home schooling is a good idea, but very few parents have the 
knowledge, financial and emotional resources needed to successfully educate their 
own children; the same appears to apply to shared residence.  Consequently, the 
NBHW report was correct in doubting whether the necessary preconditions exist in 
cases where the parents have been unable to compromise.39  Moreover, Rejmer’s 
research on custody disputes, confirmed by Ekbom and Landberg in relation to 
supervised contact, showed a dangerous gap between family law’s abstract norms 
based on ordinary, responsible parents and the families they interviewed as part of 
their research into contested cases, who were struggling with addiction, physical or 
mental ill health, unemployment, social exclusion and other difficulties.40  The fact 
that law is unable to see these problems is particularly worrying since research 
suggests that the demands of shared residence make it more difficult for children, as 
well as adults, to cope with multiple stresses.41  Greater use of the order against one 
parent’s wishes is likely to place vulnerable individuals under unnecessary strain, yet 
the autopoietic nature of the legal subsystems means this may not register in legal 
communications, as law can only interact directly with its own semantic artefacts.  
s.  One Swedish mother argued, based on her own experiences, that it must be better 
for children “to have one well-adjusted everyday parent and one contented weekend 
parent” than to be “caught in a dysfunctional alternating arrangement where neither 
                                                 
36  Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n3, p24; Smart (2004) op cit n35, p487.  
37  Interview with Marre Ahlsén and Ulf Lindberg, shared residence parents, in Carling, M, “Flyttcirkus med 
barnen i fokus”, Svenska Dagbladet, 19th October 2005.   
38  Smart (2004) op cit n35, p489; Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n3, p8, p29.  
39  Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n3, p36.  
40  Rejmer (2003) op cit n24, pp78-79, p342; Ekbom & Landberg (2007) op cit n24, p29. 
41  Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n3, p35.  
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adult is able to parent properly”.42 A legal system, which was able to recognise the 
real value of care, and of caring for children, would reach a similar conclusion; but it 
would be unrealistic to expect law to change suddenly and dramatically.  Autopoietic 
systems are self-reproductive, and as such can “define the limits of their tolerance to 
structural change”.43  Changes that are viewed as threatening internal identity and 
autonomy will be resisted.  Furthermore, new legal communications can only be 
built from existing concepts; radical departures from existing modus operandi are not 
possible. Autopoiesis “defines the boundaries of every evolutionary change”.44   
Systems do evolve, albeit in erratic patterns, and it would, according to Teubner, “be 
misleading to exclude the environment from evolutionary processes”.45  Attempts to 
improve law’s recognition of care can be made, but must be slow and incremental.  
Thus, it is better to restrict shared residence to families where neither adult objects.  
Although this may mean that some parents raise selfish vetoes, it is nevertheless the 
best way to ensure that children are not harmed by being caught in the middle of 
acrimonious, inflexible shared residence arrangements.    
 
8.3.3 ... and Some Children  
 
This thesis asserts that, as law is unable to communicate directly with children, 
restricting shared residence to families where both adults have freely agreed to it is 
the best way to ensure that this demanding arrangement is not imposed against 
individual children’s stated wishes or in circumstances where they cannot cope with 
it.  The chapters on England and Sweden observed that despite increased recognition 
in legislation and travaux préparatoires of the need to take children’s views into 
account, in practice the legal autopoietic subsystem continues to recreate children as 
stereotyped semantic artefacts assigned the needs of a generic child of their own age.  
Children’s opinions are judged mature enough to be included where they fit the 
dominant welfare rhetoric but are otherwise disregarded.  In relation to shared 
residence, it is known that children’s personalities and individual resources have a 
significant impact; studies have also emphasised the need to consult children.  
                                                 
42  Letters page, Svenska Dagbladet, 6th November 2005.  Some support for this statement is provided by the 
research by Smart et al, who found that parents in more traditional arrangements reported less conflicts 
and higher levels of satisfaction, Smart & Neale (1999) op cit n31, p59, p63 
43  Teubner (1993) op cit n4, p56.   
44  Ibid, p55.   
45  Ibid, p61.   
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Where young people have had negative experiences of shared residence, they 
commonly complain about feeling constricted and unable to influence rigid 
schedules.46  In Sweden, the conceptualisation of shared residence as providing 
parents with welcome child-free weeks has been identified as a cause for concern and 
a source of dissatisfaction for the affected children.47  A Swedish newspaper’s letters 
page devoted to shared residence provided several examples. One satisfied former 
couple explained how they had rescheduled their hand-over to midweek as it had 
previously proved too demanding to have a full week working overtime to catch up 
after a week spent with the children: a purely adult-focused decision with no 
mention of consultation.48   Three parents justified shared residence in terms of 
needing time for new relationships.49  Interviews with children suggest that whether 
parents insist on child-free time, or demand more time to achieve justice inter pares, 
the feeling of being little more than another possession cancels out the supposed 
positive benefits of shared residence in terms of close and natural contact.50   
 
The Swedish examples show that there are some families where both parents make 
selfish choices.  One benefit of the autopoietic perspective is a more realistic 
understanding of what can actually be achieved through legal regulation and these 
parents are beyond the reach of the family courts.  However, denying the order 
where one parent objects should significantly reduce the number of cases where the 
arrangement is chosen solely to suit adults.  The research suggests that those who 
agree to share residence have good social and childrearing skills, and are 
consequently less likely to ignore children’s objections.   This argument can be 
supported with Ryrstedt’s recent research on cooperation talks, which found that 
parents in high conflict disputes were less able to consider their children’s needs and 
wishes and more likely to focus on their own.51  Relationships can sometimes be 
                                                 
46  This could be because parents wanted “child-free time” to develop their own relationships, or because there 
were several sets of children involved in the arrangement, or where a parent would demand their “fair 
share” of the child’s time,  Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n3, p29; Smart (2004) op cit n35, p500.  
47  Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n3, p11; Familjerättsjurist, Letters page, Svenska Dagbladet, 6th November 2005.  
Interview with Sofia, aged 19 and still in a shared residence arrangement, in Asker, A “Stressigt att 
ständigt flytta mellan två hem” Svenska Dagbladet, 24th October 2005 
48  Letters page, Svenska Dagbladet, 6th November 2005.   
49  Ibid.   
50  Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n3, p29; Smart (2004) op cit n35, p486; Interview with Sofia, aged 19 and still in 
a shared residence arrangement, in Asker, A “Stressigt att ständigt flytta mellan två hem” Svenska 
Dagbladet, 24th October 2005.   
51  Ryrstedt (2009b) op cit n26, p831.   
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reversed, so that children feel responsible for maintaining the binuclear family 
relationships.52  In Re R [2003] the 11-year-old boy had suggested that he could 
alternate between his parents on a daily basis; touching but also disconcerting 
evidence of his desire to end the conflict by being fair to both parents.53  His 
impractical proposal was rejected, but in other reported cases it is noted in support of 
shared residence that children are in favour, with little consideration of their 
reasons.  The children in A v A [2004] had for years been caught in a “virtual state of 
war” and were probably desperate to try anything that could stop their parents from 
fighting; this is not the same as actively choosing shared residence.54    
 
In conclusion, research has found that children pay a high price “in order to have 
equal access to both parents” and moreover that while those who grew up in child-
focused shared residence arrangements generally described this as a price worth 
paying, others often reported that the price had been too high.55  An understanding 
of law’s autopoietic nature and consequent inability to distinguish between these 
two types of families leads to the conclusion that it is better to let parents choose 
whether to share residence.    
 
8.4 WHAT WOULD A PRESUMPTION DO?  
 
8.4.1 Introduction 
 
The argument that shared residence can help parents learn to cooperate and thus 
benefit children by reducing conflict, is not only contradicted the autopoietic 
perspective as well as by research findings, but also seems completely contrary to 
common sense.  Where two people are struggling to get along, whether at work, in 
student halls of residence or in a classroom, the recommended solution is usually to 
separate them, rather than bring them into closer and more frequent contact.  Thus, 
the suspicion arises that in the context of shared residence orders this reasoning may 
                                                 
52  Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n3, pp29-30; Ekbom & Landberg (2007) op cit n24, p28.  
53  Re R [2003] EWCA Civ 597 per Wilson J at [16]. 
54  A v A [2004] EWHC 142.  
55  Singer, A (2008) “Active Parenting or Solomon’s Justice?  Alternating Residence in Sweden for Children 
with Separated Parents”, 4(2) Utrecht Law Review, 35-47, p41; Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n3, p42; Neale, B, 
Flowerdew, J & Smart, C (2003) “Drifting Towards Shared Residence?”, Family Law, 904-908, p906.  
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be mere obfuscation.  These supposed benefits serve to conceal law’s real objectives: 
to reinforce links between fathers and children; to make separated families resemble 
the nuclear ideal as far as possible; and to diffuse tension created by social and 
demographic change.    
 
In the second chapter, feminists’ observations that law thinks and communicates in 
a particularly male way were used to confirm that law, as an autopoietic system, has 
an inherently patriarchal normative framework, retained since its initial separation 
through increased specialisation.  One important consequence of this is the 
public/private dichotomy, which leaves mothers complaining of law’s inability to 
recognise their efforts in caring for children.56   In England, symbolic messages about 
the immutability of fatherhood are made through parental responsibility orders, and 
are given practical effect through contact orders granted to all but the most 
unsuitable, violent fathers.  In Sweden, the joint custody order has undergone a 
gradual transformation from a practical obligation to care for children to a right to be 
consulted on major decisions, while the case law on contact mirrors English 
developments.  There are, however, notable differences in the two jurisdictions’ 
courts’ use of shared residence orders.    
 
8.4.2 Shared Residence and Law’s Gendered Parenting Norms  
 
In the preceding chapters on both England and Sweden it was observed that while 
traditional, cultural understandings of motherhood and fatherhood continue to shape 
both individuals’ and law’s expectations of parenting, there are also differences 
between the two countries.  In Sweden, interference from the political system may 
not have been wholly successful in eradicating cultural, gendered understandings of 
parenthood or steering law away from its traditional patriarchal understanding of 
families; but English family law has, if anything, been encouraged by interference 
from political discourse to retain the conjugal nuclear family as its normative 
standard.  Where the social engineers of the Swedish welfare state deliberately 
sought to break down the public/private boundary, the continuing influence of 
classical liberal theory has meant that the English family is still seen as beyond the 
                                                 
56  Laing (2006) op cit n8, p173; Kaganas & Day Sclater (2004) op cit n8, p16.  
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ambit of legal intervention (at least until it is judged dysfunctional).  In Sweden, the 
transition to dual-earner households saw care partly repositioned in the public 
sphere; in England, care remains predominantly a matter of private responsibility.  
In Sweden, divorce, cohabitation and single motherhood have all become so 
common that they have been normalised and debate on fatherhood focuses on 
removing structural obstacles and encouraging hands-on involvement.  In contrast, 
the British welfare state was originally constructed on the breadwinner model, thus 
reinforcing the primacy of the conjugal family and rendering single motherhood 
both more visible and more problematic.  Whilst recent reforms may be seen as 
signalling a move towards a dual earner norm, they constitute a modification, rather 
than abandonment, of the breadwinner model.  A recurring theme of debate is “the 
ills that fall on society because of inadequacies of parents”.57   Although parenthood 
has now replaced marriage as the primary legal status relationship; “[p]arenthood 
remains the very sphere where official discourse places the most value on 
marriage”.58   The decreasing popularity of marriage and greater fluidity of modern 
familial relationships is likely to have been constructed as problematic within law 
even without recent interference from the political subsystem problematising law’s 
treatment of separated fathers.  However, the latter has had a significant role to play 
in the latest reinterpretation of the shared residence order to fulfil the new function 
of reassuring fathers of their equal status.   
 
Those who argue for greater use of shared residence draw links between father 
absence and perceived social disintegration; it is claimed that a shared residence 
presumption could improve gender equality, help fathers become more hands-on, 
and thus strengthen family relationships.59   There is an element of truth in this 
argument, but, like the linking of shared residence with parental cooperation, it 
reverses the causal relationship.  Shared residence is more prevalent in Sweden 
because, even where internal critique is taken into account, the preconditions for the 
successful sharing of parenting are better in Sweden.  Post-separation parenting 
                                                 
57  Gilmore, S, Herring, J & Probert, R (2009) “Introduction” in Probert, R, Gilmore, S & Herring, J (Eds) 
Responsible Parents and Parental Responsibility, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1-20, p1.  
58  Barlow, A, Duncan, S James, G & Park, A (2001) “Just a Piece of Paper? Marriage and Cohabitation” in 
Park, A, Curtice, J, Jarvis, L, Thomson, K & Bromley, C (Eds) British Social Attitudes: The 18th Report, 
London, Sage Publications, 29-47, p38.  
59  Geldof, B, “You Sit Outside and Wait and Sob”, The Times, 5th December 2003.  
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skills need to be developed in intact families and Swedish fathers are more involved 
than their English counterparts.  This also explains why shared residence is still 
understood as an order regulating practicalities.  It is too late to expect fathers to 
suddenly become expert parents at a time which is marred by emotional and 
practical upheaval; a time when they have also lost the person who has previously 
mediated interaction with the children.  Fathers may choose to do substantially less.  
Wallbank has observed that it is, in practice, impossible for the law to regulate the 
quantity or quality of contact in the vast majority of cases.60  The same is true of 
shared residence orders.  However, English law does not seem unduly concerned by 
this; either because it gives no real thought to care, or because it is not interested in 
redistributing the burdens of caring.  Courts apply the shared residence label where 
the second parent has the child for alternate weekends and holidays, and it is not 
uncommon to see a shared residence order coupled with an order for contact.  
Consistent with the more traditional, patriarchal construction of fatherhood which 
is part of the system’s existing normative framework, the granting of equal status 
has become as important as the allocation of time, and benefits to children are often 
discussed in terms of the order’s symbolic messages.   
 
This means that if Swedish mothers, with their better starting point, complain that 
shared residence leads to inequity, this should be a warning against greater use of the 
order in this jurisdiction.  The analysis of Swedish law did indeed find a gap 
between rhetoric and reality.  According to one mother with shared residence, she is 
far from the only woman who buys all clothes, arranges birthday parties, keeps track 
of important dates, “generally holds everyday life together”, and spends far more 
time with her children despite the fact that, on paper, everything is shared equally: 
“more mothers than you can imagine pack a suitcase of clean clothes one weekend 
only to be sent back a case full of dirty washing the next.”61  As in England, the law 
still implicitly expects mothers to prioritise their caring responsibilities, and 
compensate for fathers’ shortcomings, while these gendered assumptions are 
obscured by the gender-neutral legislation.  Interviews with parents show that to 
change the allocation of responsibilities in the transition from intact to post-
                                                 
60  Wallbank (2009) op cit n5, p307.  
61  Kajsa, Letters page, Svenska Dagbladet, 6th November 2005.   
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separation family “requires a deliberate and concerted effort”.62  Restricting shared 
residence to families where the parents are able to agree is the best way to ensure 
that this effort is made. This is particularly important in England, where recent 
reforms have been criticised for the focus on rights attribution and equality where  
empirical work has shown that women continue to “bear the brunt, in responsibility 
terms, of the confluence of women’s and men’s lives”.63  Although the law 
increasingly expects fathers to be hands-on, it is also still openly concerned with 
those aspects of fathering that are seen as vital in a patriarchal system: provision, 
discipline and authority.   
 
8.4.3 Shared Residence as Power  
 
In both Sweden and England, complaints have been made that the apparent logic of 
equal division is allowed to overshadow the welfare enquiry as children’s right to see 
both parents becomes confused with the parents’ perceived right to equal time.64  In 
England, Fathers’ groups use court statistics and simplistic formal equality 
arguments to portray fathers as victims of discrimination, and a 50/50 presumption 
as the way to redress this.  They combine rights and welfare rhetoric by claiming to 
support “the rights of children to have both their parents fully involved in their 
lives”.65    Yet, an analysis of the arguments made by UK fathers’ groups reveals a 
clear preoccupation with parental rights; both the Equal Parenting Council (EPC) 
and Families Need Fathers (FNF) see 50/50 as a “starting point” for negotiations and 
offer two-pronged definitions of shared parenting where time spent with the child 
and legal status are given equal prominence.66  Hunt et al have criticised the recent 
FNF guidance on shared parenting for its almost exclusive focus on adult 
entitlements.67  Reece has recently observed that the “watering down” of PR has led 
to an increased demand for shared residence orders as a way for men to gain equal 
                                                 
62  Ibid.  See also Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n3, p24.  
63  Wallbank (2009) op cit n5, p300.  
64  Smart (2004) op cit n35, p490; Socialstyrelsen (2004b) op cit n3, p11; Letter from a family lawyer 
(Familjerättsjurist), Letters page, Svenska Dagbladet, 6th November 2005.  
65  Press Release: Society is Still Failing our Children”, http://fnf.org.uk.uk3.clientproof.co.uk/news-
events/press-releases/2006-archive/060614  accessed on 30th September 2007.   
66  Coe, T, Shared Parenting: The Right Starting Point? Equal Parenting Council website 
http://www.equalparenting.org/shared-parenting/index.php accessed 30th September 2007; Families Need 
Fathers’ Policy Paper on Shared Residence. http://fnf.org.uk.uk3.clientproof.co.uk/law-policy/shared-
residence.  Accessed 30th September 2007 
67  Hunt, J, Masson, J & Trinder, L (2009) “Shared Parenting: the Law, the Evidence and Guidance from 
Families Need Fathers”, Family Law, 831-836, p834.  
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authority; and these arguments have been amplified through repetition within the 
political subsystem, as discussed above.68  Fineman has persuasively asserted that 
“[f]or this group of equality advocates, the real goal is restoration of historic 
inequality”.69   The chapters on England and Sweden found ample evidence of 
abusive fathers using the strong contact and joint legal custody presumptions to 
assert power over their former partners.  There has been a welcome recognition in 
recent Swedish case law that shared residence requires more parental interaction and 
should be avoided where fathers have previously shown themselves to be 
domineering or aggressive.  In contrast, the English judiciary fallaciously assume 
that shared residence can provide a solution for such problem families (or 
alternatively, ensure that mothers do not exclude difficult fathers).70  It is becoming 
increasingly difficult to disagree. The combination of the paramountcy principle, 
where shared residence is seen as better for children, and the post-liberal insistence 
on reasonable, conciliatory behaviour, mean that mothers will be labelled selfish and 
obstructive if they try to oppose shared residence on the grounds that fathers are not 
contributing their fair share and that shared residence is consequently simply not 
worth the effort they are asked to put in.  Research has also worryingly shown that 
children’s objections to the dominant binuclear paradigm are often dismissed as the 
results of maternal manipulation.71   Finally, Smart found that the ostensibly 
irrefutable logic behind equal division meant that many young people who were 
deeply unhappy with alternating between their parents’ homes felt it impossible to 
challenge the arrangement, once implemented.72      
 
8.5 CONCLUSION  
 
In conclusion, the difficulties of communication across autopoietic systems 
boundaries mean that if shared residence is ordered against parents’ wishes it is 
unlikely to reduce litigation, improve relationships, or reduce children’s exposure to 
                                                 
68  Reece, H (2009) “The Degradation of Parental Responsibility” in Probert, R, Gilmore, S & Herring, J 
(Eds) Responsible Parents and Parental Responsibility, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 85-102, p95.  
69  Fineman, M (2001) “Fatherhood, Feminism and Family Law”, 32(4) McGeorge Law Review, 1031-1049, p1035. 
70  Re W [2009] EWCA Civ 370 per Wilson LJ at [15]. 
71  Barnett, A (2009b) “The Welfare of the Child Re-Visited: In Whose Best Interests? Part II”, Family Law, 
135-141, p139.  
72  Smart (2004) op cit n35, p491.  
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conflict.  It may, in fact, have the opposite effect.  There is no empirical evidence to 
support the assertion that shared residence is better for children; the success of the 
order depends on factors law is unable either to control or detect such as parents’ 
dedication, and on whether the benefits it offers individual children can outweigh 
the considerable practical and emotional sacrifices.  Thirdly, the fact that shared 
residence is increasingly understood within law’s chains of communications in 
terms of equal authority rather than practical sharing means a presumption would 
operate as an obfuscatory device to enable the continuation of patriarchal power 
structures across binuclear families.   
 
This thesis argues against the development of a shared residence presumption; the 
search for alternative solutions lies beyond its scope.  The autopoietic perspective 
also cautions against attempts at wholesale reform.  It is recognised, for example, 
that to create discursive space within law for ethic of care based arguments would be 
desirable, but would at present require dramatic change and is thus too ambitious a 
goal.73  The Swedish law shows, however, law’s ability to recognise caring can be 
improved.  In English contemporary family law this could be achieved by stipulating 
that post-separation orders should, as far as possible, resemble the arrangements of 
the intact family.74  This would meet the child’s need for stability and continuity, 
and would preserve those parent-child relationships that have developed to such a 
degree that children are likely to benefit from them.  Moreover, it assures that time 
is spent predominantly with an adult who has greater experience and is thus likely 
to be better able to anticipate the child’s future needs.75  It is acknowledged that 
many separating parents will give different accounts; but findings of fact could be 
made by courts aided by Cafcass reporters.  Law, as a subsystem, is already using 
this as a way to create knowledge, and minor modifications to the system along 
these lines should, therefore, not meet too much resistance.  This author would like 
to see parents asked questions like: “Is your child afraid of the dark? Does he eat fish 
fingers?  Who are her teachers and what are her favourite bands?”; questions that are 
                                                 
73  Fineman, M (1993) “Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American Law and Society”, Utah 
Law Review, 387-405, p398. 
74  Bartlett, K (1999) “Child Custody in the 21st Century”, 35(3) Willamette Law Review, 467-482, pp476-477. 
75  Ibid; Scott, E (1992) “Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody”, 80 California Law Review, 615-672, 
pp629-630; Singer, J & Reynolds, W (1988) “A Dissent on Joint Custody”, 47(2) Maryland Law Review, 497-
523, p522. 
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designed to explore real involvement in the day-to-day care for the child rather than 
mere caring about.  Such a presumption could avoid imposing any idealized norm on 
all families and could, if behaviour during relationships is at all influenced by the 
legal rules of thumb employed at separation, provide breadwinners with a clear 
incentive to increase the time spent in meaningful interaction with their children.76   
It is acknowledged that there will be some children, who could potentially benefit 
from sharing residence, but whose intransigent parents (predominantly mothers) 
will selfishly refuse to agree.   The available evidence suggests, however, that it is 
better for such children to have their need for a relationship with the unimpeachable 
parent met through contact, than to be caught in the middle of an inflexible 
arrangement or drawn into parents’ conflicts.  
 
The Swedish experience shows that shared residence is a demanding order, which 
must be used carefully.  It should be restricted to families where both parents so 
desire to remain highly involved in their children’s lives that they are willing to put 
up with continued close association with a person they no longer wanted in their 
lives.  It is an extraordinary arrangement, which should be reserved for 
extraordinary families.   
                                                 
76  Bartlett (1999) op cit n72, pp479-481. 
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10 APPENDIX 
The Swedish Law 
 
 
 
The Courts 
 
Swedish courts are separated into administrative and general courts, and the latter 
are organised into the three tiers of approximately 60 district courts (tingsrätter), 
six appeal courts (hovrätter) and the Supreme Court (Högsta Domstolen).1  The 
general courts hear both civil and criminal cases.  There are, moreover, no 
specialised family courts; cases are heard by three lay and one professional judge, 
all of whom rely on reports and recommendations from social workers known as 
social welfare investigators (familjerättssekreterare).  Parents can also reach legally 
recognised agreements through cooperation talks provided by local social services 
departments.   
 
Statute and Case Law  
 
The Swedish legal system is, like many continental counterparts, dependent 
primarily on statute, rather than case law.  The main statutes are the codes 
(balker), which were first introduced in 1734.2  Disputes between parents over 
children are regulated by the Parents Code (föräldrabalken or FB), which was 
enacted in its current form in 1949, and has since been frequently amended.   The 
codes are cited by the abbreviated name, chapter and section (marked by §): FB6§2.  
Newer pieces of legislation (lagar) are often enacted separate from the main codes, 
and are identified by the name of the act, the year, and a consecutive number: Lag 
om Registrerat Partnerskap (1994:1117).   
 
Case Law 
 
Case law is markedly less important than in England; as noted in the introduction, 
appellate judgments are brief and focus exclusively on statutory interpretation.  
                                                 
1  http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/sweden.htm. 
2  Ibid. 
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Case reports, too, are brief, with few facts and no more than a summary of what 
has been decided.  Reports of cases from the Supreme Court have since 1874 been 
published in a series similar to the English law reports (Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv or 
NJA).  Cases are not cited by parties’ names, but instead by the initials of the 
report followed by the year and the page of the publication (abbreviated as s. for 
sida): NJA2008 s.34.  The Supreme Administrative Court produces a year book 
(Regeringsrättens Årsbok, RÅ), while brief, anonymised reports of significant appeal 
court decisions are published in a further collection (Rättsfall från hovrätterna or 
RÅ).  Cases are, again, cited by the reports’ initials, followed by the year and the 
number assigned to this case: RH 1999:12.  Reports of cases from the lower courts 
are sometimes, but not as a general rule, available on internet databases.  These 
cases have been cited by stating the court, the court’s internal reference numbers, 
where available, and the date: Sundsvalls Tingsrätt, Case No T2862-08, 9th July 
2009.   
 
 
Travaux Préparatoires  
 
Commissions of inquiry are appointed by the government each time a proposal for 
new legislation is under consideration.  Commissions are appointed ad hoc and 
frequently include experts in the relevant field as well as legal professionals; their 
terms of reference are set by the government.   Commissions’ findings, comments 
and proposals are published as Swedish Government Official Reports (Statens 
Offentliga Utredningar - SOU), except where the inquiry is carried out by a 
government ministry, when the report is published in the Ministry Publications 
Series (Departementsskrivelser - Ds).3  These publications are cited by using the 
relevant abbreviation, the year or publication, and the number allocated to this 
particular report: SOU 2007:52, p23 or Ds 1999:57, p45.  The subsequent proposal for 
new legislation is known as a government bill (proposition); these, too, are cited by 
year and number.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3  Swedish Parliament Website: http://www.riksdagen.se/templates/R_Page____7053.aspx. 
